NAVY'S GREAT TASK.

Taranaki Daily News, 28 August 1919, Page 6

NAVY'S GREAT TASK.

WHEN THE WAR BEGAN. At Wellington on Thursday Lord <lellicoe said lie could wish that some 'more efficient mouthpiece than he could have been found to express the grateful thanks for the very kind references made to the work of the Royal Navy. New Zealand had offered the British Empire the battle cruiser New Zealand, in which ship they were very proud to be to-day. That offer had been made in consequence of speeches made in the British House of Commons pointing out the importance of the German naval menace. The example of this country had been quickly followed by Australia. The experience of this war had shown that the misgivings of the Admiralty in 190!) were very fully justified. It could even be said that the building programme of that year was inadequate to the needs of the situation. It was not only inadequate in capital ships, but inadequate in those other attributes which went to make up an efficient navy. In those days it had been difficult to persuade the people even that capital ships were required. There had been great opposition to the Admiralty's programme at that time; indeed, it had nearly caused a split in the Government of the day. But although money could be obtained with diffieulty for capital ships, it had not been possible to obtain it for all the other necessary attributes of a fleet, as docks, light cruisers, destroyers, and other vessels. The result was that when the war came it found the Navy deficient in these accessories, docks, light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. As a result, tire Navy' had to fight a very difficult battle for many years of the war. In the early days the. protection for our trade from the German China squadron had not been really adequate, and there had been serious misgivings as to the fate of the overseas expeditionary forces being brought to the European theatre of war. The difficulties of these early days had been intensified later when the German raiding cruisers and disguised vessels got through the blockade. It had always been a very easy thing for them to get through. It was impossible for the British fleet to prevent them from going up the coast of Norway, and the wonder of the British Government throughout the war had been why the Germans lost opportunities for sending out many more raiding vessels. Of those which tried to get out only two fell victims to the blockading squadron, and these two fell victims because they came out halfway between the Shetland Islands and the coast of Norway, into waters where it was possible for the British squadron to catch them.

FIGHTING THE SUBMARINE. But these dangers of lack of sufficient cruiser strength were as nothing to the dangers which came about from the German submarine campaigns. These dangers were brought about very largely from our lack of adequate numbers of destroyers. The only way to save tinmerchantmen was by the convoy system He had been pressed oil all sides to dj it, but he had been unable to do it because he had not the necessary vessels. Had he withdrawn his few destroyeis from the trade routes to inadequately protect convoys the losses would have been greater than they were. The only thing that enabled the Admiralty to adopt the convoy system had been the assistance of the American Navy in giving their whole destroyer forces. This had been another instance in which the Americans had shown that blood was thicker than water. When they came into the war they asked what the British required. He replied: "We want every destroyer and every small vessel in the United States Navy." The Americans sent their ships at once, and it'had been the assistance of those vessels which enabled the Admiralty to develop the convoy system which had done so much to save the merchantmen in the later days of the war. But in the early day* they had no destroyers, and no'power on earth could have produced in Ipks than six months the anti-submarine measures then being devised. Everything had to be made. Workshops had to be set up to make them, and there was no hope of anything effective being done before the autumn of 1918. Six bad months had to pass before the submarine menace could be taken in hand.