IF THE FLEET HAD GONE BACK.

Taranaki Daily News, 4 January 1919, Page 6

IF THE FLEET HAD GONE BACK.

i-'' AMBASSADOR'S :: STORY.'

:G'ALLIPOLI ■■■.SHORT OF; MUNITIONS' 1

"WE MAY HOLD OUT A FEW:

v HOURS*

Mr Henry Morgentliau. formerly American Ambassador to Turkey, makes (some astounding revelations in an article in the World's. Work. He states that the Turks were practically without ammunition after the abortive attempt of the Allies -to force the Dardanelles on ,18th March, 1815,. and that a second attempt would certainly have been attended with success, involving the fall of Constantinople and the break-up of tke Ottoman Empire. With the sole exception of Enver, the enemy leaders —'both Turkish and German—were prepared for defeat.

Having visited all the important places on the Anatolian side, we took a, launch and sailed over to the Oallipoli ■peninsula (Mr Morgenthau writes). At , Kilid-ul-Bahr till© batteries were of about the same character as those on the other side; they formed one of the main defences of the Straits. Here everything, so far as a layman could judge, was in excellent condition, barring the fact that the artillery pieces \Vere of old design, and tihe ammunition not at all plentiful.'

Tlie batteries showed signs of a heavy bombardment. None had been destroyed, but shell holes surrounded the fortification. My Turkish and Qerman friends looked at -these evidences of destruction rather seriously, and tlliey ■were outspoken in their admiration for the aceurracy of the Allied fire.

"How do they ever get the range?" Tliis was the question they were asking each other What made the shooting eo remarkable was til'.at it came, not from Allied sEips in the Straits, but from ships stationed in the Aegean Sea, on the other side of the Gallipoli peninsula. The gunners had never seen their target, but had to fire at a distance ot nearly 10 miles, over high thills, and yet many of their shells barely missed the batteries at Kilid-ul-Bahr FANATICAL TURKS When I was there, however, the place was quiet, for no lighting was going on that day. For my particular benefit the officers put one of tlheir gun-crews through a drill, so that I could obtain a perfect picture of the behaviour of the Turks in action.

Everything was -quickness and alertness; evidently the Germans had been excellent instructors, but there was more to it than German military precision, for the men faces lighted up with all that fanaticism which supplies the morale of Turkish soldiers. These gunners momentarily imagined that they were shooting once more at the infidel English, and the exercise was a congenial one. Above iihe shouts of all I could hear the sing-song shants of the leader, intoning the prayer with which the Moslem has rushed to battle for thirt en centuries:

"Allaih is great, there is but one God, and Mohammed is his Prophet!" When I looked upon these frehzied men, and saw so plainly written in their 'faces their uncontrollable, hatred of the unbelievers, I called to mind what the Germans had said in the morning about tilie wisdom of not putting Turkish and German soldiers together. I am quite sure that, had this been done, here at least the "Holy War" would have proved a success, and that the Turks would Ihave vented their hatred of Christians on those who happened to be nearest at hand, for the moment overlooking the fact that they were Allies.

ALLIED ATTACK.

I returned to Constantinople that evening, and two days afterwards, on 18th March, the Allied fleet made its greatest attack. As . all the world knows that attack proved disastrous to the Allies. The outcome was tilie sinking of the Botivet, the Ocean, and the Irresistible, and the serious crippling of four other vessels. Of the 16 ships engaged in this battle of the 18th, seven were thus put temporarily or premanently out of action. Naturally U'ne Ger> mans and Turks rejoiced over this victory The police went around, and ordered householders each to display a prescribed number of flags in honor of the event. The Turkish people have so little spontaneous patriotism and enthusiasm of any kind that they would never decorate tlheir establishments without euch definite orders! As a matter of fact, neither German nor Turks regarded this celebration too seriously, for they were not yet persuaded that they had won a, victory.

Moat still believed that the Allied fleets would succeed in forcing their way through. The only question, fliey said, was whether the Entente was ready to sacrifice the necessary number of ships. Neither Wangenheim nor Pallavicini believed that the disastrous experience of the 18tta would end the naval attack, and for days they anxiously waited for the fleet to return. This was the general expectation, for no one believed that the Allies, after making this great demonstration, would accept defeat after the loss of only three ships. The !high tension last for days and weeks jifter the repulse of the 18th. We were still momentarily expecting the renewal of the attack. But the great .jM-mada never returned .

THE ETERNAL QUESTION

Should it have come back? Could the Allied ships really have -captured Constantinople? I am coutantly asked this question. As a layman, my own opinion can have little value, but I have quoted the opinions of the German gener&ls and admirals, and of the Turks—practically all of whom, excepting Enver, believed that the enterprise would succeed, and 1 am half inclined to believe -that Enver's attitude was merely a case of graveyard whistling. In what I now have to say on this point, therefore, I wish it understood that I am not giving my own views, but merely those of the officials then in Turkey who were best qualified to judge.

Envcr had told me. in our talk on the deck of the Yuruk, that he had "plenty of guns—plenty of ammunition." But this statement was not true. A glimpso at the map will show why Turkey was not receiving munitions from Germany or Austria at that time The fact was that Turkey was just as completely isolated from her allies then as was Russia. There were two railroad lines leading from Constantinople to Germany. One went by way of Bulgaria and Serbia. Bulgaria was then not an ally; oVjS.n. though she had gt,the .aw

>sage;of guns., and 1 shells, this line could' 'notiave been used, since Serbia, which, controlled tlie vital link, extending from; 'Nislii-to Belgrade, was still intact Theother railroad line went through Bumania, by way of Bucharest. This route was independent■«£ Serbia, and,, had the Roumanian Government consented, it would have formed a clear route from Krupp's to the Dardanelles.

