PEACE IN EUROPE.

Taranaki Daily News, 7 February 1920, Page 11

PEACE IN EUROPE.

j THE BALANCE OP POWER. i LEAGUE OP NATIONS DISCREDITED. NOTED JOURNALIST'S DEDUCTIONS, Mr. Frank Simonds, the famous American journalist, whose writings during the war have made him a widely recognised authority on military and political affairs, is very sceptical of the prospects of the League of Nations and a revolution in the world's way of settling its quarrels. Writing to the San Francisco Chronicle-.in December, he said: The defeat of the Peace Treaty will have certain consequences as far as Europe is concerned which will not be modified by any later ratification. Chief among these consequences will be the total discrediting of the League of Nations. The United Senate may, or may not, have killed the Treaty of Versailles, so far as American participation is concerned, but it has destroyed the, League of Nations. And with this destruction the way is cleared for a European return to that system of the balance of power, which for centuries has been the central circumstance in European history. In saying that the League of Nations has been discredited and is doomed, there is no implication that it will be at once and formally repudiated by the European nations, who have already subscribed to the' Treaty of Versailles. On the contrary the various commissions appointed will meet, as prescribed, they will function for the time being, since it is of utmost importance that there be no further delay, but beneath the surface great and rapid changes will inevitably take {ilace.

The reason is obvious. When the President went to Europe, carrying his League of Nations project, Europe was divided on the course to follow. The experienced Statesmen of the Continent had little faith in the League, and very grave apprehensions as to the dangers which it would bring in its train. Some urged that it was a wise policy to give Wibon what he wanted, and thus insure American co-operation; others argued that the price was Itoo high to pay. Lloyd George setfleU'the debate against the advice of Clemencean, by promising Britain's,aid to Wilson. 'THE '/TEST OP IPIUME MB [SHANTUNG.

| This British aid gave'TCilson a decisive' advantage in the conference; Clemenceau saw he was helpless, and turned fromllus course of opposition. Italy and Japan, withcohvious mental reservations, followed suit. But if British support of the President was steady, and French relatively certain, after the promise of American aid against German attack, Italian and Japanese refused to accept Wilson's decisions in the case of Fiume and Shantung revealed the real state of mind, and "Italy actually withdrew from the conference, as Japan threatened to do, when Wilson, with. Anglo-French support, stood out in the matter of Fiume.. Rumania, and Serbia presently went also,, even Belgium threatened ta> goLooking backward on tha Paris conference, with tha slightest regard for what men said, and how they acted; it is plain that the League of Nations was opposed on principle by all continental statesmen, with the cordial sympathy | and approval of the Japanese. It would have been openly fought, and promptly i killed, but for British championship. British championship was very little founded upon faith in the League, but very largely upon the conviction that the President spoke for the whole United States in demanding it. This British adherence supplied the decisive turn for the President in Paris. American importance in the world, as it existed after the war, was fully grasped in Europe; but even the appreciation of the importance of America to Europe, the need of American loans, American co-operation, would not have been sufficient to keep the conference together in its earlier stages and prevent a general revolt against Wilson's insist- | ence upon combining the Treaty and the 'League had British support wavered.

