WORTH SEA GRIP.

Taranaki Daily News, 15 November 1918, Page 7

WORTH SEA GRIP.

THE GREAT FLEET ACTION.

SITUATION LEFT UNCHANGED. The immediate and constant domination of t'li-e North Sea by Allied naval power not only governed the whole naval situation, it was tAo key of the strategic scheme of the war. It alone -enabled the British Army to intervene on tlie Continent and to maintain itself, and with the least possiblo expenditure of energy it crippled the enemy's activities all over tbe outside world. The ■reality and completeness of this domination was extraordinary. . It was such tomt, contrary to the generally accepted theory, both military and naval, a British army could almost immediately bo landed in Europe; and having been landed, could be maintained there with almost as little actual injury to its communications as if there were no hostile jinavy at aJI. On .the other hand the .efficacy of elaborate minefields and Mie comparative helplessness of surface ships to avoid ultimate destruction in the presence of Submarines had their anticipated effect, and enforced the method of the "distant blockade." Nelson asserted that his country's frontier in time of war was the enemy's, coast line; but in the late war the mass lof the British naval strength was kept as far away as possible from the enemy's coast consistent with its being within a proper distance to meet any enemy move. It was held in the neighborhood of the North of Scotland and the Orkneys. The effect of the naval dispositions in the North Sea was to block the Straits of Dover with a practically impenetrable barrier protecting the Channel transport traffic, and to close tlie northern outlets of the North Sea against everything -but submarines and an occasional disguised adventurer of the Moewe type. But within these limits the whole area was constantly patrolled by hundreds, even thousands, in fighting squadrons down to .the of vessels of all classes, from capital .ships merest mosquito motor boats. Tlhis disposition of forces did not forbid the enemy to try to raid the English and French coasts; nor would it have been sound policy to do so. But it did prevent him from winning any of the partial victories which would have worn down the British superiority. Only one gerious attempt at suoh a victory was attempted, and it failed. In the battle of Jutland (3st May-June, 1916) practically the whole strength of th German High' Sea Fleet was pitted against a sections of the British Fleet. This great battle crippled neither side; it altered in no sense, except to endorse its solidarity, tlie fact that the naval control exerted by the British in the North Sea was absolute.

JUTLAND. The Battle of Jutland was incomparably the most terrific of all the seafights of history. On either side the losses, though small in relation to tho total engaged, were enormous judged by earlier standards. Each capital ship that took her crew down with her meant t/he loss of more than twice as many men as England lost at Trafalgar. The British losses in the battlew ere: battlecruisers Queen Mary, Indefatigable, Invincible; armored cruisers, Defence, Black Prince, Warrior; destroyers, Ardent, Fortune, Nestor, Nomad, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Tipperary, Turbulent. The German losses, officially admitted, were: Battle-cruiser, Lutzow; battleship, Pommern; light cruisers, Rostock, Elbing, Wiesbaden, Frauenlob; and five destroyers. But this list was generally scoffed at, and is much below the losses as estimated by Sir John Jellicoe. He made out the number of vessels seen to sink as two dreadnought battleships, one battleship, two battlecruisers, five light cruisers, six. l destroyers, and one submarine; while one dreadnought, two battle-cruisers, and three destroyers were so badly damaged that they seemed unlikely to reach port. One of the damaged battle-cruisers was the Lutzow, the loss of which was admitted some days after the battle. Throughout the war after Jutland, the question Whether the German would risk his fleet again, or would keep it in hand as a peace pawn, periodically came up for discussion. But another great naval battle was thereafter most unlikely. The enemy could not hope, after such an event, ever to find conditions in his favor. And he would never soberly contemplate a straight-out challenge of the full naval strength opposed to him. Once, indeed, the German Fleet did show itself in the Nortli Sea—in August, 1910. But the British' were sighted in strength, and the enemy ran for shelter. The only serious aspect of this encounter was that the cruisers Falmouth and Nottingham were sunk by submarines while looking for the German ships. The German battleship Wcstfalen was torpedoed '-by a British submarine, but not sunk. TORPEDO AND MINE. Throughout the war, the duties of the Navy in the North Sea were arduous, and knew no pause. The possibility of an emergence of the inemy in strength, or of powerful raiding squadrons, necessitated the Grand Fleet being constantly ready for action; but the lesser units of the Navy were always on duty, patrolling, convoying traders, of warning against the submarine and the mine. At the very beginning of the war, Germany began extensive minelaying operations, completely disregarding the recognised conventions for the safe-guarding of naval interests, and the first casualties in the North Sea were the sinking of the mine-layer Koningin Luise, on sth August, while laying mines, and on the fololwing day the destruction, by one of her mines, of the cruiser Amphion, which had sunk the Lnise. Submarines also promptly made their appearance, choosing men-of-war at first as their targets. On 22nd •September there occurred a great naval tragedy. A single submarine of an early type, lurking in their patrol area, calmly torpedoed the three big sister armored cruisers, Cressy, Aboukir, and Hogue, which quickly sank, with terrible loss of life. This shocking event led to strict orders being issued that big war ships must not stand by in the event of submarine attack. Happily there were few such losses in the North Sea, considering the constant exposure of an enormous number of warships. The old cruiser Hawke was torpedoed and sunk on 15th October, 1914; the Hermes on 81st October; the Niger (gunboat) on Hth November; the battleship Formidable on Ist January, 1915; and at various times some destroyers and auxiliaries were similarly destroyed wMlc (patrol duty, The number of waiships sunk by mine («wxt from en. gaged in clearing up the enemy*? mines) »as remarkably small, They included

