THE PRICE OF VICTORY.

Taranaki Daily News, 21 June 1919, Page 11

THE PRICE OF VICTORY.

BRITAIN'S CASUALTIES, FEATURES OF THE WAR, HAIG'S FINAL DISPATCH. The War Office released for publication in April Field-Marshal Haig's final dispatch. Part I deals with the advance 'nto Germany, Part II with the general features of the war, and Part 111 consists of the Commander-in-Chief's acknowledgments of services rendered by various commanders and others. The most valuable section is that Which discusses the features of the War. The following will be read with interest:—

Obviously the greater the length of 4 war the higher is likely to be the number of casualties incurred in it on either side. The same causes, therefore, which served to protract the reoent struggle are largely responsible for the extent of out casualties. There can be no question that to our general unpreparedhess must be attributed the loss of many thousands of brave men, whoso sacrifice we , deeply deplore, while we regard their splendid gallantry and self' devotion With unstinted admiration and gratitude.

Given, however, the military situation existing in August, 1914, our total losses 111 the War have been no larger than Were to be expected. Neither do they dompire unfavorably with those of any other Of the belligerent nations, so far aa figures are available from which comparison call be made. The total British casualties in all theatres of war, killed, Wounded, missing, and prisoners, including native troops, are approximately three millions (3,078,388). Of this total some two and a half millions (2,508,834) were incurred on the Western Front. The total French losses, killed missing, and prisoners, but exclusive of wounded, have been given officially as approximately 1,831,000. If an estimate for wounded is added, the total can scarcely be less than 4,800,000, and of this total ft is fair to assume that over four millions were on the Western Front. The published figures for Italy, killed and wounded only, exclusive of prisoners, amount to 1,400,000, of which practically the whole were incurred in fhe Western theatre of warFigures have also been published for Germany and Austria. The total German casualties, killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners, are given at approximately six and a half millions (6,480,000), of which the vastly greater proportion must have been incurred on the Western Front, where the bulk of the German forces were concentrated and the hardest fighting took place. In view of the fact, however, that the number of German prisoners is definitely known to be considerably understated, these figures must be accepted With reserve. The losses of Austria Hungary in killed, missing, and prisoners are given as approximately two and three-quarter millions (2,772,000). -An estimate of wounded would give a total of over four and a half millions.

He extent of our casualties, like the duration of the War, was dependent on Certain definite factors, Which can be stated shortly. In the first place, the military situation compelled us, particularly during the fifst portion of the war, to make great efforts before we had developed our full Strength in the field or properly equipped Mid trained our armies. These efforts were wasteful of men, but in the circumstances they could not be avoided. The only alternative was to do nothing and gee our French allies overwhelmed by the enemy's superior forces. During the second half of the war, and that part embracing the critical and costly period of the Wearing-ont battle, the losses previously suffered by our allies laid Upon the British armies in France an increasing share in the burden of attack. From the opening of the Somme battle in 1916 to the termination of - hostilities the British armies were subjected to a strain of the utmost severity, which never ceased, and consequently had little or no opportunity for the rest and training they so greatly needed.

In addition to these particular considerations, certain general factors peculiar to modern war made for the inflation of losses. The gTeat strength of modern field defences and the power and precision of modern weapons, the multiplication of machine-guns, trench mortars, frnd artillery of all natures, the emuloyt ment of gas, and the rapid development of the aeroplane as a formidable agent of destruction against both men and material, all combined to increase the price to be paid for victory. tt only for these reasons, no comparican Usefully be made between the relative losses incurred in this war and any previous War. There' is, the • furtfier consideration that the issues involved in ,this stupendous struggle (were far greater than those concerned ••in 4ny other war in recent history. Qur existence as an Empire; and civilisation itself as it is understood by the free nations were at stake. Men fought as they have never fought before in masses? >■"' .

Despite our. own particular handicaps ond| the foregoing general considerations, it fs satisfactory to note that, as the result ojt the courage and determination of ;and,the high level of leaderdjijj' generally -nflitintained, our losses, even in attack over the whole period of 'ihe ,-battle,. compare favorably with thojie inflicted on our opponents. The approximate .total of our .battle casualties In 4all'ic:arms, and including overseas troops, from the commencement of the Sojjame battle in 1916 to the conclusion of the armistice 19 2,140,00. The calculation of German losses is obviously a matter of great difficulty. It is estimated, however, that the number of casualties inflicted .0n,,/the enemy by British troops during the above period exceeds two and a. half millions. It is of interest, moreover, in the light of .the paragraph next following, that more than half the total casualties incurred by us in the fighting of 1918 were occasioned during the five months, MarchJuly, when our armies were on the defensive. WHY WE ATTACKED WHENEVER POSSIBLE. - Closely connected with the question of casualties is that of the relative values of attack and defence. It is a view often expressed that the attack is more expensive than the defence. This is only a half statement of the truth. Unquestionably, unsuccessful attack is generally more expensive than defence, particularly If the attack is pressed home with cow«ga and resolution. On the other hand,