WHEN BRITAIN WAVERED. , Bui British fsupport did not -waver iin- ; iil towardl the end of March. It but- , 'rived the shock of the President's sud- I, den refusal to stand by the programme . agreed to in his absence, and provision- ( ally accepted for him by Colonel House. His veto of this programme, which put . the league of Nations discussion over ratal the Treaty was formulated, precipitated the first real crisis in Paris, was despatched from Brest, when fe Handed on his way tack from Europe. Bad Britain refused her support to : President at that moment he would ihave lost his control of events; but, de- ' spite the unmistakable restiveness in certain British quarters, reflected in the ! 'Press, the British delegation at Paris ; accepted the President's decision. They . accepted at as further detail in the policy ' fe> please America bv satisfying the President. They continued their course when 1 ! Wilson ruled against Belgium and took 1 the League of Nations to Geneva. They joined with him in opposing French occupation of the left bank of the Rhine or annexation of the Saar basin. They stood with him against Italian possession of Piume. They really broke With him only over reparations, and this was a nft&ter of life and death for Lloyd George personally. RESENTMENT AMONG OTHER .NATIONS. The'extent to whteft the Briti'sl supported Wilson at Paris; led ultimately to a certain resentment on the part of the French and to ate open; denunciation on the part of the Italians;. Orlando is reported to have suggested to Clemenceau at one moment that France- and Italy,, with the ultimate adherence of Rumania* should form: tu Latin; bloc- to i counter Kalanee the Anglo-Saxon duo and the Paris- papers: murmured! against 1 an: Anglo-Saxon peace;. But; these- protest® were- ephemeral:. | Lloyd! George really placated! the- French; 1 although; he; had! at least one- bad; quarter of air hour-' in: which- He- openly threatened! to take- the- conference- amyfrom Paris; by his support; aft their de»mand for- an- Anglo-American- guaran*-, tee,, and- hiss championship off tPwr rights to oceupy tlie- Saar basin-.. Dismisiblj,' , But surely,. Clemenceau;. influenced! by 1 ] Jusserand' and' Tardieu, was led' to ac-j cept the British view, that pleasing, the.j . Pi;esid<j»fc. wesuitt America,.

I In the middle stage of the conference there was much French resentment against the President and his league i purposes, but toward the end this more or less died down, although the President never regained the popularity ha had enjoyed in the first moments of his arrival. From start to finish the French never had any faith in the League of Nations, but they were reconciled by the treaty of insurance, and they "were convinced, in the end, that the British policy was wiser. That the American Senate might reject the Treaty never for a moment obtained even respectful hearing in Paris, In Prance and in Britain foreign affairs are outside the sphere of operations of party politics, and the American situation was ignored. Moreover Paris was filled with the friends of the Administration and the champions of Wilson's League, who consistently reported, and many of them at least honestly believed, that the League of Nations project would receive American sanction when the Senate at last received the Treaty.

SENATE UPSETS EVERYTHING. I am going over this fairly familiar ground once more, because only by recalling it can one explain the situation in Europe. The situation was just this: Europe whole-heartedly desired American aid. Great Britain unreservedly sought a new and better understanding with America, and hoped for American participation in world administration. France, equally anxious for American friendship, necessarily thought also of material things, such as new German attacks and possible European combinations growing out of Italian and Rumanian disappointments.

Now the action of the Senate destroys the whole British conception of the American situation. It discloses an opposition to the President which must pass all British conceptions. It reveals fact, not even suspected in Paris, that British support of the President, however much appreciated by that portion of tha American public believing in the League of Nations and- approving of the President's course,, necessarily rouses the antagonism of the President's opponents. i

Thus it has been a matter of frank surprise on the part of Englishmen: in their country and here that not a few of the opponents of the President and the League have spoken with unmistakable bitterness of the British course in sup-| porting the X esident. And it is plain that, so far from helping alnm; the cause of British-American friendship, British policy, while unmistakably winning high opinions in one political camp, has roused compensating animosity in the other. The result is, then, both confusing and disappointing to- the British. Who.iy outside of their intention, actually in exact conflict with their purposes,, it has made them participants in American domestic politics.. For- this, of course, there is only one remedy.. It can be no part of British policy to endeavor- to help one political party at the expense of another.. Therefore an inevitable abandonment of the Paris, policy is forecast.

EUROPE FORCED TO OLD METHODS.

And with: the British will go the ; French,, led into their present position mainly by British influence,, and with I great reluctance on their own part a!: the t outset. The Anglo-American partnership of Paris- comes to ai: end'.. In its place there must come a., new AngloFrench Association, an actual alliance; 1 since America, does not accept for itself the Wilson principles and programme, Europe will perforce go back: to its older methods..

This is the more- certain,, because the defeat of the Treaty in the Senate was not the result of any deviation from the President's Fourteen Points. The battle was not fought ou the Saar basin or Danzig; It was won and lost on the question of American participation in European affairs, and the result strikes "t the heart of the whole thing, for it was to obtain American co-operation and American participation that Europe accepted the League. Most of Europe did not believe in the League,. But all of Europe was convinced that America insisted upon it.

