GERMANY'S DOWNFALL.

Taranaki Daily News, 13 September 1919, Page 10

GERMANY'S DOWNFALL.

. COLONEL BAUBER'S STORY* .. , 'ARMY DEMANDED PEACE, (From Our Special Correspondent)-. London, June 21. If anybody is still clinging to the notion that Germany was not really vanquished in the field, they should read the revelations of Colonel Bauer, which have just seen light in the German press. This officer was head of the Artillery Department at Headquarters, but is also credited by German public opinion with having been the special confident and political inspirer of Ludendorfl'. I-Jo has anticipated his chief's hook by publishing in pamphlet form the German General Staff's version of the events which led up to the armistice. From the facts which he relates, it is clear that Ludendorff realised quite early in August, 1918, that the war was lost, and that the request for an armistice was the result of urgent and repeated demands from General Headquarters. Prom the Colonel's narrative and the document?! he .cites it is also established that Prince Max's request for a cessation of hostilities, sent off on the night of October 4-5, was the result of the action not of the politicians, but of the generals, and that the motive behind it was the realisation that Germany had boen beaten in the field, and could only escape appalling military disaster by the transfer of the struggle from the battleground to the conference table. As quoted by the German papers, Colonel's Bauer's narrative stated that; on October 1 it was announced that the Chief Army Command has been compelled to take a terribly grave decision, and declares that, according to human probabilities, there is no longer any prospect of forcing peace on the enemy. Above all, said the report from Headquarters, two facts have been decisive for this issue. First, the tanks. The enemy has employed them in unexpectedly large numbers. Where, after a very liberal clouding of our positions with artificial mist, they effected a surprise, our men's nerves were often unequal to them. Here they broke through our first line, opened a way for their infantry, appeared in the rear, created local panics, and threw the control of the fighting into confusion. Whey they had once been identified, our tank-de-fence weapons and our artillery quickly settled with them. Then, however, the misfortune had already happened, and solely the success of the tanks explain the large numbers of prisoners, which so painfully reduced our strength, and brought about a more rapid consumption of reserves than we had hithorto been accustomed to.

We were not in a position to oppose *o the enemy equal masses of German tanks. Their construction would have exceeded the resources of our industry, which was strained to the uttermost, or other more important things would have had to be neglected. But it is the reserve situation which has become absolutely decisive. The army entered the groat battle with weaS complements. In spite of all the measurer, adopted, the strength nf our battalions sank from about SOO in April to about 540 at the end of September. Moreover, this number could only be maintained by the dissolution of twenty-two infantry divisions, the equivalent of sixty-six infantry regiments, The Bulgarian defend devoured seven further divisions. There in no prospect of bringing the strengths to a higher level. The current enrolments, the convalescents, and the combings-out will not even cover the losses of a tranquil winter campaign. Only the embodiment of the MOf) plans will give the battalion strength a single increase of 100 men. Then our last reserve of men will lie exhausted. The losses in the battle now in progress have been unexpectedly high, especially in officers. More than ever the troops require the example of their officers, whether in defence or attack. The officers had to. and have, recklessly risked and sacrificed themselves. The regimental commanders and higher leaders fought in the front line. Only one evample: Tn two days of battle, one division lost all its 'officers, killed or wounded. Three regimental commanders were killed. The small body of active officers still available has melted away. The building up of the division coming from the great battle is now hardly prae- • ticable. What is true of officers 'is also true of non-commissioned officers. Through American help the enemy !» m a position to replace his losses. American troops as such are not of special value, to sav nothing of being superior to ours. Where they attained initial successes by mass tactics they were repulsed in spite of their superiority in numbers. It was, however, decisive'that they were able to take over wide stretches of front, and thus give the English and French the po°sibilit.v to set free their own battle-tired divisions and create for themselves almost inexhaustible reserves. So far, our reserves have sufficed to fill the gaps. The railway brought them up promptly. Assaults of unparalleled severity were repulsed. The battles are described as of unexampled severity. Now our reserves' are coming to an end. Tf the enemy continues to attack, the situation may demand that we retire fighting along large stretches of the front. In this way, we can continue the war for an indefinite time, impose heavy losses on the enemy, and leave behind us devastated country, but that can no longer give us victory. These perceptions and events brought to maturity in the minds of the General-Field-Marshal and General Ludendorff the decision to propose to the Emperor to attempt to break off the struggle, in order to spare the German nation and its allies further sacrifices. Therefore no time must be lost. Any twenty-four hours mav change the situation for the worse, and give the enemy a chance of clearly recognising our present weakness. That might have the most disastrous consequences for the prospects of peace as for the military situation. Colonel Bauer gives interesting particulars as to the negotiations with regard to the text of the peace offer. In conferences with the Ministers in Berlin on October 2, Hindenburg insisted that the fourteen points should merely be taken as the "basis" of Rather than surrender large areas of territory, he said, Germany must continue the war. It was better to perish than be dishonored. This view was opposed hy Count Roorlern, who said that nindenburg had expressed the views of a soldier, but the statesman must try to save what was not irretrievably lost. Of the other Ministers present, namely, Payer. Hintze, Solf, and Friedher?;, oniy the Vice-Chancellor supported Hindenburg. Prince Max wished to herald the Peace Note by a speech in the Reichstag, but had the Cabinet unanimously against him on this point. Rolf, whose view on this matter was shared by Ludendorff, wished to send the Note simultaneously to America, Great Britain, and

France, but his proposal was opposed i>y HinUe and defeated. On October 3, Payer, on behalf of Prince Max, sent urgent interrogatories to Hindenburg, who replied that "The Chief Army Command adheres to its demand, made on Monday, September 29, that an offer of peace be immediately issued to our enemies. In consequence of the collapse of the Macedonian front, the consequent necessary weakening of our Western reserves, and in consequence of the impossibility of making good the very considerable losses which have occurred in the battles of the last few days, there is no longer within human calculation any prospect of forcing peace *n the enemy. The enemy for his part is continually bringing new fresh reserves into the battle. The German Army is still standing firmly jointed, and is victoriously repelling all attacks. The situation is, however, becoming acuter every day, and may force the Chief Army Command to momentous decisions'. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to break off the struggle, in order to spare the German nation and its allies useless sacrifices. Every day's delay costs thousands of brave soldiers their lives."