attack E5 siessed. home. >f skilfully conauctea, is rflfeiy TmsmreesSiui, Whereas, 111 its later stages especially, unsuccessful defence is far more costly than AttackMoreover, the object of all war is victory, and a purely defensive attitude can never bring about a successful decision, either in a battle or a campaign. The idea, that a war can be won by standing on the defensive and waiting for the enemy to attack is a dangerous fallacy which owes its inception to the desire to evade the price of victory. It is an axiom that decisive success in battle can be gained only by a vigorous offensive. The principle here stated has long been recognised as being fundamental, and is based on the universal teaching of military history in all ages. The course of the present war has proved it to be correct. To pass for a moment from the general to the particular, and consider the light of the present war to the facts upon which this axiom is based. A defensive role sooner or later brings aboiit a distinct lowering of the morale of the troops, who imagine that the enemy must be the better man, or at least more numerous, better equipped with and better served by artillery or othor mechanical aids to victory. Once the mass of the defending infantry become possessed of such ideas, the battle is as good as lost. An army fighting on enemy soil, especially if its standard of discipline is high, may maintain a successful defence for a protracted period, in the hope that victory may be gained elsewhere or that the enemy may tire or weaken in his resolution and accept a compromise. The resistance of the German armies was undoubtedly prolonged ift this fashion, but ill the end the persistence of our troops lad its natural effect.

Further, a defensive policy involves the losS of the initiative, with iill the consequent disadvantages to the defender. The enemy is able to choose at his own convenience the time and place of his attacks. Not being influenced himself by the threat of attack from his l opponent, he can afford to take risks, and by greatly weakening his front in some places can concentrate an overwhelming force elsewhere With which to attack. The defender, on the other hand, bacomes almost entirely, ignorant of the dispositions and plans of his opponent, who is thus in a position to effect a surprise. This was clearly exemplified during the fighting of 1918. As long as the enemy was attacking he obtained fairly full information regarding our dispositions. Captured documents showed that, as soon as he was thrown once more on the and the initiative returned to the Allies, he Was kept in comparative ignorance of our plans and dispositions. The consequence was that the Allies were able to effect many surprises, both strategical and tactical. As a further effect of the loss of the initiative and ignorance of his opponent's Intentions, the defender finds it difficult to avoid a certain dispersal of his forces. Though for a variety of reasons, including the fact that we had lately been on the offensive, we were by no means ignorant of the enemy's intentions in the spring of ) 918, the unavoidable uncertainty resulting from a temporary loss of the initiative did have the effect of preventing a complete concentration of our reserves behind the point of the enemy's attack.

An additional reason, peculiar to the circumstances of the present war, which In itself compelled me to Tefnse to adopt (i purely defensive attitude so long as any other was open to me, is to be found In the geographical position of our armies. For reasons stated by me in my dispatch of July 20, 1918, we could not afford to give much ground on any part of our front. • The experience of the tvar has shown that if the defence is to be maintained successfully, even for a limited time, it must be flexible.

THE END OF THE WAR. If the views set out by me in the preceding paragraphs are accepted, it will be recognised that the war did not follow any unprecedented course, and that itß end was neither sudden, nor should it have been unexpected. The rapid collapse of Germany's military powers in the latter half of 19i8 was the logical outcome of the fighting of the previous two years. It would not have taken place but for that period of ceaseless attrition which used up the reserves of the German armies, while the constant and growing pressure of the blockade sapped with more deadly insistence from year to year at the strength and resolution of the German people. It is in the great battles of 1910 and 1917 that we have to seek for the secret of our victorv in 1918.

Doubtless, the end might have come sooner had we i been able to develop the military resources of the Empire more rapidly and with a higher degree of concentration, or had not the defection of Russia in 1917 given our enemies a new lease of life.

So far as the military situation is concerned, m spite of the gTeat accession of strength Which Germany received as the result of the defection of Russia, the battles of 1916 and 1917 had so far weakened her armies that the effort they made in 1918 was insufficient to secure victory. Moreover, the effect of the battles of 1918 and 1917 were not confined to loss of German man power. The moral effects of those battles were enormous, both in the German Army and in Germany, By their means our soldiers established over the German soldier a moral superiority which they held in an ever increasing degree until the end of the war, even in the difficult days of March and April, 1918.