END OF THE GREAT WAR.

Taranaki Daily News, 13 November 1918, Page 7

END OF THE GREAT WAR.

. ATJffDSI 19i4-NOVEMBEB 191 S. VAST SCHEME BROKEN. HISTQEy-OF TEE OPERATIONS. The main principle at issue in the great war was the survival of democracy, winch was assailed in the feat .place by militarised autocracy, in the .««cond place by terroristic anarchy. Democracy, which permits neither the tyranny of military caste over the people nor that of class over class, y !l» een e te f : "f Bolshevism; but its cva-thro-.y of autocracy, as represented by Prussian militarism, is to-day one of tne great landmarks of history purpose of this publication will be suW ciently served if it succeedsin picturing in vivid and truthful form, the fateful events of the last fifty months . The central fact of the wax is that, lor Germany, there was never any chance of success save by a decisive victory in the West. While tie French stood to their guns, maintaining a European bridge-head and battlefield for tile oversea Anglo-Saxons, German hegemony of toe Continent was impossible; and therefore, for Germany, the overthrow of France was the sine qua non. Almost everything eke the Germane euxecaed in doing. By attaching Turkey to themselves and Austria-Hungary, they imposed, without sea-power, a' partial blockade of Russia; By drawing in Bulgaria, they overthrew Serbia, and opened the Baian-Turkish corridor to the East By political intrigue following on military action, they drove Russia and Rumania temporarily out of opened, bat did not develop, a Russian road to Asia; partially dismembered Russia, enforced their strategy upon almost the whole Eastern front, and helped Austria-Hungary to inflict a colossal defeat upon Itaiv. But always, when they turned westward to destroy France, they met witiH failure. In 1914, they failed at the Jlirne; k>. 1910 at Verdun and the Somme; in 1918, on the whole front Every Extern victory, the Germans found, merely committed them to another tilt at the Western wall; and through those successive assaults they bled to death. The war was finally lost when they staked everything on the 1918 campaign to overthrow France before America's arrival. By August it was certain, on the evidence of the American reinforcements!, tihat the interwoven strategy of Ludendorff and Tirpitz had missed its mark; and the German dream of victory had passed forever.

GERMANY'S RACE AGAINST TIKE.

The meaning of Hub third major assault upon France—the last and greatest—was defined by the Evening Post on 3rd August, in an article reviewing the alternate attempts of Germany 'ja conquer the East and overthrow the West: "Still another year (1917) was spent in completing the ruin of Russia, during which the Western initiative in Haig's hands proved indecisive; and the dawn of the present year (1918) disclosed Germany once more at liberty to concentrate against France, and to conentrate in greater strength than ever before. In this last adventure speed is more than ever essential to the Gernot because, as in 1914 at the Maine, he has to forestall Russian intervention, but because his task postulates effective arrival before the Americans. What the world is witnessing at this mtoment is nothing less than the destruction of the postulated condition fijad the ruin of Germany's hopes of victory. Once more, the enemy has lost the race by inches. Notwithstanding the Russian collapse, the release from tlhe Eastern front of a million German soldiers, and the utmost frightrulness of the submarines, powerful American armies have arrived, not too late, in the decisive theatre of Europe. The defensive balance in the West is already restored, and the Allied mrss moves irresistibly onward to the point where it will provide a conquering margin." That anticipation proved well-found-ed, but its realisation was assisted by a dramatic development not at the time foreseen. In 1 the closing days of the month of September, when the tide of success lutd set in strongly in the Allies' favor in the Franco-Belgian and Palestine spheres, the long-quiescent Allied army in Macedonia-Albania (based on Salonika and Valona) suddenly broke tike Bulgarian frost, and Bulgaria's surrender quickly followed. This poli-tico-military disaster shook the enemy alliance to its foundations, and incidentally proved bow unoerftm are the fortunes of war. For months, and indeed years, the AlEed army in MacedoniaAlbania had been, by many critics, viewed askance. In tie intermittent controversy between Westerners snd Easterners, the former not infrequently, and not always illogiealry, held up tihe prospect of the Allies' defeat in the West because of their Eastern diversions. As a matter of fact, the Bulgarian surrender proved the converse, for Germany .thereby received a terrible blow in the East beesuse of her Western diversions. A few German divfaiens might fcav« propped up Bulgaria for anotiVr year; but. when Hindenburg and Ludendorff magnetised an avaimfcle force to Franee in order to match victory before America's arrrrai, <saey did so a,fc the cost oi Bulgaria's) toeakdown. In other words. Ore strengthening <rf tits enemy ring in. ite : West did not prevent its fracture a£ Che'' point where <4>e almosfeforgottm "fiversioir'' army of the kXai began suddenly to operate,

