GALLIPOLI

Taranaki Daily News, 21 November 1919, Page 6

GALLIPOLI

THE OLORfOUS. MORE OF FAILURE. THE INNER HISTORY.BLUNDERS AND MISCALCULATIONS By Telepaph.-PreM Assn -Copyright. Tl,« n n- i- r, LoDdon > Nov. 18. me Gallipoli Commission report proceeds to state:— e The Peninsula defences were anticipated, and that large military operaions were necessary. General Maxwell forf L I I h u l>oh was P«e««Uy a tort agains.which an attack from my haz a X'„ Wit w Ut } kxy n8 > ™« »« ofZ™ He a . d Vised Lord Kitchener ot the recommendation of Colonel MauTco lT'? 7 enCh Milit «y at Constantinople, wherein the latter jested an attack on the Asiati de as the least difficult. Colonel Maucorps «garded a landing at Gallipoli as ex was satisfied that no general plan was evolved and failed to see why there sou.d„have been one, and tins pl the problem more clearly before the War Cbuncil. The naval authorities in "„nr 9 s ni sfied !t wouw be "- Gall pol, before the fleet could make the Straits safe for transports. C-d K Vt hener thereupon thought that no operaT/r 1 !^" 6 P ,ace bef ™ the arrival of the 29th Division. ARMY A "SECOND STRING." General Hamilton's evidence showed he was given clearly to understand that h s force was merely a second string, that the navy could force the Dardanelles on its own, and that the military nV « i P , in " nles « *e admiral definitely "chucked up the sponge." Genml Hamilton added that he could obtarn practically no information or the posit.on blfore he left. He was not sup. Plied with the information prepared by the General Staff until 1006, „or was Colonel Maucorps' view communicated to him or he War Office's information on the whole, subject of Colonel Meaawst Ho received definite instructions from Lord Kitchener that the occupation of the Asiatic side was strongly to be deprecated. General Hamilton, 'after arrival, con- ? !dW ' t l Admiral Robeck - The latter said the War Office was too sanguine, flunking the navy's guns would prevent a Turkish lodgment on the Peninsula, me Germans had grappled witn the situation and Government troops scienti-* fieally disposed and heavily entrenched The enemy had nothing to fear owing to the flat trajectory of the naval guns ri a ' ? amilton . >'n a private letter to Lord Kitchener, said: "Gallipoli on the spot looks a tougher nut to crack tlian did our map in your office." General Hamilton, after witnessing the naval homhardment, telegraphed Lord (Kitchener that he was reluctantly driven JJ , oon s , . l , us , ion that the Dardanelles were less hkely to be forced by the -Navy than once seemed probable, and if the army participated it would not assume a subsidiary form hitherto antie'pated. To this Lord Kitchener repliedYou know my views, that the Dardanelles must be forced. If a large militnrv operation is necessary it must be undertaken and carried through." A MOMENTOUS DECISION. General Hamilton stated at a conferVwJ.'T! the ,een E,izabeth that Admiral Robeck said it was quite clear that they couldn't get through without the help of troops. Admiral Wemvss concurred and no voice was raised'to question this momentous decision. Admiral Robeck. reporting to the First Sea Lord said the assumption that the forts could be destroyed by naval fire was conclusively disproved. The analogy of the Belgian forts was quite misleading, as these were destroyed by howitzer' lire. After this Mr. Churchill saw clearly that a combmed operation was essential nstcad of h, s original plan of achieving the object without involving the army. <ieneral Hamilton, on April 4, told Lord Kitchener that he hadn't enough ammunition to destroy the entanglements by field guns'and howitzers. Therefore he must rely on other metho<K The Commission was unable to ascertain the precise date whereon after the faUurc of the naval attack the militarv operations were decided on When the decision was taken much ineptitude was displayed in loading the transports whereby men. material and stores were shipped in different vessels resulting in delay. Much unnecessary material was also taken. THE QUESTION OF REINFORCEMENTS. '_ On May 14 the War Council discussed the situation. There were insistent demands for men for France, while we were, saddled with requirements V Egypt and elsewhere. The Council had therefore, to consider the wisdom of continuing* the Dardanelles campaign. There was a tendency to send more reinforcements, but nothing immediately was done beyond Lord Kitchener asking General Hamilton how many men were required to ensure success." He replied that if the present situation was unchanged it would need an additional army corps. General Hamilton reckoned he could advance with half the loss of life if he had a liberal supply of guns and munitions, especially high explosives. Lord Kitchener replied on May IS expressing disappointment. His preconceived views as to the conquest of positions necessary to support the troops on land were miscalculated, and now it became a question of whether thev could support two field operations. The draining of our resources and the intervention of a political crisis blocked a decision on General Hamilton's request for 24 days, and, in Mr. Churchill's opinion, the crisis prevented an unbroken stream of reinforcements. Provision was made to send two divisions. Then Lord Kitchener changed his mind and I sent only one. Mr. Asquith admitted that the political situation caused delay, but thought there was a shortage ol available troops. The commission,'~however, thought the crisis was the main cause. When the new Cabinet was constituted, several new members had to be convinced that the expedition was justifiable. Lord Kitchener, at the end of May, informed the Dardanelles Committee that the difficulties of the enterprise had proved more formidable than anticipated, and that a- much greater effort than was originally bargained for was now renuired, and for the first time there was the hint of evaauation heard,

