THE SCAPA SCUTTLERS.

Taranaki Daily News, 20 September 1919, Page 11

THE SCAPA SCUTTLERS.

VIEWS OF ADMIRAL VON SCHEER. GERMAN PLANS FOR BIG SEA FIGHT. (Times' Correspondent). "I rejoice over the sinking of the German Fleet in Scapa Flow," said Admiral von .Sdieer, the former Cninmander-in-Chief of the German Higli Seas Fleet, in an interview at Weimar with Mr. Cyril Brown, the correspondent of the :iew York World. The Admiral, who, besides voicing the satisfaction nt the treachery of his men in terms which are a mix' Lure of jubilation and insolent defiance, took the opportunity, as did General Ludendorif in a recent interview, to curry favor with America by making invidious comparisons between her motives and those of tie other Allies in regard to the fixing of the terms of peace as well as her probable future attitude towards Germany. He also imitates his late colleague in attempting to bow suspicion among the Allies througn discussion of their future policies. With regard to tin- sinking of the German Fleet, Admiral von Scheer said his satisfaction arose from two causes. The first, he declared, is that the fleet lias been prevented from falling, permanently into the hands of the British. "It would have been painful for our good ships, after sailing the seas for years, to come under enemy flags. This humiliating and painful sight is now spared us by the brave deeds at Scapa Flow. The second reason why I rejoice is that the staid of surrender has been wiped from the escutcheon of the German Fleet. The pinking of the ships has proved that the spirit of the fleet is not dead. This last ed or inspired from Berlin. Our seamen act is true to the best traditions of the German Navy. The deed was spontaneous, and, I am convinced, was not ordered or inspired from Berlin. Our ksamen were unwilling to bear the final disgrace or suffer that the ships should be turned over to the British. WHY THE MEN STRUCK. More than this, the spirit of Scapa Flow points a significant moral. Our seamen, once removed from evil propaganda influence and left to come to their senses, again became mindful of their military honor. The terms of peace brought men of our fleet to the realisation, unfortunately too late, that they had been misled, hoodwinked, and deceived. Subtle revolutionary propaganda had persuaded them they could end the war quickly by going on strike. They were told, and believed, that if they struck the seamen of the enemy fleets would revolt also, and that the war would thus be brought to an end automatically. In this misguided belief they started a revolution. Too credulous, they made the mistake of not waiting to let the other fellows strike first. Admiral von Scheer then proceeded to disclose the plans for a naval attack on England, which had been frustrated by the mutiny of the sailors of the fleet;— It was never our intention (he said) to send the High Seas , Fleet to certain death. At the beginning of the November revolt we were on the eve of undertaking a naval operation from which we promised ourselves the utmost success. This operation, after nearly two years, had at last been made possible by the discontinuance of our submarine warfare during the negotiations leading up to the armistice. For nearly two years we had been unable to undertake an operation on a large scale with the High Seas Fleet, first because the fleet was essential to protect the base for our submarine warfare; and,secondly, because, while our submarine warfaro was. carried on we lacked all strategic flank protection for a long-distance naval operation. Our fleet attack could proceed only from the narrow Wet Triangle behind Heligoland. To this base alone we were always forced to return An operation of the High Seaa Fleet against any point on the British coast left both our flanks exposed. The Battle of Jutland proved that wo were- not afraid of encountering the British Grand Fleet on a fair field. In an operation against the British coast our strategic left flank was always exposed to nttack by British naval forces coming from the Channel, and our right flank to attack from the north. With the suspension of submarine warfare this unfavorable strategic situation suddenly changed. We now had plenty of submarines to use for the flank protection of our High Seas Fleet. With our hands thus freed w* decided at the beginning of November that our fleet should strike a hard and perhaps decisive blow. We decided that while our armies were stubbornly and heroically resisting, our fleet should not remain idle. Our plan offered every chance of success. It was not one to send the High Seas Fleet out to death, but to attack the coast of England in the direction of the mouth of the Thames, employing submarines as flank protection. By this plan we hoped to draw the British Grand Fleet out of its Scottish lair down towards the mouth of the Thames to give us battle, in which case the Grand Fleet would have run into cur flanking submarines. Our plan was carefully worked out and offered the certainty of success if the Grand Fleet came cut. The one chance of failure we foresaw was that the British Fleet might , rot be coaxed out by our Channel attack. | The Admiral then entered on an elaborate explanation of the motives of the surrender of the German Fleet:— Our plans for attack (he went on) raturally could not be disclosed to the men of the fleet, and from the preparations for the operation they got the fatal idea into their propaganda-turned heads that the fleet was about to be sent out to its death. "Why," hey argued, "should we die on the verge of peace, with negotiations for an armistice going on?" In this misguided frame of mind they mutinied and started the revolution which they have since come to regret bitterly. They thought they were doing right, and that their action would secure a just and equitable peace for the Fatherland. They still thought so when they took the ships to Scapa Flow to be interned. I am convinced that not an officer or a man would have been willing to take the ships to Scapa Flow if he had know how peace would ultimately be imposed-