TURNING POINT OF THE WAR

Taranaki Daily News, 9 January 1919, Page 5

TURNING POINT OF THE WAR

EPIC FIGHTING OF THE BRITISH —■ . * AGAINST SUPERIOR ENEMY FORGES ALLIES' PLANS COMPLETELY REALISED SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S MOVING DISPATCH

£ecsived Jan. 8, 8.25 p.m. London, Jan. 7. A gazette has been issued containing Sir Douglas dispatch, dated December 21, covering the period anee the termination of the great defensive battles <tt the Soirme and the Lys. The dispatch states that last April tho German attacks, though unsuccessful, had restricted the Allies' resources to the uttermost, and the possibility of tho immediate renewal'of the enemy offensive tru viewed with grave anxiety. On the contrary, the enemy undoubtedly had suffered severely, but possessed ■efficient superiority of force to retain the initiative, which, however, he could not afford to delay in applying, owing to the increasing growth of the American Amy. The British policy was to maintain active defence until the equilibrium ot strength was reached. The complete success of the Allied counter-attack near Soissons on July 18 marked the turning point' of the campaign, after which the initiative lay witb VU Allies.

"At this point, and in this condition,'' says Sir Douglas Haig, "I should like to pay a personal tribute to the foresight and determination of the French Marshal in whose hands the co-ordination of action of the Allied armies was placed." GREAT RAILWAY WORKS. Bu* Douglas Haig proceeds to describe the steps taken during the period of active defence to repair the effe; is of the enemy breaches in the defensive system, and Bhows how, in consequence of the enemy fire commanding important railway construction and railway junctions the Allies undertook a compreLensive programme of railway construction, in order to Tender traffic between the north and south independent of Amiens. This involved the laying of 200 miles of broadgauge track. 6000 MILES OF TRENCHES. Between April and July the new offensive work involved digging 6000 m'.es of trendies. Meantime our fighting troops severely harassed the enemy in the Lys sector, delaying and ultimately preventing the renewal of the German offensive there. SERIES OF VICTORIES. The outstanding feature of toe events described is Sir Douglas Haig's own account of the great series of British victories between August 8 and November 11. He says at Amiens and at Bapaume, in the breaking of the Drocourt-Queant and Hindenburg systems, before Le Cateau and on the Selle, in Flanders and on the Sambre, the enemy was again and again brought to battle and defeated. THE FINAL DEFEAT.

The enemy was finally defeated in the gnat battle* of November 1 and i, and, utterly without reserves, at the date of the armistice he was falling back, without coherent plan and in widespread disorder and confusion.

PORCING A CONCLUSION. In further referent* to the situation when hostilities ceased, Sir Douglas Haig states that by the end of October the British armies were in a position to prevent the enemy's withdrawal.to shorter lines, and the British were able to force aa immediate conclusion.

THE ENEMY BROKEN , The despatch discloses that the prin«4, *>sal British attack was to have taken puce on November 1, after Valenciennes was captured.

Sir Douglas Haig gays: "In the fight, ing on and subsequent to that date we broke the enemyi resistance beyond the possibility of recovery, and the enemy thereafter was capable neither of accept*nj; nor refusing battle."

ALLIES' PLAN COMPLETELY REALISED

fhe Allies' strategic plan was realised fiih a completeness rarely seen in war, and when the armistice was signed the enemy's defensive powers were already definitely destroyed, and tfte continuance of hostilities could only have meant disaster to the German armies, and an annad Invasion of Germany.

EPIC FIGHTING OF THE BRITISH. In tbe coarse of eloquent passages Sir Douglas Haig says: "In three months the epic fighting of the British armies in France brought a sudden and dramatic end to the great wearing-out battles of the put four years. . The confidence of our troops throughout the years of ■train never wavered. The annals of war hold no record of a more wonderful recovery than that which three months after the tremendous blows showered upon them on the Somme and Lys saw the undefeated British armies advancing from victory to victory, finally forcing tbe erstwhile triumphant enemy to acknowledge unconditional defeat" VTOKDEKFDL ACHIEVEMENTS.

In tbe decisive contests of the period covered, Sir Douglas Haig says: "The' British attacked tie strongest and most tital fart* of

lateral communications, fought his best divisions to a standstill on different battle fronts; 187,000 prisoners were taken, 2085 guns, 29,000 machine guns and 3000 trench mortars were captured. These results were achieved by fiftynine British divisions, which engaged and defeated ninety-nine separate German divisions in three months, despite the accepted military doctrine that in good defensive positions any given force can hold up a considerably greater attacking force (and this our defence proved in March and April) Yet when the tide of battle turned, and the British attacked and completely destroyed the German resistance, the British were numerically inferior to the defeated German forces." THE MAGNIFICENT INFANTRY. Sir Douglas Haig pays a tribute to the most magnificent spirit of the men. Referring to the infantry, he says: "Despite the enormous development of mechanical invention in eveTy phase of warfare the place which the infantryman has always held as tU main substance and foundation of an army is as secure to-day as in any period of history. The infantryman remains the backbone of defence and the spearhead of attack. At no time has the reputation of the British infantryman been higher or achievement more worthy of his renown. No prai3e can be too high for the valor he has shown, and no gratitude too deep for the work he has accomplished." TRIBUTES TO VARIOUS ARMS. Sir Douglas Haig also refer; to the unsurpassable work of the artillery :.nd cavalry, adding: "The recent fighting showed that the cavalry was still a necessary arm in modern war."

I ing strength and in fighting efficiency." I (5) The largo reserves of the enemy "enabled him to carry out extensive training with units completed to establishment." Plana were worked out in detail with tho French to meet the various possibilities of enemy attack, and these included a hostile offensive on the line of the Somme River.

DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES. Such was the position in March, when there were all the indications of a German offensive on the Somme. In distributing 1113 forces Sir Douglas Haig had regard tc> three considerations! (1) In the northern portion of the British area lie the northern Channel ports of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, the security of which necessitated the maintenance of sufficient troops in the neighborhood. Little or no ground could be given up on this front, and therefore the necessary reserves must be kept in close proximity. (2) In the central portion lie the northern collieries of France and certain important tactical features which cover our lateral communications.

Here, also, little or no ground could be given up, except in the Lys Valley itself. (3) In the southern portion of the British area south-east of Arras, in contrast to the central and northern portions, ground could be given up under great pressure without serious consequences, the forward area of this sector consisting chiefly of a wide expanse of territory devastated by the enemy last spring in his withdrawal. When the German offensive began, the Fifth Army, under General Gough, which linked up with the French, behind defences which were not completed, consisted of fourteen | divisions and three cavalry divisions. The latter, with three infantry divisions, were in reserve, and the disposition "only allowed of an averago of one division to some 6750 yards of front." The Third Army had eight divisions in line, with seven in reserve, and each division covered 4700 yards of front. The total force of the British on ■the original battle front was thirty-two divisions, and against these the Germans employed sixty-four divisions on the first day of the offensive. USING THE RESERVES. Once the main attack had developed Sir Douglas Haig collected eight divisions from the reserves behind the line in the north. These were put in before the end of March, and by April 9 another four divisions had been brought iii. Forty-six British divisions in all wen used in the Somme battle. Before these reinforcements could arrive Sir Douglas Haig had discussed the situation on several occasions with the French Commander, and after the afternoon of March 23 "arrangements were made as ■rapidly as possible for the French to take over the front held by the Fifth Army 4011 th of Peronne." How critical were the decisions that Sir Douglas Haig had to make at this time is emphasised ■by the account of the Lys battle. An attack had been foreseen on the Lys before March 21. It was delivered when Sir Douglas Haig had already engaged in 'the Somme battle forty-six out of his total force of fifty-eight divisions. In the Lys battle the Germans used fortytwo divisions, while the British had only 'twenty-five divisions, seventeen of whic had already come through the terri!;! experiences of the Soioiue" front.

Sir Douglas Haig also pays tributes to other arms, including the gas oervices, which discharged between March and November 2250 tons of gas; also the Forestry Corps, which for the year ended October 31 cut two and a half million tons of timber for the Anglo-French armies. Tho despatch concludes with reference to the harmonious relations with the Allie3, undimmed by any hint of discord or conflict of interests or ideals. IN THE DARK DAYS OF MAftCH.

In the ate weeks of almost constant fighting, from March 21 to April 30, a total of fifty-five British infantry divisions \va3 employed on the battle fronts against a force of 109 different German divisions. During this period a total of 141 different German divisions were engaged against the combined British and French forces. NUMBERS TOO WEAK. That is the essence of what has sometimes seemed the inexplicable story of •thfl greatest disaster to the Allies and the greatest heroism of lie war in France. Sir Douglas Haig was in a position where "the extent of our front made it impossible, with, the forces under my command, to have adequate reserves at all points threatened." His front had been greatly extended, the strength of his divisions had been reduced; and their fighting efficiency had been more than correspondingly lowered. The Fifth Army was simply too weak in numbers to hold •the front assigned to it, and upon the Fifth Army fell the heaviest weight of the German blow. Everywhere along the line the British forces were outnumbered. They were outnumbered must heavily at the point where the first blow fell.

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S STORY OF THE GREAT CRISIS.

THE TRAGEDY OP THE FIFTH ARMY Sir Douglas Haig's dispatch describing the operations of March and April last was published some wciiks ago. It filled 27 pages of The London Gazette, and .(says the Westminster Gazette, in a crisp, lucid precis in narrative form) "it tells a noble story of the British Army in the face of disaster and in victory. How near tho Germans came to reaching their goal they probably never realised. The situation was saved" by the grim tenacity of men who went straight from one battlefield to another, and who held their positiona to the last. Well may Sir Douglas Haig write, as he approaches the end of the story: "The splendid qualities displayed by all ranks and services throughout the Somme and Lys battles make it possible to view with confidence whatever further test* the future may bring." There is not space here to recount the various movements in the battles of tho Somme and the Lys, it which Sir Douglas Haig gives a full narrative. A first question is, why the break tcok place, and upon that point the dispatch gives us much light. The disappearance of Russia from the fight had enabled Germany to transfer forty-six divisions from East to West between November, 1917, and March, 1018. Germany had then available 192 divisions in Franco and Flanders. In the face of this situation the Allies Jiad, early in the winter, decided upon a defensive rather than un offensive policy. The Americans were not expected to be available, and without them the Allies were gravely outnumbered. Sir Douglas Haig, "pursuant to a decision taken by the British Government," took over in January twenty-eight miles of the French front, and at the same time "the French forces which had co-operated so successfully on the left of the British in Flanders had been withdrawn." The taking over of this twenty-eight miles left the British only seven weeks in which to organise the defences of a position in which "old systems had to be remodelled and new systems created." The time was not suiiicient, 'but "a large portion of the work was in fact completed before tho enemy launched hit great attack."

THE COMMANDER'S DIFFICULTY. Sir Douglas Haig was in a quintuple difficulty: (1) The.strenuous efforts made by the British forces during 1917 had left the Army at a low ebb in regard both to training and numbers. (2) Training had hitherto been primarily devoted to preparation for offensive operations. (3) There bad not been time and labor for the proper preparation of rear-line systems of defence.

(4) "Under instructions from the Army Council the reorganisation of divisions from a 13-battaUon to a 10-battalion