TIRPITZ'S STORY.

Taranaki Daily News, 29 May 1920, Page 10

TIRPITZ'S STORY.

1 A RECORD OP FAILURE. ' SOMETHING ABOUT THE MEMOIRS. 1 PIRATE CHIEFS EXCUSES. ) Reviewing Grand Admiral von Tir- i pitz's book, "My Memoirs," Mr. Archibald Hurd writes in the Daily Telegraph:— Grand Admiral von Tirpitz has written of his life's failure in two bulky 1 volumes. They tell the story at firsthand of a man, undoubtedly of parts, who believed himself to be not only a <?ieat sailor, but a consummate statesman and administrator. Sitting in his old age amid the ruins of all his ambi- 1 tions and plans, lie is convinced that if only ho had been entrusted with the ! triple appointments of Imperial Chancellor, Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas • Fleet, and Naval Secretary, with power 1 to make bis will prevail in each sphere, Germany would, after all, have gained ' "her place in the sun." He makes no : secret of his conviction that he was the 1 one man to steer the ship of Empire, to command the fleet at sea, and to direct jiaval administration* on shore. His egotism is relieved by no humor; the ' result of his efforts with the pen is a work which, at any rate to English readers knowing something of German ; policy, is heavy and wearisome; moreover, lie presents an inaccurate picture of German naval development. That is apparent to anyone who is familiar with the writings of Von Rcventlow, Captain 1 Persius, Tirpitz's boyhood friend, Von 1 Maltzahn, and others. These two vol- 1 limes are a labored apologia to his fol-low-countrymen for the failure of the 1 policy to which he devoted the best yeara of his life. He is neither correct in his statements, nor 1 consistent in his excuses and explanations, nor fair to those whom he regards as his rivals. He wearies the reader with his cantankerous criticisms of practically everyone who was concerned with the conduct of public affairs in Germany, naval, mili- ' tary, political, and if you can, what an ambitious, overbearing, inordinately proud, and self-conscious German, who has done a few hundred "morning hates," is like in the hour of defeat, and you can form a very fair conception of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz as he reveals himself in these volumes. Place this German's book beside the boisterous memories of Lord Fisher, the modest record of great achievements which Lord Jellicoe has given us, or the masterlv exposition of the work of the Dover Patrol which has come from Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, and you -will feel proud that you were born this side of the North Sea. "My rise," he admits. "i 3 bound up with the development ' of th? torpedo arm," and it is as the pirate chief, crafty, inhuman, and, if his German critics are to be believed, incompetent as naval administrator and states- ' man, that Grand Admiral von Tirpitz will be remembered in after years. ENGLAND'S SEA MONOPOLY. ' The author devotes a long chapter to , "England and the German Fleet," and he is pleased to assert that in the year , before t\ie war "the German Fleet preserved the peace according to its aim and purpose." But it ia unnecessary to indicate the splenetic character of the Gorman Admiral's references to "England's monopoly of the sea," for were we not familiar with it in the enemy propaganda during the late war? The creator of the German fleet repeats, all the parrot cries as though 'they wea-e original. The book was written for Germans, and to a section of them, no doubt, these war-worn phrases may appeal; but to us they are stale and unprofitable. Similarly, English readers are Bomewhat weary of the Haldane mission, to which Tirpitz refers repeatedly. He makes a long series of complaints as to his treatment by the successive Chancellors and others of his fellow Ministers. It is rather a melancholy business, this old man in the hour of his defeat trying to show how right he was, and how wrong was everyone else, and how Machiavellian was the diplomacy of Lord Grey and Lord Haldane. As an example of the author's style we have, the following passage: Ji "If the archives of the Entente were opened before the most incriminating documents have disappeared from them, the friends of humanity in England and America would be staggered by the most murderous of all lies with which they could indict their own Governments, who, in order to render the annihilation, disintegration, plundering, and outlawry of tilie German nation palatable ito their own peoples, imputed to Germany desires of world conquest, of which nobody in Germ an v had dreamed in 1914. . "England and France have pursued the aim of Germaniam esse delendum with Roman severity, and, thanks to our mistakes, they have achieved it. They stand there to-day as successful criminals, who have thrown off the mask now that thev havp made jjood their schemes. If the German people had realised in time the whole risk of Bismarck's creation, they would not 'have made themselves defenceless, and thereby have accomplished the enemv's desires. We were too careless epigenes. But now we experience the sight of the wolves who are devouring the sheep playing the part of judges over this 'criminal' victim." Von Tirpitz does not mention whether he ever read the Kaiser's speeches, or studied Von Bernhardi and other panGerman writers. He has also evidently forgotten the literature of the German Navy League. "Defenceless" Germany possessed the greatest army in the world and the second largest fleet at the outbreak of the war. TRAP FOR THE GRAND FLEET. The first volume brings tile reader down only to the outbreak of war, and in . the second Tirpitz indulges in further ; reproaches, blaming the Imperial Chan- [ cellor and practically all the admirals , because they did not act as he would > have had them do. The Kaiser is de- > picted as a weak man fighting with adf versify, ill-equipped for his supreme position. Everyone in a position of au- , thority in Germany was wrong—except - Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. If Lord t Jellicoe required a justification for the i Nelsonic policy he adopted in refusing 3 to seek action under the guns of the > "wet triangle," the former Naval Secref tary of the German Empire has supplied it. He was for an offensive naval policy. What he meant, he explains with a disingenuousness which disarms criticism ! from this side of the North Sea: j "I did not think that we could seek battle in any case, and in any position. a I rather desired that the North Sea _ Fleet should create by continual activity a situation that would compel the Eng- " lish to draw nearer to us. If a battle developed in "this manner on our initiative, not too far from our home waters , there was a possibility, espeeiallv in the •Briiar jj*rt ef thawar, that the' English

would not throw the whole of their united forces into the fight. The history of the war, which it is not .my intention to write in this book, will show that such opportunities were, in fact, offered. At the beginning: Of the war the fact j had not emerged so qlearly as it did later that the British Fleet fulfilled its raison d'etre simply by lying quieti) at Seapa Plow. Public opinion in the enemy countries might have made it difficult at that time for the British to avoid battle. Even minor successes on our part might have driven them to seek us out. There was futher to be considered the, for us, comparatively favorable numerical relation between the two forces in the first year of war." But the trap would have been set in vain, as Lord .Tcllicoe has revealed. For the rest, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz discusses the submarine campaign and his own personal fortunes and misfortunes, and proves, to his own satisfaction, that if it had been conducted as he desired it would have succeeded. His standpoint as a historian can be gauged from his reference to the Lusitania as "this armed cruiser," and his acceptance of the statements that the Susses was "painted as a warship," and that "there were a large number of British troops on deck in uniform." From such perversions of the truth the value of his defence of piracy can be appreciated. Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, having endeavored to play the roles' of seaman, naval administrator, and statesman, failed, as he realises in bitterness. His naval ambitions were largely responsible for the war, for he made the Germans mad with lust for world-power. We can afford to judge with some generosity such men as Moltke, Hindenburg, Ludendorlf, Falkenhavn, Von Spee, and Von Muller of the Emden; but, if Tirpitz, as the arch-pirate, was outsU'.- the pale before he wrote this self-revealing book, he has pushed himself still further outside it now. It is not a British characteristic to kick a man when he is down, but Grand Admiral von Tirpitz in his hour of defeat is a figure of contempt and »ot of commiseration.