If the treaty hail Been rejected By the United States Senate because of the Saar Valley circumstances, because of the Shantung affair, Because of Danzig, then there mi®ht be some solace for tlie British. They might argue that it was still necessaiy for Europe to make additional concessions to the American idea. But neither the Saar nor Shantung influenced the decision of the Senate. The Treaty was defeated Because a majority of the Senate opposed Wilson's idea of America's duty in the world, and public sentiment, up to tie moment of ths vote, did not disclose any decisive support for Wilson's idealism.'

A PROSPECTIVrc ALLIANCE. We may expect, then, as I have said, that, seeing the situation as it is, the British and tlia French will proceed to a new agreement. President Poincare's recent trip- to London; was accepted abroad as the first step in that direction. France and Great Britain will proceed to formulate terms of'alliance, since both will be equally menaced if Germany- takes up arms again. They will agree to defend the integrity of Belgian and French soil, by force of arras, and to maintain armies sufficient for this task.

But will the British continue to- insist that the French shall surrender the left bank of the Rhine, 11 few years hence and submit their occupation of the Saar to a plebiscite, when both, courses may bring- German troops nearer to the Channel',. and make the line on which the i British will have to defend themselves i nest time fifty or a hundred miles nearer , to the Straits of Dover, from the eastern | shores of which Big Berthas could bombard London It WES', all right to insist that the French do this when such a , retreat was the price: paid for the promise of 2,000,000 more of American troops; available against ai German aggression. But these troops seem; less available- now,, while.- the; German is still there..

Dr _ any event,. France- and Great Britain have' to agree upon the terms ,of an alliance' whiclr wilL include the defence' of the' soil of France, Belgium-, and' Luxemburg. Great Britain may still advocate' the Wilsonian doctrine-of abandonment of the- Rhine barrier; but any such advocacy will: have- to- carry with it specific pledges; in the' matter- of' British. divisions,, available on the- first suggestion: of. a. new.- German attack. WHAT WILL. ITALY DOT: France- and' Britain -will' then have- to consider-thc case of "Italy: If Italy joins German in a new war, France and Britelm curate tone, ion victor® ~ aad. witiiv

' out American aid will probably be doomed to defeat. Therefore, it is essential that Italy should be brought into, a new alliance such as the last war created. But this can only be done b)' supporting Italian claims in many regions, but particularly in the Adriatic. Anglo-French opposition to these claims was at bottom based upon the policy of following Wilson, but with Wilson out of the situation, and conditions and not theories confronting British and French statesmen, who can doubt the decision in Downing-street, or at the Quai d'Orsay ? We shall have then an Anglo-French-Italian Alliance, which will be the successor of the old Anglo-French-Russian Alliance against Germany. But such an alliance will be concerned about the independent states of Middle Europe. If Germany can again dominate Europe from Hamburg to Belgrade, from Berlin to Byzantium, all the old dangers will reappear. Therefore for London, Paris, :r,"' Rome, it will be a matter of utmost: concern what Rumania means to do,! whether Poland will stand, what Czecho-| Slovakia can contribute in the way of divisions and guns to block German .ad-Jj vance southward.

. Thus, inevitably, we shall seo, the.,, now alliance recognise Rumanian claims.! to Bessarabia, Polish claims to, Lithu-J ania, Greek claims in Thrace, and using! necessary force to compel the Jugo-Slavsl to moderate their Adriatic attitude, and in any event to giv« up Fiume. In place of a policy based upon abstract justice, no matter how it injures your friends, and without regard to the advantages it bestows upon your incurable! enemies, we shall see develop a newj application of the older principle of ■ mutual association for mutual profit and protection.

OLD PRINCIPLES TEMPORARILY HALTED. I do not think that anyone can doubt that Europe will now react to the old principles and the old ideas- In point of fact these were never laid aside. They were, at best, temporarily abandoned ill the face of an imperious necessity, which grew out of the commanding position attained by America during the war, and the force, American and. British, behind President Wilson, in the Paris Conference..

