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LUDENDORFF'S MEMOIRS.

CIVTL LEADERS BLAMED. BREAK WITH THE KAISER. London, Aug. 10. Interesting extracts have been published in Berlin from Ludendorff's memoirs, written after the armistice. The ionner marshal complains that the suffrage decree of July, 1!)17, "revealed our weak points to the enemy, showing our fenrs of a revolution." After the Reichstag peace resolution of 1017, both he and Hindenlmrg tendered their resignations, which were withdrawn upon the Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, retiring. He refers to von Kuhlmann, a former Foreign Minister, as a post-Bismarck type of diplomatist, whose name will ever be associated with the Bolsheviks' entry into Berlin, and the permitting of Bolshevik propaganda from the Russian Embassy. Dealing with the critical days towards the end of I'M 8, Ludendorff says tiiat even after President Wilson's second note he urged a fresh national effort. Indeed,. Hindenburg issued an army order sharply condemning President Wilson. This order, says Ludendorff, "brought about my fall." The former Kaiser declared against the order, so Ludendorff, feeling that he had lost his master's confidence, resigned. Wilhelm, accepting his resignation, said, "Your departure will make it possible for me to create a new State, with the help of the Social Democrats." Ludendorff then went to see Hindenburg, and said, "in a fortnight we shall no longer have a Kaiser." VICTORY NEARLY A DEFEAT. Perhaps the least-known fact which the memoirs disclose is that the Germans nearly lost the battle of Tannenberg, which was only won by Ludendorff drawing off all the troops facing Rennenkampf's army and concentrating them against Sasonoff's army on the Narew. "The battle lasted from August 27 till August 30. Rennenkampf's immense army lay like a threatening thundercloud in the north-east. All he had to do was to have come up, and we would have been beaten; but he didn't march with his main body beyond the Allen-burg-Gerdauen-Nordenburg line, and we won a brilliant victory. Few people knew of the anxious thoughts during these long days, when I looked towards Rennenkampf's Neimen army." | Ludendorff admits that the enerty into the war of Rournania was a bitter blow, compelling him to realise his stupendous ■ responsibilities. He bowed his head, he [ said, and asked Almighty God to sustain him. Continuing, he says that the was confronted by growing difficulties. The Allied armies were developing, and j the increase in the war material was daily manifested on the Somme to an extent hitherto undreamed of. Consequently Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided to mobilise the whole of the physical, industrial, and moral resources of Germany. OPPOSED TO SUBMARINE WARFARE. Ludendorff toured the tvest front in I December, 1017, and was disagreeably impressed with the seriousness of the situation. He gave most anxious thoughts to defence, and decided to adopt the new tactics of lightly holding the front lines to obviate the growing losses. The failure «f the, earlier peace moves compelled the realisation that Germany's only watchword was "Victory or downfall." The whole of 1917 saw Ludendorff at variance with the civil authorities. He complains that through weakness and under-estimation of the allied strength the civil authorities hesitated to accede to his demand >for universal conscription of both sexes between the ages of 15 and CO. Finally, under extreme pressure, they enacted a weak compromise, doing more harm than good. Ludendorff describes the conflicting counsels concerning unrestricted submarine warfare. He and Hindenburg at first opposed it on the grounds that the time was not ripe for it, but gradually they were converted as the hopes of peace waned. They remained sceptical of the optimism of the naval experts, however, but personally they thought that the unrestricted warfare would be decisive within a year, before the intervention of America became effectual. The final decision was taken on January 9. After the refusal of the peace offers the Kaiser fell in with the views of the experts, and ordered the campaign to open on February 1.

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Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TDN19190920.2.104

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Taranaki Daily News, 20 September 1919, Page 12

Word count
Tapeke kupu
649

LUDENDORFF'S MEMOIRS. Taranaki Daily News, 20 September 1919, Page 12

LUDENDORFF'S MEMOIRS. Taranaki Daily News, 20 September 1919, Page 12

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