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GALLIPOLI

OUR BLUNDERING HEADS. COMMISSION'S TRENCHANT REPORT'. By Telecraph.—Press Assn.—CopyriEht. Received Nov. 19, 12 a.m. London, Nov. 17, The following is a precis of the second report of the Gallipoli Commission. In a general review, the report says that from the outset the risKs %f the failure of the expedition outweighed the chances of success. The problem was never fully investigated by competent experts. No correct appreciation of the difficulties was arrived at. The Commission considered that a general plan should.have been prepared, and that it was the duty of the Secretary of War to ensure that this was done. The naval operations in November, 1914, and February and March, 1915, naturally led to a great strengthening of the Turkish positions. It was the undue delay in considering the situation after the failure of the attacks, following the first landing, while the plan of attack from Suvla and Anzac in the beginning of August that was open to criticism. The attack at Suvla was not pressed as it should have been. The orders given by General Hammersley were confused, and his staff work defective. General Sitwell, Senior Brigade Commander, did not show sufficient energy or decision. General Stopford did not take sufficient means to inform himself as to the progress of operations. He and his staff were partly responsible for the failure of the supply of water to the troops. The Commission's opinion is that General Stopford's difficulties were increased by General Hamilton's intervention. While recognising General Hamilton's personal gallantry and energy, he should have examined the situation disclosed by the first landings more critically, and weighed the probabilities of success and failure more impartially, having regard to the resources at his disposal) and submitted a comprehensive statement to the Secretary for War for and against a continuance of operations. After General Monro's advice to evacuate had been confirmed by Lord Kitchener, a more prompt decision should have been taken by the War Cabinet. A considerable amount of artillery was available in Egypt and Mudros for the Suvla operation, but it was not utilised. The Commission finds that on the whole the food supply was satisfactory, but provision for the evacuation of the wounded, especially hospital ships, was insufficient, This was due to want of a general plan. The supply of medical requisites on the whole was adequate, except in the case of the Australians and New Zealanders, who were short of ordinary medicine, especially castor oil, and a variety of food for sick men. The narrative shows that Lord Kitchener's death made the Commission's task difficult, as, owing to his secretiveness in nfilitary matters, the reasons for various actions were unknown early in 1915. Kitchener thought the Dardanelles a suitable objective, probably requiring 150,000 men. He had in view a possible stalemate on the Western Front, and the necessity for providing another theatre of operations. The War Council subscribed to the latter view. If a stalemate occurred it would be in the spring, without, however, specifynig the Dardanelles, the general opinion seemed to be that either the Dardanelles or Serbia'was the most suitable. The question for joint naval and military action was not considered, because months must 'elapse before troops were available. Mr Churchill, at the War Council on May 14th, stated that if he had known three months before that an army of eighty or a hundred thousand would be available, the May attack would never have been undertaken. Towards the end of January diplomatic efforts to secure the co-operation of Greece and Serbia failed, and attention was turned to the Dardanelles, but anxiety as to a possible German offensive on the West front delayed the departure of the troops until' March. There was a diplomatic side to the proposed expedition. The Commission's interim report indicated that Russia wanted relief from Turkish pressure in the Caucasus, while in addition -was the hope that success at the Dardanelles would unite the Balkans against the Central Powers. The disastrous effect of possible failure wasn't altogether absent from the minds of the War Council. On the military side there was doubt of the fleet's ability to guarantee the landing, and in view of this risk the General Staff was not prepared to recommend tho attempt. The Director of Naval Intelligence,, while generally in agreement with the General Staff and fully concurring in the great risks involved in a joint enterprise, 'thought the staff under-rated the value of the fleet's heavy covering fire at the disembarkation point. The War Council did not think the staff's opinion wholly applicable to existing conditions; The fali of the Namur and Liege forts led to the conclusion that permanent works could easily be dealt with by long-range guns, while the value of a naval bombardment was greatly advanced by aircraft observation, also the development of submarines encouraged the hope that the Turkish communications at Gallipoli through the Sea of Marmora would be very vulnerable. The question of the appointment of a commander was discussed in February. General Birdwood's name, .was first considered, but as the scoo* of operations became enlarged it was thought advisable to select, an officer of higher rank and greater experience. General Hamilton was chosen. General Birdwood went to the Dardanelles and made reconnaissance, and telegrams which passed between him and Lord Kitchener showed the latter intended that the troops would be used in a minor capacity only, while General Birdwood fully appreciated the formidable character of Suvla was not due to the opposition of the Turks, but to General Stopford's failure to provide water for the troops. Sir Thomas Mackenzie directs attention to the evidence of several witnesses as to the frittering away of life through General Hunter Weston's repeated frontal attacks, and quotes Colonel Wilson's evidence that lives had to be sacrificed almost with futility, and General Hamilton's admission to Lord Nicholson that lives were used instead of shells. Regarding the treatment of wounded. Sir Thomas Mackenzie quotes Colonel Chowse's matured opinion: "That lie personally would recommend his Government when the war was over that under no conceivable condit'en- in trust the Imperial authorities with .be medical arrangements for the care of Australian sick and wounded."

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TDN19191120.2.36

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Taranaki Daily News, 20 November 1919, Page 5

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,025

GALLIPOLI Taranaki Daily News, 20 November 1919, Page 5

GALLIPOLI Taranaki Daily News, 20 November 1919, Page 5

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