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AFGHANISTAN.

WANTON 1 , CRAZY, AMD MEANINGI LESS WAR. SIR HAMILTON GRANT ON THE SITUATION. Sly Telegraph.—Press Assn.—Copyright. Allahabad, July 23. Addressing the Afghan delegates at Rawal Pindi. .Sir Hamilton Grant described the war as wanton, crazy, and meaningless, but warned tliem that the continuance of tlie war would mean annexation. In reply the president, of the Afghan delegation said the friendship of Britain to Afghanistan was not so esesntial as the friendship of Afghanistan to Britain. Although Britain was more powerful, there were possibilities of combination open to Afghanistan which would not make a British victory easy.—Aus. N.Z. Cable Assoc. BRITAIN'S AFGHAN POLICY. (By Sir Francis Younghusband.) The advent of a new • ruler on the Afghan throne is an occasion which may lead some of us to think again over the nature of our relations with Afghanistan. In our main policy we shall certainly make no change. In the future, as in the past, we shall preserve the independence of Afghanistan. What we may> well consider, though, is the best method of carrying that policy Into effect. Hitherto our method of preserving the j independence of Afghanistan has been to pay the ruler a subsidy and present him with arms on' condition that he had no relations with anyone but ourselves. The dominant consideration on which our relation with Afghanistan had been based had been the approach of Russia towards India. Russia was a great land-power advancing—irresistibly, bo it seemed—over tho level plains of Central Asia, absorbing one weak Khanate after another, till at length she had come 'into direct contact with Afghanistan, which country, also, she had tried to bring within the sphere of her influence. We were a distant island-Power with a minute army to all appearances incapable of permanently holding ludia against so formidable a rival so securely bsed. By every means at our disposal, therefore, we had to prevent the Russians from establishing themselves in Afghanistan, and thus securing the gateway to India. We wanted the warlike Afghans to be a buffer between us and the Russians. It was to our interest, we thought, that Afghanistan should .be united, strong and independent. And this being the Afghan wish also, our Interests appeared to be identical. So we gave the Afghan ruler money and arms, and gunwnteed his country against invasion on condition that he placed his foreign relations in our hands. Tliis policy and the method of carrying it out seemed to suit our immediate purposes fairly well. The stress of their expansion worked itself off eastward towards Manchuria instead of southwards towards India. And the late Amir resisted all the attempts of the Germans to make him sever his connection with us. So far so good. But tho question is whether, under the new condition? which new prevail a more satisfactory arrangement could not be. made. As long as Afghanistan allows herself to be paid money and arms she is not really independent. And as long as we pay .nonoy and arms to Afghanistan, but 'have no means of ensuring that these are not used for the suppression of rivals or of rebellion caused by oppression, and as long as we are responsible for protecting Afghanistan, but. have no means of ensuring that she does not provoke her neighbors, no one can call our own position satisfactory or dignified. What we really want on our Northwest frontier of India is a neighbor who will be both independent and friendly. And what we have to consider now is whether the payment of money and arms to a ruler is the best way of making a neighbor independent and friendly. On the face of it the method seems crude and clumsy, and more worthy of a huckstering trading company than a great people. And personally I have for years thought it thoroughly derogatory to us and degrading to the Afghans. But it has produced reasonably good results up to the present, and tliere is no use in abusing it unless a better can be j suggested. j The better method, I suggest, is that | of helping the Afghan rulers to make for j themselves all the money they need. By adopting it we ought' to be. able to mako them both more independent and mori friendly. The Afghans are an intelligent, a robust, and enterprising peoplj Their country does not abound in natural resources, but a great deal mora might be made out of it than is at present produced. What we should do Is to help the Afghans to develop themselves and their country. In place, therefore, of giving the ruler a subsidy and arms—whieh is not respecting, but debauching, his independence-—! would offer him unbounded opportunities for improving his country and strengthening his position by allowing j »nd inviting as many men as he may like to come to India and England to learn of us in military affairs, civil administration, science, agriculture, civil en-1 gineering, mining, and industrial devel- J opment. j Every facility for profiting by our accumulated knowledge and experience £ would place generously at the disposal of the Afghan ruler. and any of his subjects. I would not urge upon him that lie should take British supervisee and experts into his service in Aglutnistan. But I would invite him t& send Afghan officers and officials to cotoe and consort with; the great generals,at,tend rnir camps of instruction and staff Bourses, inspect our agricultural colleges and demonstration farms, irrigation capals,and canal colonies, mines,, factories, schools, colleges, and technical Institutions—and let them come and learn there also if they wished toIt is: perhaps unlikely that the now ruler would prefer these facilities to cash down and frequent supplies of guns and munitions. But there is no urgent hurry About fixing the Conditions of our relations with him, and it is worth the expenditure of much time and patience and friendly 'persuasion to bring him and his leading men round to see the ultimate advantage of this new manner of securing independence. By employing such a method we could put our hearts into our Afghan policy as we never have been able to put them When we were using the timid, degenerate methods of the past. s Our policy will become a truly forward policy, for it Tjrill bring Afghanistan forward, make her strong in her own strength, and therefore really independent,

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TDN19190730.2.35

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Taranaki Daily News, 30 July 1919, Page 5

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,057

AFGHANISTAN. Taranaki Daily News, 30 July 1919, Page 5

AFGHANISTAN. Taranaki Daily News, 30 July 1919, Page 5

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