THE ELECTIVE EXECUTIVE.

Taranaki Daily News, 21 August 1920, Page 7

THE ELECTIVE EXECUTIVE.

REFORMING THE CONSTITUTION. (Special Correspondent.) Wellington, August IC. When a Bill is read a first time "in Parliament it has not necessarily been even drafted. The "reading" is one i){ tho convenient fictions which have fastened themselves on to legislative procedure to the enmfort and advantage of all concerned. This was' the case with Mr Stathams Executive Bill which was read a first time in the House on Friday. The measure has not yet been printed, nor its details, It would seem, verv closely considered; but it will have to make its appearance in the House in due form on September J, which is the day selected for its second reading. The Prime Minister having argued v/hen the member for Dunediu Central brought, down his proposals ns an amendment to the Address-in-Reply that, it, should he embodied in a private member's Bill, had no alternative to promising "a fair run" to the acceptance of liis°suggestion and this no doubt it will receive.

WHAT IT MEANS. It is understood that Mr Statham and the members who are collaborating with him in this matter will frame their proposals on the lines of the Bills introduced by the late Sir William Steward some years ago. TJieUe provided for the election of the members of the Ministry by a ballot of the House and the allotment of the various portfolios between themselves. Mr Massey himself was at one time an ardent supporter of this scheme, holding that it was the only means of restraining the undue dominance of the Prime Minister, hut ofter the death of Mr Seddon he renounced his former profession of faith and gave his vote and influence to the maintenance of the existing svstoin. Sir Joseph Ward also supported Sir William Steward's Bills, but in late years has not urged their principle on his own behalf. FORMER OBJECTIONS, - An obvious objection to Sir William Steward's proposals was that they inevitably would lead to the election of the members of the Ministry by the dominant party in the House and not by the House as a whole. The leader of the dominant party in the House, who would' have established himself in his position at the preceding flection, would nominate his Ministers to the caucus and the caucus would confirm their appointment under the provisions of the Elective Kwutive legislation. It is conceivable, of course, that the dominant party might contain a sufficient number Of members of "independent'' tendencies to upset the choice of their leader by coalescing with the Opposition, but in this case it would be onen to the leader to resign and to throw upon the malcontents the responsibility of disorganising and possibly the party they had been returned to support.

ITS ADVANTAGES. On the other hand, it was argued by Sir William Steward and his friend that the election of the Executive of the House would lead to the selection of the best men available, would check the arrogance of a self-willed leader, would make each Minister responsible for the administration of his own departments and would enable th<j ( House to get rid of an unsatisfactory member of the Cabinet, without dismissing the whole of his colleagues. All tliese advantages, however, would depend upon the Prime Minister being prepared to abrogate the privileges and authority he enjoys under the present Constitution and to settle down as a member of a team in which he would have no more effective voice than the least of his colleagues. It would be an act of selfabnegation that would not come easy to the average party leader.