HELIGOLAND.

Taranaki Daily News, 25 November 1918, Page 6

HELIGOLAND.

THE ISLE OE. MYSTERY,

CLOSING GEEM.Ajs'FS- EfiONTGATE.

(By Pcreival C, Bislam.)

The war has been in progress a year when Germany celebrated the fcwentyfiftlli anniversary of tlie receipt of the forlorn little island from Lord Salisbury in exchange for certain land and rights in East Africa. In those days our relations with Germany were excellent, for it was only in the previous year, 1831), that tho Kaiser's secre.t ambitions had been stirred by : a sight of •the assembled British Fleet at Spit'hcad. The possibility of Germany ever becoming a naval power of importance never entered the heads of the Government of the day; they parted with Heligoland without troubling to mention the niatT ter to the Lords of the Admiralty.

The ?alue of the island, whether to Germany or to us, has been a constant source of debate in British naval circles ever since the Kaiser discovered that for Germany "the future lies on the water," and iu these critical days Cue urgency of the subject is intensified by the ef- ' forts that are frequently made to forecast what will happen to Heligoland during or after the war. Advance parties of military engineers came across from Cusjbaven, measuring and sketching, boring and blasting, to gauge tho defensive possibilities of their latest possession. There followed hordes of working parties, and bit by bit the hard-worked potato fields -of the Oberland disappeared, and vast caverns driven into the bowels of the earth took their place. These were to be the emplacements for the great .guns. Wide subterranean passages were burrowed to connect them one with another, and with a central distributing station for ammunition, where there is reputed to be stored a supply of shot and shell sufficient to feed the guns during a three-years' siege. Rails are laid along the underground passages, and electrically-driven trolleys can deliver the charges and the projectiles much faster than they can be used.

In spring of 1914 largo numbers of heavy guns were reported to have been landed on the island, although no mountings were known to have been prepared for tihem, nor any accommodation for an enlarged garrison to have been provided. They were ciearly reserve guns, ready to be cradled in the mountings when t ne original weapons should give out. The idea, that Heligoland could, wider anj» circumstances, ever he called upon, to withstand a three-year attack seems grossly fantastic; but in these matters, if the German is going to err at all he likes to err on the safe side.

Most of the heavy guns mounted in Heligoland are Krupp 12in., firing a shell of SGOlbs., but, according to report, during the last few years there have been mounted a number of lfiin fortress guns, whose projectile weighs 20281b. All these main guns are mounted in great armored caissons sunk into the earth and protected from above by armored hoods of enormous thickness, while invisible galleries of lighter guns are recessed into the face of the cliffs like, the secondary armament of a proDreadnought battleship.

A PERPLEXING P.KOBLEM.

The protection of the island against tho disintegrating forces of Nature, reinforced by the terrific concussion caused by firing the heavy guns, lias been for Germany a perpetual and per-

.piecing, problem. A close watch is kept for any fissures- that may appear, and rts they form ao they arc. promptly filled in -with liquid cement to prevent the entry of further moisture and the widening of the crack that would follow.

Nor is this all that has been done. In many places the face of the cliff is strengthened by means of enormous buttresses of stone and cement having a thickness of Jifteeu feet, ■while in others a similar system of "armor" has been applied to a long stretch of the face. It has even been rumored that .Krupp plates have- been used to armor the more important parts ag-iiisfc gunattack, hut if there is any truth at all in this it probably applies only to the gun-positions that are actually embedded in the face of the cliff. It lias already cost our enemies £G,0011,000 to buttress up the island to their satisfaction, and early in 1912 some exceedingly thorough experiments were made to test the result.

OF TREMENDOUS IMPORTANCE.

It is clear enough that Germany regarded Heligoland as a place of tremendous importance, for otherwise she would not hive spent sufficient upon it to build, a fleet of eight or ten Dreadnoughts.

You will often read that "Heligoland commands the approaches to the German coast," whereas, in point of fact, it commands—or, rather, covers—just as much of the sea as lies within reach of its own guns. That is does not "command" such an area is plain from the fact that our first naval success was jtdhieved well within their reach, though on that occasion a sea-fog played no small part in blotting the island out of the fight. It does not command the approaches to the German coast any more than Margate commands the entrance of the Thames, and no ordinary ship desiring to approach Hamburg, Wilhelmshaven, or Emd'en need pass within sight of it. As an advanced observation post facing the opeu sea, and as a base for torpedo craft, Heligoland possesses undoubted merits, and these iluive been recognised in the last three or four years by the construction of a harbor for destroyers adjoiuing the Unterland, at a cost'of £2,000,00U, and the establishment of an extensive depot for naval aircraft.

The latter is believed to include two revolving sheds for Zeppelins, which can be lowered to the level of the surrounding earth of seaplane hangars. It will be remembered tliat aircraft which were believed to come from Heligoland helped to prevent a number of Germans being rescued from the sinking Blucher, and that after the air raid on Cux'haven on Christmas Day, 1914, one of our submarines picked up three of our seaplane pilots whilo a Zeppelin from the same place hovered near. However, it is easy to overrate the value of Heligoland even as an advanced post. Emden is nearer the British coast; Sylt, another base for torpedo and other small craft, has the advantage of being central between the extremities of the "wet triangle" of the German coast. Heligoland may afford shelter to vessels nervous of steaming on for another thirty or forty miles to the German coast. There its usefulness ends.

SHOULD WE KEEP IT?

The chances are thjat the forceful transference of Heligoland to the British flag would be a greater misfortune for us than for our enemies. It adds practically nothing to tho strength of their sea defences, while it absorbs a good deal in the way of men, money, and attention. If, no matter what the cost, we should determine to take it, the Germans would get just the opportunity for which they have been waiting—the opportunity of meeting the British Fleet on the ground and under the conditions of Germany's own choosing.

Having taken the place, there would still remain the problem of what to do with it. It is 3511 miles from the nearest British naval base, and well under 50 from two of the most important of Germany's—Wilhelmshaven and Cuxliaven. In these days of mines, submarines, and mine-laying submarines, tho task of Bidding such a place might well prove too much even for tho British Navy.