The fact that munitions could be sent off with the connivance of the Eoumanian Government perhaps accounts for the suspicion that guns and shells were going by that route. Day after day the French and British Ministers protested at Bucharest against this alleged violation of neutrality, only to be met with angry denials that .the Germans were using this line.

There is no doubt now that the Rumanian Government was perfectly honorable in making these denials: It it not unlikely that the Germans themselves started all these stories merely to fool the Allied fleet into the belief that their supplies were inexhaustible. "WE SHALL TAKE. TO THE HILLS."

Let us suppose that the Allies had returned say on the morning of the 19th, what would have happened! The one overwhelming fact is that the fortifications were very short of ammunition. They had almost reached the limit of their resisting powers when the British licet passed out on .the afternoon of the 18th.

I had secured permission for Mr George A. Schreiner, the well-known American correspondent of the Associated Press, to visit the Dardanelles on this occasion. On the night of the ISth, this correspondent discussed the situation with General Mertens, who was the chief technical officer at the Straits. General Mertens admitted that the outlook was very discouraging for the defence.

"We expect that IBie British will come early to-morrow morning," he said, "and if they do we may be able to hold out for a few hours." General Mertena did not declare in so many words that the ammunition was practically exhausted, but Mr Schreiner discovered that such was the ease. The fact was that Fort Hamidie, the most powerful defence on the Asiatic side, had just 17 armor-piercing shells-left, while lit Kilid-ul-Bahr, which was the main defence on the European side, there were precisely 10, "I should advise you to get up at six o'clock to-morrow morning," said General Mertens, "and take to the Anatolian hills. "That's what we are going to do." The troops at all the fortifications liad their orders to man the guns until the last shell had been fired, and then to abandon, the forts

SIMPLE PROBLEM. "'W

Once these defences became helpless, the problem of the Allied fleet would have been a simple one. The only bar to their progress would have been the minefield, which stretched from a point about two miles north of Erenkeui to Kilid-ul-Bahr. But the Allied fleet bad plenty of mine-sweepers, which could have made a channel in a few hours. North of Tehanak, as I have already explained, there were a few guns, but they were of the 1878 model, and could not discharge projectiles that could pierce modern armor plate. North of Point Nagara there were only two batteries, and both dated from 1835. Thus, once having silenced the outer Straits, there was nothing to bar the passage to Constantinople except the German and Turkish warships. The Goeben was the only first-class fighting fihip in either fleet, and it would not have lasted long against the Queen Elizabeth. The disproportion in the strength of the opposing fleets, indeed, was so enormous that it is doubtful whetlher there would have been an engagement. Thus the Allied fleet would have appeared before Constantinople on the morning of the 20th. What would iliave happened then ? We have heard much discussion as to whether this purely nftVal attack was justified. Enver, in his conversation with ine, had laid much stress on the absurdity of sending a (leet to Constantinople, supported by no adequate landing force, and much of the criticism passed upon the Dardanelles expedition since has centred on that point. Yet it is my opinion that this purely naval attack was justified. I base this judgment purely upon the political situation whidhi then existed in Turkey OTTOMAN STATE SHAKING,

As a matter of fact the whole Ottoman State, on that day of 18th March, I!) 15, when the Allied fleet abandoned the attack, was on tihe brink of dissolution. Ali over Turkey ambitious chieftains had arisen, who were momentarily expecting the fall, qnd who were looking for the opportunity to seize their parts of. the inheritance. As previously described, Djemal had already organised practically an independent Government in Syria. In Smyrna, liahmi Bey, tfie Governor-General, had often disregarded the authorities in the capital. In Adrianople the Hadji Adil, one of the most courageous Turks of the time, was making his plans to set up an independent Government. Arabia was already practically an independent nation. Among the subject races the spirit of revolt was rapidly spreading. The Greeks and the Armenians would also ihave welcomed an opportunity to strengthen the hands of the Allies.

The existing financial and industrial conditions seemed to make revolution inevitable Many farmers Went on strike; they had no' seeds and would not accept them as a free gift from the Government, because, they said, as soon as their crop should be garnered tihe armies would immediately requisition them. As for Constantinople, the populace there and the best elements among the Turks far from opposing the arrival of the Allied fleet, would have welcomed it with joy The Turks themselves were praying tlvafc' the British and French wot\ld take their city, for this would relieve them of the controlling gang, emancipate them from the hatred Ger-

mans, bring about peace, and end their miseries. TALAAT'S MOTOK READY. No one understood this 'better than Talaat, He was taking no chances on making an expeditious retreat, in case the Allied fleet appeared before the city. For several months the Turkish leaders had been casting envious glances at a Minerva automobile that had been reposing in the Belgian Legation ever since Turkey's declaration of war. Talaat finally obtained possession of the coveted prize He had obtained some where another automobile, which he had loaded with extra tyres, gasolene, and all the other essentials of a -protracted journey. This was evidently intended ■to accompany tlhe more pretentious machine as a kind of "mother ship." Talaat stationed these automobiles on the •Asiatic side of the city with chauffeurs constantly at hand. Everything was prepared to leave for the interior of Asia at a moment's notice.

But the great Allied . anu&da never