SALONIKA STRATEGY. The conclusion therefore forces itself that, wen vaiaaa Rnßsia, the Entente's envelopment plan yielded bri3Jant regatta. Bolgarurt surrender demonstrated &tX, despite Westerners' criticisms, > and notwithstanding the ftilatojrrness flat lost Serbia in 1915, tffe ooenpation ef Salonika was strategically aorajd, gnd its evaonation wonW haw been a blunder from the offensive as well as the defensive standpoint. Had there been no Russian front, and also no MaoedwDarAlbania front, the Central Powers in 1918 coald have cwseentrated Westward with impunity. Bat &c Biwnatie event in Bulgaria ifewetl to them tbeir error, and th: em was- , viud. The lose of Bnlg cia removed 'the eonnectingMc of tire enemy corribaor. ft uncovered "ftrrkey and AustriaJfiongary; and, by oceentnarting the despair of *» latter .wintry, paved «*, jMtyfor fl» wwovering of Germany he»nrf Evea tf» German people began ►to-wthat <«e Western gaim w«w beina Wd by tadendorfl and ffinderinng

by heavy reinforcement, postpone derasive defeat in the West—at the cost of leaving open the back-door! Gradually the futility of this furious Western effort was brought home to Germany, along with the consciousness of impending isolation, encirclement, and overthrow.

The real issue between Westerner and Easterner is best glimpsed "oy quoting from an editorial of the Evening Post, written on lTtftn August, at a time when the question was still hot: "Allied policy Is to seize every chance of exerting direct pressure in the Eastern theatre, consistent v.-ith not compromising the chance to secure the decisive Western victory. Two things arc basic to Allied success. The first is sea-power, which includes the holding of the submarine peril; the second is military victory in the West. Jf possible, military' supremacy in the East must be added to these twain, but Aithout compromising them. Not an ounce of strength necessary to the West should be sent East. But ncithsr should the exercise of power in the East be neglected when it is exercisable witlwiit r-nsjrdiea to the Lwo plan." The principle h,;"om laid <!own tf.ias .wt ae?,i;. to Id oapsiJe of serkns challenge. But the real poin*of di*T(rreiu > e Westerners and Easterners was not the principle, but the application of it. Tie real difference lay in conflicting estimates of the military force essential in the West; and much of the trouble was removed when Marshal Foeh, with tie policy he represented, was elevated, into a place of authority. As Generalissimo, Fodb was in a position to say what tho West required, and he speedily showed that he understood, and possessed, the secret of winning battles against the Germans in tfo* decisive sohere. Thus, at last, West and East were revealed in a exercise of glorious co-opera-tion and reciprocity.

VARIOUS BLOCKADES. Blockade tactics—in which, of course, the Allied naval strangle-hold stood supreme—profoundly influenced the course of the war; and German submarinism had a revolutionary effect not only on the military side but also on the political It must be conceded that the partial blockade imposed by Germany on European Russia was a strategic success; probably it weakened a poorly orgauised State like Russia more quickly than tie Central Empires were weakened by the blockade set up against tfiemRelvns by the sea and land farces of the .iilias; but the German conception of a subnurine blockade missed its mark disastrously. To its credit may be placed a terrific mercantile attrition, which diverted an immense amount of Allied labor and material that otherwise might have been utilised in a more direct offensive. But to its debit are the tremendous facts that it assured the belligerency of America, and it failed to prevent the American troops coming to Prance. The replacement of Russia 'by America gave Germany the doubtful benefit of being able to initiate in 1918 the concentrated offensive against the sorely-tried French. Against this, it cut away from the Allies' cause the incubus of Tsarism, and it added the democratising influence of the American President and his hundred million Eng-lisb-epeaking people. An Anglo-Rus-aian Alliance could never have been in the fullest sense popular; it was necessarily official, diplomatic, and—on one side or the other, therefore probably on both —imperialistic and in part annexationist. Prom iti very nature, an AngloAmerican Alliance could have none of these tendencies; subject as it must be to the popular will on botfli sides of the Atlantic, it could only bring to the Allied aims an influence at owse democratising and vitalising. And the evolution of the Allied cause in that direction was one of the greatest facts of 1017--18. Morally, the effect, both on the wax and on the world's future, of America's alignment with Britain, France, and Italy, is incalculable. Militarily, it made tiae war more than ever a conflict between Western sea-power and Continental land-power. And, incidentally, it reinsured the tactical defeat of the submarine, that terrible threat to nations maritime and insular.