Lord Kitchener prepared a memorandum on May 2S, in which he submitted three solutions. Firstly, withdrawal; secondly, to seek, if possible, an immediate military decision; and thirdly, to continue the push and make what' progress was possible. In regard to withdrawal, Lord Kitchener declared the disadvantages were so great that it could only be justified in order* to avoid a great disaster, and he threw his weight in favor of the third solution, because it avoided a blow to our prestige, kept the door open to the Balkans' intervention, and ensured a strategic position, besides preventing active Turkish operations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Caucasus. Early in June Russia relieved the Turkish position, and General Hamilton telegraphed that he foresaw rt might enable the Turks to throw a quarter of a million men against him, and urged that some equivalent for Russian cooperation was now vitally necessary. Three fresh divisions were despatched, and when they arrived a mistake was, apparently, made by employing them at Suvla without the admixture of seasoned troop 9. Moreover, their officers were, generally speaking, inexperiencd, and the failure which followed was the precursor of evacuation. POOR CONDITION OF TROOPS. Eventually General Munro went to Gallipoli to report, and he came to the conclusion that, with the exception of the Australian-New Zealand Army Corps, the troops on the peninsula were unequal to a sustained effort, owing to inexperienced officers, want of training, and defective staff work. General Birdwood agreed with General Monro regarding the difficulty of making progress, but 'opposed evacuation, considering that the Turks would view it as a complete victory, while it would exert a bad effect on the Mahomedans in Egypt, India and Persia. Further, that"'the' Idleness of the season and the probability of bad weather would make a withdrawal dangerous. Generals Byng and Davies agreed with General Munro with regard to evacuation. KITCHENER OBDURATE. Lord Kitchener, on November 3, wired to Genera] Birdwood: ''l am coming to see you. I believe the Admiralty will agree to force the Straits. We must do what we can to assist them- Examine the best landings at the head of the Gulf of Saros. We may, perhaps, have to evacuate Suvla- AH the best fighting men that can be spared, including your Anzac boys and everyone T can sweep up in Egypt, might be concentrateu: at Mudros ready for this enterprise. You will have the. command of the whole force. General Munro will go to Salonika. Please work out the plans. We must do it right this time. I absolutely refuse to sign the order for evacuation, whicli would be the gravest disaster, and would condemn a large percentage of men to death or imprisonment." ■, It appears that Admirals Robeck, Wemyss and Keyes held strongly that the fleet should attempt to force the Straits in order to relieve the army, hut, between November .1 and 4, Lord Kitchener's proposal to seize the Bulair Isthmus was adversely criticised by the Admiralty and General Birdwood. Therefore Lord Kitchener, on November 4, telegraphed to General Birdwood that the uaval operations mightn't be renewed. "The more I look at the problem, the less I see a way through, so yon had better quietly and secretly work out any scheme to remove the troops." POSITION UNTENABLE. On the 22nd .Lord Kitchener telegraphed to the Prime Minister that as German assistance for the Turks was now practically available, our position was untenable, and that evacuation seems inevitable. Lord Kitchener, on the 15th, had reported to the Prime Minister the result of his personal inspection. He said: "The country is more difficult than I imagined. To 'gain what we hold has been a most remarkable feat of arms. Everyone has uone wonders, both at sea and"on land- The fact is that the base at Mudros is too detached from the field force, and the .impossibility of proper lines of communication was made a difficulty as regards successful operations."

