The Daily News. TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1919. ANGLO-AMERICAN SEA POWER.

Taranaki Daily News, 6 May 1919, Page 4

The Daily News. TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1919. ANGLO-AMERICAN SEA POWER.

When entertained at a luncheon; in London last week, Mr. Jqsephus Daniels, American Naval Secretary, made a speech which should serve to allay the speculation and mistrust concerning the ambitious naval programme entered upon by the President and Government of the United States. The matter was certainly one that needed placing in its true light before Britain and the world. Without some satisfactory explanation of the meaning of a programme that involved an expenditure of five hundred million sterling on new warships in the next ten years, there was ground for assuming that the spirit of jingoism had infected President Wilson and his advisers, especially in view of the President's cable to Congress urging that the speedy passage of the Navy Bill was of the utmost importance. Apart from the surprise and concern occasioned by this remarkable policy, it seemed inexplicable that at a time when the imperative necessity for reduction of armaments was being promulgated, and when President Wilson was taking a leading part in a conference having for its object the permanent peace of the world, that he should select that particular time for announcing what appeared to be a determination on America's part to become the dominant sea power, without other justification than what might be regarded as an outburst of mere vanity. The occasion was one whieh might have been at least expected to have produced a frank statement of the object in view, but beyond the bald statement that the American Navy must be equal, if not superior, to that of any other Power, there was nothing to indicate the meaning of the new departure. According to Mr. Archibald Hurd (Fortnightly Review) this programme is the second of a set of three, designed to create the "greatest navy." The American Navy is at present equal to the combined navies of France, Italy and Japan. The carrying out of the first programme, which was formulated in 1916, was interfered with by the war, the Navy Department postponing the work of construction on capital ships and concentrating on destroyers and submarines. It is now intended to complete the original programme by 1921, and to start on the second programme, to be completed by 1925, while the third, according to Admiral Badger, will put the American Navy on an equality with "any in the world, so far as we can see in the future," and the cost of maintaining such a navy is estimated at £200,000,000 a year. Naturally ths solution of this riddle has exer cised the minds of statesmen, experts and the people of the British Empire considerably. The policy dictating this huge expenditure on naval armament is capable of explanation in several ways, any or all of which may be wide of the mark. It might be a political move to be used as a lever for enforcing general disarmament, but, if so, it would certainly not affect Britain's maintaining her maritime supremacy, without which the Empire would be in danger at its most vital point. On the other hand, there is a possibility that America desires to become stronger at sea in order to take her full share of policing the world, as part of the duty necessi tated by a backing for force for the League of Nations. America has learned by experience that ar [ mies may, to some extent, be improvised, but that an efficient navy *can only be obtained by a process

of slow growth. It is also obvious that the Powers who intend to make the League a success must bring their navies to a high pitch of perfection. It may be that President Wilson recognises there is a moral obligation on the part of America to take this full share in backing up the decisions of the League, in conjunction with Britain, but it is manifest that such a laudable intent would have been proclaimed had it been the operating factor in this naval development. There is yet another possible explanation of America's naval expansion. America may* not fully recognise how vitalily essential it is to Britain, with her far-flung Empire and her dependence on overseas supplies, to possess the command of the seas. We have also to bear in mind the fact that America is bent on largely increasing her mercantile marine, and capturing as much as she can of the carrying trade, which before the war was in German hands, and that fleet will require protection and watchful care There is ample justification for a large increase in the American Navy, but although Mr. Daniels has scouted the idea of rivalry with Britain in naval supremacy, and stressed the need for co-operation, it would have been more satisfactory if he had explained more frankly the real reason for America having a navy equal to Britain's. The reference to America's large coastline is manifestly not convincing, and though the mystery still exists it will be good policy to assume that co-operation rather than rivalry will be the policy of the future.