KULTUR VERSUS CULTURE. The exit of Russia and the entry of | America enabled Dr. HelffericJ. to observe that tie war had resolved itself into a struggle between the political system of Germany uil t'be political system of Britain. The generalisation was not unjust, provided that Dr. Helfferich intended Jus formula to embrace all those- moral aa well as military considerations which the rival systems | connote. Germany's war against the West amounted to a challenge by collective disciplined "efficiency" to individual freedom. It was a challenge based on no moral consideration whatever, but on ability to wield the sword; and it compelled the two great branj ches of the English-speaking people to resort to military compulsion. Their ability to do this, in the present stage of their civilisation, was as great a discovery as that of Columbus, and dazzled everybody, none more than tihe Germans. /Hierefore, while forced to admit that democracy is a poor war-machine, no democrat should forget that, when forced to fight for its life, democracy, despite its inherent disadvantages, took up the sword to the full extent of ite human capacity. The world then sawthat what had been dona once could be done again; and the "new" British and American armies in France, with all their machinery imperfections, established an imperishable guarantee of democracy's ability' to defend itself against "efficient" wrfcoeracy. '" "&" wnjte tie Evening Piast, "Russia finds her soul, and China pwves inconvertible to militarism, in all probability Wfthefan wiß, prove to be the last of the Kapoteons. At the very least, the sacrifice of Use Western democracies has immensely improved the oottloofe for a lasting peace ir» the Old WorH; owl efeo pointed &e paQ* of duty for nations in Mte Pacific where—as everywhese—ant sratk designs will be ranged only by the resoirte will of democracy to defend itself Sa the most eSrfectrw manner, and *> jeEgetete ita own exwtenca?

BEMOCP.YHC unity aki> wea - Tfce stoiy of democracy's aSffity to defend iteeif, and to take up -the trappings of mffifcurism in oaks' to crush the bool Unseat, does not-end with the adoption of eamputooa. There -was ftno&er foal to attain—*mity of military command oa ™e Westcm frontDemocrat, always fearful of extreme individnaJ power, and jeakms of foreign control of a nataonaJ army, for sometime stood hesitant, and the fcesitatioiri •was prolonged by utißtssy jeakwsma-. [Early pawning the exfcrema danger oil separate ewnmands against Q«e German coweußsSwn of IStf-IS, Mr Uojd Georgo gaoped out atf?er unity of «&* viee, tfien after unity of control; was; ateoanged' in Earis, wa resfetsS hf

a "political strategist." At last the disaster to the British Fifth Army came to his rescue. His arguments were reinforced by the German sword, and the four Western Allies found themselves compelled to pool their forces, from the North Sea to the Adriatic, under the heaven-sent genius of Geneialissimo Foeh. President Wilron led the way by sinking false national pride, by brigading the American units with French and British divisions, and by putting the full tece of the United States behind the demand for a united control of the armies and their reserves. Thus the military jealousies were broken down, and it was then found that the peoples, vriser than their masters, \7ere quite ready for a radical transformation Budln as the situation demanded. Common-sense triumphed over convention, and democracy gave one more proof of its s«lf-sacrificing capacity to adapt itself to supreme necessity. Mr Lloyd Geoige can claim all credit for having foreseen the need of military union. It is easy to say that his foretight proved greater than his coura?'', Imr unties i-'houid always tsinimbtr ue limitations of his. pdiofcal sii,uution. 1i:0..c .-j.ime liriilatio'is r«w partly responsible fiT the xa/'t tlbai. the Englishspeaking lecdenJiip tended to pass from him to President Wilson. After Russia's decline, such a tendency might naturally result from, the westward swing of the Allies' centre of gravity, and from tie American Government's freedom from embarrassing diplomatic undertakings belonging to the era of Russian Tsaristic ambition. Moreover, the American President is, constitutionally, mightier than any Prime Minister, Nevertheless, civilisation owes much to Lloyd George the "political strategist," and to the "tiger" politician of France, Grand Old Man Clemencean.

, OUT OP EVIL COMETH GOOD. la the political history of the war, the United States Presidential election of 1910, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the ruthless submarining, are conspicuous landmarks. Without knowing what they were doing, Tirpitz, the autocratic terrorist of the sea, and Lenin, the high priest of Bolshevik anarchy, were building for democracy. Similarly, the German peace drives, though designed to save Prussian militarism, merely held the stage till its ruin was complete. Until October last the German Government still strove to retain Eastern gains at the cost of Western surrenders wihen suddenly the Bulgarian secessif'ji broke the idea of MittelEuropo in twain. In a moment the Eastern knot was cut, and the German grip on Russia, without the need of any European intervention by Japan, gave way. The closing stages of the war proved yet again the futility of evil machinations in the face of a Higher Power; and the unalterable truth that out of evil coraeth good. Among many builders, few knew the work he was engaged on; yet the labors of all, good or evil, have been turned to the service of humanity. From the foregoing discussion of principles, we pass to a review of the war in greater detail, with, as far as possible, a chronological surrey of the events of the five fateful years, 1914-18.

