JUTLAND.

Taranaki Daily News, 20 December 1920, Page 5

JUTLAND.

SECRETS OF THE BATTLE.

SURPRISES OF THE ENEMY,

"VICTORY NOT COMPLETE." By TelejTaph.—Prus Assn.—Copyright. London, Dec. 17. The Jutland official dispatches, with appendices, have been issued to-day. They coi sist of a volume of six hundred pages, with numerous maps, charts and diagrams. The reports are most numerous comj rising one from every ship

enga?»d. Lotd Jellicoe,. in a covering letter, dated "Iron Duke, June 8, 1910," directs attention to a number of lessons to be drawn from the battle. He says that when the Admiralty ordered the arand Fleet at Scapa Flow to proceed to sea an May 30 he ordered Admiral Beatty, whose ships were at Rosyth, to be at a certain spot in the North Sea at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of May 31, giving alto his own probable position at that hour. If Admiral Beatty had no news at 2 o'clock he waa to stand towards- Lord .Tellicoe.

Admiral Jellicoe says he had no anxiety about' Admiral Beatty's advanced position, owing to the gunpower and speed of Admiral Beatty's ships, but the German third squadron displayed unexpected speed. Though nominally the British battle-cruUers could do 25 knots and the Germans only 20% knots, the former were unable to increase their distance from the Germans.

EFFICIENCY OF THE GERMANS. This came to us as an unpleasant surprise, and will considerable affect future operations. It is quite evident that the German ships were much faster than their nominal speed. Admiral Beatty adopted the correct and only possible course in keeping between the- enemy and his base and keeping in touch with the enemy. He had great superiority in gun-power.

The loss of the Qneen Mary and Indefatigable waa unpalatably due partly to the indifferent armour of the British battle-cruisers and the disadvantage as regards light, but the German gunnery was of a very high standard. It falls off when they are hit, but even then it is very accurate. The German organisation at night time was very good and their recognition of signals' excellent, whereas oure was practically nil. We have a good deal to learn from them.

The German tactics were as anticipated. The enemy's turning away movement under cover of destroyer's tactics is difficult to counter. It hit been closely studied, but there is no real counter except ample time and superior speed.

PERILS OF NAVAL ACTION. fhus a fight to a finish is almost impossible unless began early, in the day It would be rendered even more difficult by minefields and submarines. A feature of the action was the number of torpedoes which crossed the British line. Only one ship was hit. It is supremely important not to let the enemy know that the torpedoes' tracks are visible because it would not he beyond Cerman ingenuity to prevent a track being left. Certain lessons were learnt as regards dispositions and tactics.

Interesting sections are devoted ' to many thousands of message* and signals between the ships before, during, and after the. battle. These show thai the Admiralty received news on May 30 indicating early activity of the German fleet and instructed Admirals .Tellicoe and Beatty to concentrate eastward of Long Fort ready for nvontualities.—Au».-N.Z. Cable Asm.