FINAL STRUGGLE.

Taranaki Daily News, 21 July 1919, Page 11

FINAL STRUGGLE.

BEFORE THE ARMISTICE. GERMANY'S FORLORN HOPE. • Interesting light on the growing hopeless position of Germany in the closing e.tages of the war, hastened by the consummate generalship of Marshal Focli, which ended in tho armistice of last November is given in a recently published volume by the Union des Grandes Associations, 3 Rue Recamier, Paris. On the authority of the secret documents of ,thc French Grand Quartier General, the volume (says the Morning Post) shows to what utter straits the once victorious German Army had been reduced.

There is a picture of Marshal Foch, who every day received from the Heuond Bureau, a statement of the German Army, containing a list of tho divisions in line and in reserve, an estimate of their condition and value, and their distribution among the various armies. To this statement was appended a summary of the enemy's probable intentions. At regular intervals the same department issued,idiagrams showing the number of enemy divisions in the line tha.t required to be relieved and the divisions available to relieve them. Reserve divisions were divided into three categories; first, fresh divisions which had hnd more than one month's rest and were therefore completely reconstituted; secondly, reconstituted divisions which had been brought up to strength and had rested a fortnight to a month; and, thirdly, tired divisions just out of the line wliich had not had a fortnight's rest.

THE FINAL OFFENSIVE. Tho writer traces the general movements of great opposing armies leading up to the final offensive. Marshal Foch felt tha.t the moment had come for the decisive general assault. On August 23 lie wrote: "The offensive battle engaged in on July 18 . . . will be continued without respite so as to give the enemy no time ,to re-establish himself." Accordingly, he prepared three great cohverging attacks—the one in Flanders s the second in the centre, in which the British and French were to force the Hindenbnrg position from Cambrai to St. Quentin while the French on the right drove the enemy across the Aisne; and the third on either side of the Argonne.

These offensives opened between September 2(1 and September 28, and on October 9 the German Army abandoned the I-lindenburg position, which it believed impregnable. Between October 10 and October 20 the enemy's retreat became general on the whole front from the North Sea to the Meuse: Between September 20 and October 20, 13!) Clermnn divisions out of 101 were engaged in tho battle. On October 11 44 divisions in the line wore incapable of hard fighting, and to replace them the enemy had only seven fresh divisions that might bo withdrawn from quiet sectors.

Tho Second Bureau summed up the situation in the following words: "It is impossible for the enemy, with the forces he has at present in "the line, to stop and. face any considerable attack for an appreciable time."

Hindenburg had already written his letter to .the Chancellor, On September 28 tho Supreme Command had informed the Chancellor that an armistice was necessary, and on October 4 Prince Max of Baden had telegraphed to President Wilson asking for a suspension of hostilities. The Germans were ready to throw up the sponge.

ARMY DWINDLES AWAY. Between July 15 and November 11 the enemy had broken up twenty-thre divisions, and his reserves had dwindled away, and that although his front had been shortened by about a quarter. His infantry, despite reinforcements received from .the twenty-three divisions broken up, was about half the strength of what it had been on July 15, and on November 10 the majority of his divisions numbered between 1000 and 2000 combatants. Practically no fresh reserves remained. The moral of the army was very low, as is shown by a number of quotations from German documents, while their material was passing through a state of acute crisis. On July 15 the Germans had about 12,500 field guns and 7860 heavy guns, or 20,300 pieces in all. On November 10 they had about 9000 field guns and 4500 heavy guns, or 13,500 pieces in all. Their artillery strength had been dimished by one-third. Their ammunition stocks were so low that they had had to suppress barrage Are, Finally, and most important of all, at the beginning of November the Allies had a reserve of eighty divisions, which was steadily increasing. The German High Command realised that even retreat was impossible without a disaster, and therefore demanded an armistice.