ALLEGED LIBEL.

Taranaki Daily News, 8 September 1920, Page 5

ALLEGED LIBEL.

LAWYER AND JUDGE. PRIVILEGE PREVENTS ACTION. (By; Wiije.—Special Reporter.)' Wellington, Last Night. "This action iB. an attempt to make a judicial officer liable in damages for words said by him in the course of the administration of justice," commented his Honor Sir John Salmond in the course of an important judgment given by him in the Supreme Court to-day, in the case of Patrick Buckley' Fit'zherbert, barrister and solicitor, of New Plymouth, v. Frank Oswald Acheson, a judge of the Aotea Maori Land Board, involving a claim for £3OOO damages for alleged slander. The ease recently came before his Honor in an action by Judge Acheaon for an order dismissing the action on the ground that it was frivolous and vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the Court. After pointing out that tlie Court had an inherent jurisdiction to 'dismiss any action on the ground set up, his Honor went on to review the circumstances under which the alleged slander by Judge Achqaon against defendant took place. His Honor continued: "Defendant is the President of the Aotea Maori Land Board, constituted unde/ the Native Land Act, 1909, as amended by the Native Land Act, 1-913. Plain-' tiff a barrister and solicitor of 1 hiff Court, and sues defendant for £3ooo'> damages in respect of defamatorycharges of professional' misconduct made, against him by defendant at ai sitting of the Maori Land Board &'jr; Haweraon July 2, 1920. The MaojjT Land Board possessed both judicial artjf administrative functions. One of iff judicial functions is the hearing and determination of applications for tl|e confirmation of alienations off native land, and it is expressly provided by section 225 of the Native Land Act, 1909, that on the hearing and determination of such applications the board shall be deemed to constitute a court of record, \ and shall have the same powers of hearing evidence and summoning witnesses as are possessed by the. Native .Land Court by section 25 of the Native Land Amendment Act, 1913.

"'The President, sitting alone, may exercise all the judicial and administrative functions of the board, and in exercise of such judicial functions the. Presi-. dent of the Maori Land Board possesses absolute immunity from actions of libel or slander. What he says in his judicial capacity is absolutely privileged, and thi* is so even if hi 3 observations mav have been irrelevant to the matter in which ho was, exercising jurisdiction. This rule of official immunity applies to all courts and judicial officers whether superior or inferior. "If the defamatory words which are the subject of thfs action wero used by defendant while acting in his judicial capacity, it is clear that, whether the words were relevant or irrelevant, true or false, malicious or bona fide, the action is baseless and frivolous. If, on the other hand, the words complained of were used by defendant while acting in his administrative capacity only, they would be subject, at most, only to qualified privilege under the law of libel, or to the special protection afforded to members of the Maori Land Board by section 34 of the Native Land Amendment Act, 1913, which provides that a member, of such board shall be personally liable in damages for any act done or omitted by that board, or by any member thereof, in good faith in pursuance, or intended pursuance, of the Native Land Act, In such a case, therefore, the plaintiff would have the right to proceed to trial of his action, and the present application for the exercise of the summary jurisdiction of the Court could not succeed, "I find it is proved beyond reasonable question that the words now complained of were used by the defendant in his judicial capacity as President of the Maori Land Board while hearing and determining an application fqr the confirmation of the alienation of native land ,hy one Atemirikura to one James Suitor McKay, and that action is therefore an attempt to ;nakr> a judicial officer liable in damages i nr.the words said by him in the course cf the administration of justice." In conclusion his Honor- said: "I am of opinion, accordingly, that there is no question, either of lnv/ or of fact, genuinely in dispute in this action, and that to allow it to go to trial would be unreasonable and oppressive. The power of summary dismissal, in order to prevent the abase of the process of this Court, which may be exercised propriety in the case of actieiis for libel or slander brought against judicial officers in defiance of that rule of absolute privilege which lias been established, not for their benefit, but for the maintenance of public interest in the duo administration of civTl and criminal justice. It is ordered, accordingly, that the statement of claim be struck out, and the action dismissed." Costs amounting to. £lO 10s 7/ere allowed against plaintiff.