GUILT OF THE EX-KAISER.

Taranaki Daily News, 13 November 1920, Page 9 (Supplement)

GUILT OF THE EX-KAISER.

SOME INTERESTING REVELATIONS. | EVENTS BEFORE FINAL RUi'T'UEE. ' PRODDING UP "THE AUSTRIAN'S. ; The most sensible tliinj; that the ! German Republican Government have ■ done since the Armistice was to publish : last winter the documents, from the: Foreign Ollice, showing how the Emporer and his advisers bvoupht on the ; war. These documents were collected and arranged in the form of a narrative by Ilerr Kautsky, the veteran Socialist, : whose honesty is now attested by the fact that he is equally disliked by the Majority Socialists and by the I'.olslicviks. He bewail the work soon after the revolution, when lie. was one of the Independent Socialist members of the ■ Coalition Alinistry. and lie continued it ' after he and his Independent colleagues had resigned ottiee. If the German Gov- ' eminent had published the book while i the Peace Treaty was being drafted. I they would have done something to ' shake the widespread belief that the i new Republicans were but old Monarch- : i'ls writ lar;;e. Instead of that they ; were foolish enough to issue a While ; Paper in which ;-ami> professors tried . once more to justify the war. How- ' ever, it must be counted to the German '■ Government for righteousness that thev ■

did publish these ierrihle revelations of tlie Emperors <iu' : . in November last. ' The Knjrlish trnr Virion of Herr Kaulsky's work, whi'-'i has now appeared, j will unquestionably cause readers to; wonder whether ?nany Germans were not. n.i'lcr all, cleee'veil as completely a~ the Allien by the Gorman Emperor and hi- llinwter'j. Tim fabric of lies which ; they built 1111 in order to support tlieir l n.V'i'wcnt that r >oor innocent Germany ■ v.:i forced into war by Russia, Franc 1 .: i'vr. Great P.vi!;i!n was so elaborate ami ; InVninus that it miodit well hnV' im- ; po-ed upon a lev. credulous folk than . the Germans. Herr Kautsky maintains ■ that the Imperial Ministers thought far j more of presenting a plausible ease to ; tlieir own countrymen than of deceivimj the outer world, and he gives it as hi' : personal opinion that the Socialists ; timorous though they were, would have opposed the' war at the outset if they had known the whole truth about the German Government's active encouragement of the bellicose Austrian 0 and the Kmperor's direct responsibilitv for the disaster. From the historical standpoint, Her" Ka.ntsky's book is of (lie first importance. Among the mai*r confidential , papers which he prints, the most curb ■ on-; are the dispatches received and ;

ANNOTATED BY THE EMPEROR with his own hand. They remove all doubt as to his guilt, though they strengthen the belief that his egoism amounted almost to insanity. As early as duly 4. IM4—mx days' after the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, and before Austria had made any proposals in regard to Serbia—the German Emperor had recorded his opinion in favour of drastic measures. The German Ambassador at Vienna had reported on June W, 1014, (hat he had warned his friends "against taking over-hasty steps." The,' Emperor's marginal note on this was: "\Viio gave . him any authority to do (liar? That is very stupid! Mo affair of his, since it is purely Austria's affair what she thinks fit to do in this matter. Afterward 1 ; they will say, if things go wrong, 'Germany would not let us.' Tsehirschky must kindly avoid this nonsense. Serbia must be settled with, and that soon.\V." The next day, July 5, the German Emperor received the Austrian Ambassador at breakfast at Potsdam. The Ambassador presented a personal letter from the Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph, saying that: '"lt must be the future task of my Government to bring about the isolation and diminution of Serbia." The German Emperor welcomed the proposal as confirming his own view and. far from dissuading Austria from war. set himself to convince the Ansfrians (hat they could not strike too soon and should "seize the present favourable moment." He (old the Ambassador: "Russia will, in any case, take up a hostile altitude, but he had for years been prciiarcd for this; and should it come to f war between Aus-tria-Hungary and Russia, we might, be assured that Germany would, with her usual fidelity, bo found at our side. Moreover, as matlers now stood. Russia is by no means prepared for war. and will think long before appealing to arms."

"When the Emperor had dismissed the Ambassador, he summoned the Chancellor and the Secretary of State. Next, according to an official memorandum made in 1917 hv the Under-Secretary of State, Herr von der Bussehe. for his chief: "There took place at Potsdam a council of military authorities before his Majesty. The following took part: His Excellency Capclle, on behalf of Tirpitz; Captain Zenker, for the Admirals' Staff, representatives of the "War Ofliee and of the General Staff. It was resolved, in preparation for all emergencies, to take preparatory steps for a war. Orders in agreement, with this have thereupon been issued.'' Herr Kautsky seems convinced that there was not a Crown Council in the technical sense on .Inly .">. "According to all appearances. William decided indcpendentlv in this fatal hour. What followed might rather he described as a Council of War.'' It ',■; plain, at least, that the Emperor and his civil and military advisers came to a decision on that day. Austria was to attack Serbia, and Germany was to be ready to fall upon Russia if the \/.:\r came to the rescue of the Serb--, x l'he Emperor, to allay suspicion, ief, Berlin on July 7 for his usual crnbe in Norwegian waters, but he. continued to work mischief by telegraph. The Austrian l * were slow to move: Count Tisza. the Iluncavian. Pre- , micr. would not hear of attacking Scv- j l;ia before .-endin? her an ultimatum. I The German Emperor heartily agreed ] with Count Bcr'chtold that the ultima- I turn must be framed in such a way i that Serbia ! j COULD NOT'POSSIBLY ACCEPT IT, and suggested as one impossible demand t.l.e evacuation of Novi-Bazar by the Serb::. .The Note was to lie sent on July 10. before (lie French President left I'aris to visit the Tzar. But its