The League of Nations could only have had a. real trial had it been accepted by the United States Senate and by the country with such .unanimity and. enthusiasm as to convince Europe that it was the single price of further American aid and co-operation. Its chance of a real trial ended with the vote in. the Senate, and cannot Be reanimated! by any subsequent Parliamentary procedure. And since the League of Nations is dead, from the European point of view„ only the balance of power remains.. The erection- in. France, like thee recent course of events in Britain,, has; given, clear evidence of the triumph, of the conservative and non-revolutionary- elements.. France and Britain will be able to work together- as: they would: not ' have been: able to do had France gone I red" and Britain white. In both countries the same steadying- sense of national necessities i 3 apparent We; shall not have revolutions on the Seina or the Thames this winter;, itt would seem. With Great. Britain and' France Belgium must Be counted, and in any new alliance, in any confederation: of Europe, ■we may expect, to see Angla-Erenclis influence prevail. Any breach Between: France' and" Beltain would be a real world tragedy, and would ensure German attacks in the futyre. The severest criticism of.' Lloyd: George's policy in Paris, criticism made by many conspicuous Englishmen; was that it frequently risked'. French: friendship in seeking to obtain American approval. At certain moments, in the Paris. Conference the French did feel themselves abandoned, and protested, rather bitterly. But, with President Wilßon out of: the situation,. Anglo-French-, relai tions- are: bound! to> grow closer;. makengt peace with: Russia.

Still another consequence 1 of tlie: withdrawal of America from; Europe' seems bound to be an. Allied peace- with Russia.. A general recognition of the need of clearing away all barriers" to peace seems bound to prevail. The small countries, Poland,. Rumania, and Czecho-Slo-vakia, together with, the* Baltic States and Finland, are unable and longer to cany on a. war against Russia without large contributions from the western nations.. The western, nations are not ready to- supply men and money,, hence the beginning of negotiations', which will not impossibly lead to> restoration of peace between Russia "and the smaller races and states on her outer fringes; If this comes it wilL be only a prelude to a recognition of the ; fact of peace by the western nations,, under certain conditions, which will insure their financial interests, mainly in the i old Russian national debt.

In sum, following upon: the action of the Senate,, it seems to me> certain that we shall see a rapid change from the League of Nations ideal to. the balance of power system in Europe.. With this shift, France- and Great Britain will become the dominant forces in a, new alliance, which will in. due course of time include Italy and Rumania, both enlisted by a tardy recognition: of claims rejected while President Wilson's, influence dominated in Paris..

THE KEHNH QUESTION".. Suet an alliance will necessarily* reopen the question of the left bank of the Rhino if the United. States', fails to ratify the treaty of insurance with; France- and. Britain. It may, in any event, since American assistance will seem, a little less tangible- than it did a. year agoi We hare now to face the possibility thai Prance will stay for- a. long time on the Rhine, between Alsace and Holland.. In the same way France may claim, for Poland a better settlement at the mouth of tlie Vistula, and Italy may demand of Rumania the frontier on. the* Dniester 1 and the Theiss.

Penes with Russia, achieved By indirection li.i'ongh the medium of the Baltic States, is likely to follow soon. As for' Turkey, that Eastern: question will be disposed of at a conference 'of London in March, at which America, will hardly play any prominent part, and may not be represented, since we were not actually at war with the Osmanli. At such, a conference Italy may hope to obtain: compensation in Asia for- any concessions made in Europe. In this new ordering of European" and. Asiatic matters American participation will hardly he considerable, even if the Treaty- should finally be ratified. The reason- is obvious. The policy- adbpted by the British at Paris has hardly stood the 1 test, of time. The l confident, assurance' tiiat America would' recognise- British .friendship iii British support' of the President's wishes, t-i.s general belief thßt American enlistment, ip' world. a£s-

fairs waa to Tie procured by the European acceptance of the American League of Nations, has lead to rather bitter disillusionment, and neither Britain nor Europe is apt to run the risk of a new disappointment soon. If the League of Nations were to succeed, it had to be an act of faith all round. The course of the United States Senate in denying faith for itself destroyed European faith, such as there was, and left Europe puzzled, but 'without to risk a new American adraature

The restoration of the old hiitorio Anglican church at Buseell, which has been under consideration for some time past, will be undertaken shortly. Tha Government, in view of the'-connection of the building with the early coloidsa* tion of New Zealand, has agreed to assist in defraying the cost by a £ far ;C subsidy np to £-200. It was at this church, then known a3 the Kororaeka Mission Church, that Captain Hobson, iis Lieutenant-Governor, read his historic proclamation of British sovereignty over New Zealand, on landing at thq Islands on January SO, JMfl.