The Daily News. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1919. GALLIPOLI COMMISSION'S REPORT.

Taranaki Daily News, 25 November 1919, Page 4

The Daily News. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1919. GALLIPOLI COMMISSION'S REPORT.

The precis, recently to hand, of the second report of the Gallipoli Commission brings back to us one of the great disappointments of the war. It may safely be assumed that the text will be read with mixed feelings, not because it is a record of failure when success might have been achieved, but on the ground that the evidence affords an insight into incredible blunders and unintelligible methods of procedure in a grave crisis. Had Lord Kitchener lived he could, no doubt, have thrown much valuable light, on the seemingly inexplicable management of the campaign, and it is easy to understand that his death made the Commission's task far more difficult than otherwise would have been the case. His wellknown hyper-secretiveness on military matters leaves the reasons for his actions in the realm of speculation, while liis official communications merely give the result of his views without any indication as to how they were arrived at. The master is still further complicated by the divergence of views pf the naval and military authorities, thereby affording striking testimony to the disadvantages caused by having no unity of control. The out-j standing feature of the report is the statement that the problem concerning the expedition was never fully investigated by competent experts, and no correct appreciation of its difficulties arrived at, while, from the outset, the risks of failure of the expedition outweighed the chances of success. If the Commission found their task difficult, no layman can hope to effectively assign acceptable reasons why the attempt was made, why it was made in a particular manner, and what should have been done in order to have achieved victory., The known facts and the evidence seem, however, to indicate that a fatal blunder was made at the outset by the Navy in its operations of November, 1914, and February-March, 1915, the effect of which was to

cause the Turks to materially strengthen their positions. It seems reasonable to assume that if the expedition had been kept a close secret, adequate arrangements made for landing the forces quickly before daylight, and no naval bombardment carried out, but the fleet had been utilised to cover the landing and then to lay down a smashing barrage to enable the landing force to advance as rapidly as possible, then the eotnplete surprise might have gained the object in view. As it was the Navy, for some unexplained reason, gave the alarm to the Turks, There was undue delay in considering the situation after (instead of before) the failure of attacks following the first landiug, while the plan of attack from Suvla and Anzac was open to criticism, and the attack on Suvla was not pressed as it should have been. Confused orders were given by General Hammersley, and the work of his staff was defective; the senior brigade commander did not show sufficient energy and decision, and General Stopford did not obtain sufficient information as to the progress of the operations. Much of the blame is laid by the Commission upon Sir lan Hamilton for not sufficiently examining the situation disclosed by the first landings, and weighing the probabilities cf success and failure more impartially. 'Whether that blame was deserved history will show. That the whole of the initial operations constituted a succession of blunders appears to be established, and in the face of this evidence it is marvellous that the Anzacs put up such a magnificent record. The diplomatic side of the question is presented by the Commission with gratifying fidelity, though no new feature is brought to light, and no good purppse will be served by traversing this aspect of the expedition. Sir lan Hamilton's remarks in a private letter to Lord Kitchener aptly describe the situation thus: "Gallipoli on the spot looks a tougher nut to crack than it did over map in your office"—and so it proved. Yet it seems incredible that such an expedition should have been settled over a map. It was just one of those enterprises in -which a daring reconnaisance might have, been expected to be made by skilled scouts, especially as it was known |that German officers were commanding the Turkish operations. Gallipoli adds another to the forimidable list of Britain's "muddling through," redeemed by the brilliant exploits of her own soldiers and overseas kindred and by the final act of successful evacuation. "When Lord Kitchener personally inspected this field of operations he reported to the Prime Minister: "The country is more difficult, than I imagined. To gain what we have held has been a most remarkable feat of arms. Everyone has done avoiiders both on sea and land." That was a point blank admission that Lord Kitchener did not know the country, and yet the Intelligence Department, if it were of real service, should have been able to give him details of every yard of the country and its defences. That there was a frittering away of valuable lives is emphasised by Sir Thomas Mackenzie. At the same time Gallipoli served a purpose and acts as a beacon warning to future commanders. Most people will prefer to regard the operations from the viewpoint of Mr. John Masefield, as presented in his "Gallipoli." He says: "Later ... I began to consider the Dardanelles campaign, not as a tragedy, liov as a mistake, but as a great human effort, which came, more than onec. very near to triumph, achieved the impossible many times, and failed, in the end, as many great deeds of arms have failed, from something- which had nothing to do with arms nor with the men who bore them. That the effort, failed is not against it; nmch that is most splendid in military history failed. . . , ■ This failure is the second grand event of the war; the first was Belgium's answer to the German ultimatum."