Telegrams which passed between the Prime Minister and Lord Kitchener show that the latter was greatly concerned over the defending of Egypt' in event of evacuation. He advocated landing at Ayas Bay, near Aler>*ndretla, to cut the Turkish (railway communications. This project necessitated the withdrawal of forces from Salonika and France, as well as diverting Indian'divisions on their way to Mesopotamia. The General Staff did not support it, and it was ultimately rejected at a joint conference at, Paris, between the French and English Governments. Cabinet discussed the evacuation on November 23, when Lord Curzon, on behalf of several of his colleagues, elaborated the case against evacuation, whereto Mr. Bonar Law replied that every military expert favored evacuation. Mr. Bonar. Law's memorandum shows that the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty opposed evacuation, but the militaryadvisers' advice was accepted. THE FINAL FACTOR. Meanwhile, a blizzard, in the last days of November, aggravated the condition of the troops, 280 men being drowned in the trenches at Suvla, and many being frozen to death as they stood, while 16,000 were frostbitten. General Monro then telegraphed to Lord Kitchener pressing for a decision. From November 25 to December 8, Admiral Wemyss, with remarkable pertinacity, advocated a renewal of the naval attack, but Admiral Robeck, who was then in England, placed his views before the Council, and, as the result of the War Cabinet's meeting. Lord Kitchener telegraphed to General Monro: "Owing to political consequences,' there is a strong feeling against evacuation. If Salonika troops are placed at your disposal could you make Suvla retainable? The navy would also take the offensive." General Munro replied that he did not think there was any reasonable chance of success as the naval guns couldn't search the Turkish positions. On December 7, Cabinet, mainly on Lord Ktichener's advice, decided to evacuate. Admiral Wemyss again telegraphed, on learning of the decision, urging a renewal of the offensive, adding: "I am convinced the time is ripe for a vigorous offensive. I am confident' of j success," but the Admiralty declined. Lord Fisher appends a' memorandum [regretting that his official duties precluded his attendance at the sittings, therefore he was not justified in attaching his name to the report. ' GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY LOST. Sir T. Mackenize supplies a supplementary report in which he regrets that the evidence was not published, making the narrative inadequate. While substantially agreeing with the findings, he holds stronger views upon certain of them. He believes the forcing of the

Dardanelles was practicable had the authorities approached the proiiiem adequately, and that they should have only launched a combined attack after proper preparations. Whether General Hamilton was the right man to command can never be answered, because he was hurriedly despatched, imperfectly instructed and inadequately equipped. Though General Wolfe Murray attended the Wrr Council, he expressed no opinion and tendered no advice, nor did he clearly understand that a decision was arrived at to prepare a naval attack. When General Murray was asked why he had not prepared a plan, he replied that he had been overshadowed by Lord Kitchener. Sir T. MacKcnzie believes that the vital period determining silceesß or failure was between August 0 and 10, when General Stopford and his officers threw away the golden opportunity and gave the Turks time to reinforce.