the battleship King Edward VII. (Bth January, 1SH0), armored cruiser Hampshire (6th June, 1916, with Lord Kitdhener among the victims), arid the light cruiser Arethusa, and a few; destroyers. COASTAL RAIDS—OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE. Several raids were made on the English coast by German squadrons, but they were really of only trifling importance. They were not preventable j but their object was, by enlisting the force of public opinion, to compel the Admiralty to weaken the Grand Fleet in an | attempt to prevent them. On 3rd November. 1914, heavy ships, winch had icrossed by night, shelled Yarmouth and Scarborough. A British submarine was punk by a mine dropped by an enemy ship; and on the return the big German cruiser Yorck was destroyed by : a German mine as she reached harbor.

On 18 t)ii! December, Scarborough, Whitby, and the two Hartlepools were attacked, and 130 people were lulled. On this occasion the Germans escaped. On 24th January, 19-15, a big squadron, ranging from battle-cruisers downwards, was met on the Dogger Bank, <on its way to sibel English towns, by Sir David Beatty's battle cruiser squadron, and in a running battle lost the armored cruiser Blucher, two light cruisers, being heavily damaged. No serious damage was sustained by tlhe British ships. The only other serious effort against the English coast was made on 25th April, 1916, ostensibly to create a diversion in connection with the Irish rebellion. At the same time a futile attempt was made to land supplies on the west coast of Ireland, and Sir Roger Casement landed from a submarine. The raid on Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth effected very little damage, and the Germans returned home at full speed when the coast-guard ships—only light vessels—closed upon them. There were several German attempts to break the Channel guard, and some very lively fights occurred between the destroyer forces in these episodes, which in every case ended in a complete defeat of the attempts. The business of raiding and of at-1 tacking warships was by no means onesided. On 28th August, 1914, the firet serious naval engagement of the war occurred as the result of a reconnoitring sweep by a light British squadron in the Bigiht of Heligoland. The German light cruisers Mainz, Koln, and Ariadne, and two destroyers, were sunk; and the British suffered no loss. On Christmas Day, 1914, a combined naval and aerial raid was made at Cuxhaven, where a large number of bombs were dropped, and the escorting squadron escaped without mishap. Every other raiding incident of the naval war was eclipsed by tihe surprise attacks upon Zeebrugge and Ostend. The methods adopted were novel and daring in the extreme, and their success was remarkable. On 22nd April, 1918, the entrance of Zeebrugge was practically closed by sinking in the channel' two old cruisers filled with cement. The operation was masked by an attack on the mole outside the entrance by H.M.S. Vindictive. A simultaneous attack at Ostend failed; but on 9th May tte Vindictive herself was sunk in the channel port also. These raids are as brilliant examples of heroism and daring as can be found in naval history. They succeeded only because they were surprise attacks, and the technical difficulties were overcome with extraordinary skill. The Germans, as the result of these attacks, lost the services of the only Belgian ports which they had been able to use as advanced bases for their submarines and destroyers.