completion was delayed for a day or i two, and the conspirators thou decided j that tli'.-y must wait until M. Poincare ' had li'l't. Russia on hi; return journey, j Meanwhile the Rmpcror had consulted I Herr Jagow as to wheilier he should ' send his customary birthday "reeling on July 11 to the King of Serbia, and was"adv\sed that his omission to do so "might give rise to premature uncasi- : ness." On duly IT llevr dngow for the first time asked Austria-Hungary what she proposed to do with Serbia, when it was conuuered, The Haosbunr Mia- 1

isters could not agree on (lie disposal of the expected booty, but they decided to tell Europe that "the Monarchy is not waging a war of conquest." Prince U'hnowsky on July lfi remonstrated with the Chancellor against running .such terrible rinks for the sake of AusI ilia, hut lie was told by Herr von Jagow , on July 18 that although Russia was i not likely to go to war, it would on ! the whole he better for Germany to i fight .Russia at once than* a few years .later, when the Russian strategic railWvays would be finished. Herr Kautsky has no difficulty, of .course, in showing that ficrmnny knew ' of the Austrian Ultimatum before it was presented. Herr von Jagow lied : deliberately when he assured Sir Horace '. Kumbold and M. Cambon that he had not known the contents of the Note before the evening of July 23. Cynics have suggested that, though Herr von Jagow knew the general purport of the . Xote, lie may not have seen the full '; text. But even this quibble fails, for the text of the Note reached the Berlin 1 Foreign Office on the afternoon of July i 22. Herr Zimmermann admits as much I in a private letter printed iu this book. ! Throughout July, 1914, Germany was : acting the hyprocrite—publicly prnfess- ; ing a disinterested desire for peace, and ; privately making ready for war and i urging on the he-itatinj'Austrians. Now [ the object of all these pinroenvres. Herr ' Kautsky explains, was to

; DELUDE THE GERMAN PEOPLE, , and especially (he Socialists, who had : raised an uproar when Austria threatened Serbia. It was to flatter the Ger- ; man Socialists as well as the British : Government that the Germa.ii Government agreed to transmit to Vienna Sir Edward Grey's proposals for mediation. : Tiie assent was a mere form. The Aus- ; triaii Ambassador' at Berlin on July 27 ■ informed his chief that the mediation ; proposals were coming. But, he added, ' 'The German Government most oxpli- ; fitly states that it in no way identi- • lies itself with these proposals, is even : decidedly aganist their consideration, and j transmits them only in deference to the : request of England." ' All the Pacificist arguments based on : this (icrman move were so much waste ; paper. The Knipevor, who returned .'rom the North on July 27, despite the eii'orts of the Chancellor to keep him away a little longer, was somewhat vaKca aback by the temperate Serbian reply to Austria, and on July 2S he "•as inclined to think that there was ■no cause for war/' and that Austria ■hould he content with • a temporary occupation of part of Serbia as a satisfaction d'honneur for Die Austrian ;nnny. But the Austrians, roused at .iast by constant'prodding from Berlin, j would not he stopped and began to bomI bard Belgrade. When the Tzar remonstrated, the Emjieror took offence and I soon forgot his passing fit of moderation. On July 2!) Sir Edward Grey warned Prince Lichnowsky that, if Germany and Franco became involved, we j should he Utfhi with a new situation. ; The Emperor's comments on thig dispatch are those of a man beside himself with rage. "The greatest and most scandalous piece of English Pharisaism that I have ever seen! \ shall never make agreement with such ras- | eals." Sir Edward Grey was described jns "the low swindler,'' because he would

NOT PLAY THE GERMAN GAME. His warning that British public opinion must influence the Cabinet was ridiculed. "If they wish it, they can turn and direct public opinion, as the press absolutely obeys them." Tim Emperor then—apparently on July ::.) -recorded at length his belief that' Gr»at Britain had at last completed the "encircling" of Germany, and declared that "Our cosmils in. Turkey and India, our agents, etc., must rouse the whole Mahommedan world to a wild rebellion against this hated, deceitful, unscrupulous nation of shopkeepers. For if we are to bleed to death, England shall at least lose India."

The German Chancellor, according to the author, tried after July 29 to avert the war, but on July 30 the General Staff took control of the situation and insisted that it must mobilise, and that mobilisation meant war. The Chancellor apparently induced the Emperor to countermand the order for mobilisation given on July 00, but two days later when he again tried, he failed. Herr Kautsky enters very fully into the final stages of the Russian negotiations, and shows that the blame did not lie with the Tzar for the final rupture, despite all that has been said by German propagandists and British Pacifists to the contrary. The case against the German Emperor, his Ministers and his generals as the deliberate authors of the world war is in fact, complete.