AMERICAN OFFICIALDOM.

Taranaki Daily News, 10 April 1920, Page 12

AMERICAN OFFICIALDOM.

BLOCK NAVY'S EFFORTS. ADMIRAL SIM'S. INDICTMENT. Vancouver, March 9. Admiral Sims has charged the United States Navy Department with being the victim of German propaganda. Vancouver, March 10. Giving evidence before the Naval Committee, Admiral Sims said that when he found his own efforts unavailing to impress the seriousness of the situation on the Navy Department, he invoked the aid of the American Ambassador to Italy (Mr. Page). On April 27, 1915, Mr, Fage sent the. following message confidentially to Mr. Lansing (American Secretary of State) and President Wilson: —"There is reason for the greatest alarm about the issue of the war, caused by the increasing snecess of the submarines." The Ambassador urged the immediate asiignment of every available United States destroyer, hut even this request went unheeded for some months. In May Admiral Sims received from Mr. Daniels (Secretary for the Navy) the following message:—"Regarding convoys, I consider that United States vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently."

"When I got that message I was ready to jump overboard," remarked Admiral Sims. Vancouver, March 9. A message from Washington states that Admiral Rims told the Naval Committee this morning that the war was prolonged for four months by the failure of the United States Navy Department, to act promptly on the recommendations of the Allied authorities and himself. Admiral Sims said, that the failure of the United States navy to co-operate fully with the Allied caused needless sacrifices. Vancouver, March 10. Admiral Rims presented further documentary evidence to the Naval Committee asserting that the failure of the United States Navy Department fully to co-operate during 'the first six months after the American entry into the war cost 500,000 lives. .£3,125,000,000 and •2,000,000 tons of shipping, and prevented victory over Germany in July. 1018. In April, 1017, Admiral Sims sent Mr. Daniels a. cable saying that the critical area where the war would be Won or lost was the Eastern Atlantic, the focusof ocean communication. He repeatedly urged that every available, destroyer should be sent there, but the recommendation was not complied with for six months.

Another request which was entirely disregarded was that two divisions' of American Dreadnoughts should be sent to Brest to guard against the raids in the English Channel by German cruisers. The German offensive in 1918 was due to the failure of the submarine campaign, and probably would not have been undertaken, and the German people's morale would have been broken if American troops had been promptly despatched to France. He estimated that the Allied victory could have been achieved in July, 191S, if tonnage had been preserved the year before and more Americans sent sooner.

The Navy Department's first real decision for participation in the war was contained in a cable 27 days after America entered, so that the first month was entirely lostVancouver, March 11.

Giving evidence before the Naval Committee, Admiral Sims read a cablegram from the Naval Department, dated July 10. 1917, as follows.:— "While the successful termination of the present war must always be the first Allied aim, the future position of the United States must not be jeopardised bv anv disintegration of our main fighting fleet. '•'The Navy Department announces a general plan of action, as follows: — Willingness to send minor fighting forces in any number not incompatible with home needs to and field of action deemed advisable by the Allied Admiralty; unwillingness to separate any division from the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing to send the entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but co-operating unit when an emergency is deemed to warrant such* a course." Commenting onflthe cable from Mr. Daniels (Secretary for the Navy) re-garding'co-operation with the Allies, Admiral Sims said, "Th,e astounding features of this policy were that while it was stated to. be our intention to cooperate in the fullest degree, still the cooperation was conditional upon an adequate defence of our waters, and next upon the future position of the United States after the war." Admiral Sims opposed the project of a mine barrage of the North Sea, which tlie Navy Department later carried out despite the oppostiion of the British experts. 9 He continued: "Wo could well have afforded to strip our coast and concentrate on the critical European area." He cabled to Mr. Daniels, "So long as we maintain control of the sea there is no fear of the Germans establishing a Bunmarine base in the Western Ocean. If the enemy could bo diverted to the United States coast or any distant coast, then the anti-submarine war woud be war."—(Keuter).

WAR OVER THE CABLE. Continuing, Admiral Sims said: "I wish to show the great evil and the danger of trying to manage the war over a 3000 miles cable. Admiral Benson (former chief of naval operations) cabled me that it was not proposed to disintegrate the United States fleet, unless stronger reasons ■were advanced, but lie later visited London and personally and quickly convinced himself of ilie wisdom of sending the squadron as previously agreed. "Admiral Benson then cabled Washington, and was told that four vessels would bo ready to after docking; the boats sent finally were all of different types-"

Admiral Benson once cabled him (Admiral Sims) that he had been surprised and disappointed, because a definite plan had not been taken up of operation with the combined Allied fleets which would permit of co-operation, without splitting the United States fleet. "It is very difficult for me to 'convey to you my real state of desperation during the early months of the war," said Admiral Sims, continuing his testimony. He added that hundreds of thousands of tons of Allied shipping w«re sunk because the United States Navy Department held out for a plan to operate the ships individually with an armed guard instead of with patrols. He cabled Mr. Daniels (Secretary for the Navy) that the latter, anti-convoy scheme was fundamentally a military error, resulting in direct assistance to the enemy. Lord Jellicoe wrote to him of his grave apprehension to the success of the convoy system, unless the United States participated. "I reiterate to-day that there is no question that my recommendations were correct," declared Admiral Sims. "They were all adopted in the end, but for four months I exhausted my vocabulary explaining the system to_ Washington." SUBTLE GERMAN PROPAGANDA. Continuing, he said that, although he repeatedly warned the department that it would be informed of the advance of submarines against the United States coast, still Washington, influenced by subtle German propaganda, decided to keep the bulk of the forces at home. He repeatedly informed the department that German submarines could only visit the United States sporadically and for the specific purpose of editing the public and bluffing the navy into sticking to American waters. He warned Washington three Weeks in advance of each of the four German submarine visits. Vancouver, March 13. Mr. Hoover testified before the Naval Committee, supporting the contention of Admiral Sims that there was a critical situation for the Allies in the spring of 1017. Mr. Hoover declared that the submarine sinkings were so great at this stage as to endanger the outcome of the war. "The war would have ended almost In a moment if the Allied supplies had been cut off," said Mr. Hoover, adding, "The situation was dangerous almost beyond description, as there was a reserve supply of hreadstulTs for three or four weeks only. "As it eventuated, the Allies were never reduced to a final state of privation, although they .spent serious times on iis borderland." Vancouver, March 15. Continuing his evidence before the Naval Committee. Admiral Sims said that ho, was horrified at the lack of precautions concerning the United States troop movements. The first transports reached France safely, largely through good luck. Society women in Paris knew of the sailings before the naval officers.

The United States Navy Department used a worn-out peace-time code, after he warned them that the Germans knew the key. He believed that the failure of the Germans to sink many of the transports was due largely to the desire of the Huns not to unduly embitter the United States.