CAPORETTO.

Taranaki Daily News, 17 January 1920, Page 10

CAPORETTO.

THE ITALIAN DISASTER. Report of the inquire. CASTIGATION OF HIGH COMMAND. A brief cable message some weeks ago reported the essence of the report on the inquiry into the Caporetto disaster, which brought Italy to the verge of defeat, and turned an invasion of Austrian territory into a heavy enemy occupation of Northern Italy, and involved enormous losses in men and material.

A fuller summary shows that, in the first place, the Committee of Inquiry investigated the, general conduct of the war, and the relations which existed between the Government and the Supreme Command. Some proceedings cf General Cadorna which seemed to authorise the belief that he tried to interfere with general politics have been attributed to his exalted sense of his own responsibility : furthermore, the peculiar selfcentred and sensitive nature of the General is charged with being the cause of the lack of harmony which existed between general headquarters and the several Secretaries for War, who were thereby reduced to a subordinate position where the work, of supervision was no longer possible.

The committee shows greater severity of judgment towards the Cabinet then in power, for it opehly disapproves of the retention of Cadorna as Commander-in-Chief after the invasion of theTrentino, the General's moral position with the army being then greatly shaken, although he still enjoyed a certain popularity with an influential section of the press. In this respect the committee's opinion is that the events of May, 1918. in the Trentino region, during which the possibility of a retreat as far back as the Tagliamento was considered, might have suggested several measures which, had they been carried into effect in time, would have lessened the effects of the Caporetto rout.

Dealing with Italian preparations for the war, the committee does not spare its strictures 011 the methods with which some classes of young officers were recruited, and, as far as arms and ammunition are concerned, it is of opinion that the Supreme Command showed lack of foresight by not procuring adequate information about the enemy's defensive organisation, which, in the initial stages, succeeded in breaking the impetus of the advance, and in causing losses altogether out of proportion to the results obtained. The Supreme Command failed to make the best use of the experience gained both on the French and on the Russian fronts. And in the disaster of 1917 it failed to grasp a political and military situation that pointed to the extreme probability of an offensive by the enemy. The. committee extends its criticism io the (insufficient results derived from the units of machine-gun-ners, in spite of the many instances of individual gallantry; to the deficient organisation of the first-assault companies; to the defective training of the troops, due to insufficient periods of rest.

QUESTIONS OF DISCIPLINE. Concerning the question of discipline and the General's relations with the officers, die committee condemns Cad.orna's policy in 'removing officers, a policy which he carried too far, and which resulted not only in the removal of 900 high officers, but also in producing a wave of fear and antagonism among a great many more. It also calls attention to the bad treatment of the troops in the way of feeding, as well as to the over-taxing of their physical energy by over-frequent rounds of trench service. It eall3 attention to the insufficient work of propaganda, to the lack of uniformity in discipline, and, above all, to those dreadful, though short, periods .of harsh discipline, when capital punishment was freely resorted to, often following the cruel method of decimation when individual responsibilities could not be ascertained. The committee charges Cadorna with not having properly utilised the soldiers' combative qualities, which, indeed, he depressed by keeping the tnen in dangerous places far too long, and bv repeatedly compelling them to attack positions which had become ill-famed through the blood which they had already exacted without results. The committee maintains that, although the Italian army had already acquired an everlasting title of glory for its valiant resistance in eleven battles, yet the dreadful .impression made on the men, added to the widespread conviction of the perfect tiselessness of such efforts, reached such a climax that it would have been quite sufficient by itself to determine that mental crisis which was the ultimate cause of the Caporetto disaster. The committee recognises that all these oher causor. were additional causes. Side by side with the sentimental factors, which produced a feeling of weariness, and a longing for the end of the (war, there were polit'eal factors, such as the particular conditions under which the Italian intervention had 'alien place, the weakness of the Government towards the political parties which were opposing tin* war, thr* permission jrranted to supporters of the Soviet to civ late freely through Ttaly. the repciv";sion of the statement that there should -not he another winter spent in the trencher. the effect of the Turin riots and of til.' Papal Peace Note. All these causes would not alone have had great conseaiiencps. It was the fault of the Cabinet then in power not to have shown the secondary importance of these non-mili-tary factors to the Supreme' Council, which was prone to exaggerate the dancer of the so-called disfat.tismo (defeatism!. and not to have urged the command in adopt wiser methods in handling the troops. To state the whole matter briefly, the committe traces the chief causes of the Caporetto disaster back to the Supreme Commend. Those on whom the weight of responsibility would rest heavilv v-nnld therefore hp General Cadomn, for ihe ahovo-stated reasons, as well as for neglecting the organisation of the , strategic reserves, and the construction of defensive lines: General Form, vice head of the General Staff, for having disregarded the necessity of inducing General Cadorna to correct his methods, and for having failed in his task of ••fathering political and military information: Tipneral head of the Second Army, for hi* crH diseiplinarv methods, and for his rcrsistent prodigality in shedding blood with results out of all nronortion to the lo=ses: •>id. finrOlv. tf>p Cabb-of uresidr-d over liv Signor Br-dli. for fp'dir", to oxevc' ; '.'<- r,ro""r vigilance over the mor.ik of the firaiy.