NAVAL SECRETS.

Taranaki Daily News, 2 August 1919, Page 10

NAVAL SECRETS.

TOLD BY ADMIRAL SIMS, DESPERATE 'DAYS OF U-BOAT WAR. THE CONVOY SYSTEM. The story of the United States Navy's work in helping to win the win- was told simply but vividly by Hear Admiral W, S. Sims, in a speeßh at a luncheon given in his honor by the English-speaking Union in New York, states the Christian. Science Monitor. The Admiral told many of the naval seciets irhich were so carefully guarded during the war, especially concerning the German submarine campaign of and also paid a,hearty tribute to the seamen of the merchant marine who refused to be denied the freedom of the seas by Germany. "When I arrived in England early in April, 1917," said Rear Admiral Sims, "and saw the cards laid'on the table I Was astounded at the situation, and within three days I cabled to Washington that if the submarine losses, kept up at the rate which they had then reached the war would inevitably be decided in favor of the Central Powers. I advised the sending to European waters of every American craft which could be used in combating the submarine, even if «ome of them had to be towed." Admiral Sims denied the reports that the convoy system was an American idea, the adoption of which was opposed by the English authorities until tests had demonstrated its utility. "The con. voy system was not adopted earlier for two reasons, both of which turned out to be wrong," he said. "Naval officers did not believe that merchant seamen could handle their ships effectively in the close formations necessary. I did not share this belief, because I had taught navigation for several years on the schoolship Pennsylvania, and I knew what the average naval officer has never learned, that the merchantman is a far better seaman than the naval offlcer. MERCHANTMEN AS SEAMEN. "The reason is that the merchant officer .passes his whole life at sea, while the naval officer stays on shore just as much as he can and goes to sea only when the Navy Department orders him there. So far from the Americans demanding the convoy system, we were rather behind the English in the matter When it was decided that such a system was necessary the second obstacle wa3 the attitude of the merchant sailors themselves. They doubted their own ability until they tried it out. "But its adoption made protection by destroyers with depth charges easy, To understand how easy it was it is necessary to understand the limitations of the submarine, which can proceed only a short distance under water, and must niways keep the power necessary for under-water action in reserve in order to escape an attach by our destroyers. The advantage of the destroyers lay in their grwiV speed—nearly forty land miles .in hour in the latest types—and the ability of their oil furnaces to reach full steam pressure and full speed almost at once.

TECHNIQUE OF DEPTH CHARGES. "The destroyers patrolled a zone outside the convoy sufficiently wide to preclude the possibility of a submarine attacking from beyond, its limits, and if the enemy was sighted the nearest destroyer rushed to the spot and dropped a cirsle of depth charges sufficiently large to include the submarine if it turned to the right. Then it dropped another circle to the left, or if there were two destroyers they dropped the (two circles simultaneously." On the subject of the number of German submarines in operation, Admiral Sims said: "While I was in London there arrived at various times parties of visiting American editors, and I was often asked to speak ,to them. I always asked them how many submarines they believed the enemy had in operation off the F.nglish and Irish coasts, and the answers always ran anywhere from 50 to 200. As a matter of fact, the Germans never had more than eight or nine out at one time. The depth charges made it difficult for them to keep their boats at sea, for when they were not actually destroyed by tha machines they often were damaged in such a way as to force them to put into port for repairs, and the morale of their crews jwas seriously affected. We destroyed from seven to fourteen submarines a month. Many of them were lost by striking mines. ENGLISH CHANNEL PROTECTED. "The English Channel was completely protected by mines, and Heligoland Bight was very dangerous for navigation t-y either side, as it was sown with minss for a distance of ISO miles out to sea. First the British laid mines there, and then tho Germans laid mines to catch the British mine-layers, and then the British laid mines to catch the German mine-layers, and so it went on." Admiral Sims paid a high tribute to the merchant service, whom, ho said, "you couldn't chase off the sea." He added, "But the foundation stone of the whole Allied military machine was the British Grand Fleet, lying in Scapa Flow, always ready ior sea on two hours' notice, and so much groaler in power that The High Sea Fleet never left port. With the British fleet in some way destroyed, even if v,-p hud had 10,000.000 soldiers and 1000 destroyers, and 30,000.000 tons of shipping, the Germans would have won a victory in short order."