1914-THE "SHORT CUT" THAT MISSED.

When the real history of the war comes to bo written, it wil probably L*»c to be admitted that Germany very Dearly won, in the first round, by Bier rapid knock-out blow at France, which failed only because of an exceptional combination of adverse cirumstances. Given its best luck, the German:march through Belgium should have overwhelmed France in two months; at the least, it should have secured for Germany the Channel ports down to the mouth of the Somme; but it did neither. France was saved, in the first place, by French courage and skill, culminating in the Battle of the Marne, aided by the British alliance and its moral and material expression, the British Regular Army. But the saving of France was very (substantially contributed to by Belgium, and by the unexpectedly rapid mobilisation of Tsaristic Russia, who early in 1914 had won and lost tremendous battles against the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians. Russian victories and defeats helped, the victors of the Marne to save Paris, and aided the Tictors of the First Ypres in the Hugh strategic accomplishment of protecting the Channel ports. Blood shed liberally by Russia, as well as by France and Britain, forced the Germans to be content with settling down in the West to a rigid Franco-Belgian trench-line. They retaliated with a land-blockade of Russia, to encompass ,wMch they forced Turkey into the war in November, and at the same time accepted, having little choice, the naval blockade imposed by Britain. That was how things stood at the close of 1914. *

■ Persistence in the blockade of Russia was ultimately one of the essential elements whidhi forced the Russians out of the war, and which thus placed France (in 1918) in a position of great temporary peril. But, masterly as this department of German strategy proved later on to he, nothing could compensate for the great initial miscalculation—the -wrecking of the plan to overthrow France with one swift blow.

a915-€ffiRMAOT LOOKS EAST; Defeat in -tOre West meant much more than failure to destroy Franc© and the French Army. It meant also failure to prevent France from becoming the battleground of rew 3iitish 'armies, and 'possibly in the future of new American araiies. The surprise blow of 1914 havI ing. arris-carried, it became at once the business of German strategists to prevent, hy land and sea, Anglo-Ameriean T«farforcement of France. Owing to the eefipse, and blockade of the German High Sea Fleet, no preventive means presented itself at sea until the later development of tho submarine; and -the possibilities of a further big offensive against France by land were discounted by &fl pressure of Russia. Consequently, the year 1915 found the Germans with their eyes mainly turned eastward,; also sonth-eastward, where the (Franeo:Britißli G&llipoH army was striving to (pierce European Turkey and raise ■&*■ ■psrfiaa blockade of Russia. A s-iries-of Austio-Gerraaa defeata-m----fflcted by. tto Russians earlier in the' year terminated at tibe Dirnajec, wfceee,; iu Aoaa-lSte Ganwmy turned thefctbtes, and Russia lost Poland as* Western Oaiicia. sis&dßsasfep raSr*?"* terSng tho won. S3id I*% ISSS « JhkuA. fee efite* fcy was diluted £y Rußßfa's fortune and Vy fl» i&&s*P* H '- ?**&<*& on tha Qsffipoli Ber&sukv Wo»g if*ese- Tmf aawnabte *len*aSß -wettf bPina oisemed and "SP***. JS? **** gariS The Balgasfens saw ™*>.-'°* l if »reaa emjfesc* ' W^ B

Greek King; and they recognised the disservice tc Serbia of the Entente's dilatory Balkan policy. Bulgaria, therefore joined the Central Powers m October; 1915, about a couple of months before Britain and Irance began to withdraw from. Gallipoli. Thus Bulgaria completed for the enemy the Eastern "corridor," and sealed the fate of Serbia, who had twice Gsbwn out the Austro-Hungarians, but was overwhelmed by the new eombinafcio'3 Novembcr. Anticipating their failure in Gallipoli, and feeling that they should at least hold Greece, the Allies had secured a no»- Balkan foothold at Salonika, "too late" to save Serbia;"' The melancholy record of 1915 embraced the trench-war in France, including the Second Ypres, the Russian disaster; indecisive Austro-Italian fighting; a generally passive defence in Egypt; in Mesopotamia a reckless offensive (Townshend's) doomed to disaster. Final disappearance of the German flag from the oceans was the bright spot, tinged witihi forecasts of the submarine phase. Save in East Africa, all German colonial vesistanco «'as extinguished.

19IS-VERDUN. THE U-TOATS, JUTLAND, RUMANIA.

In 1916 Russia's reverses—though relieved towards the close of the year by a successful xea'ction against AutriaHungary—permitted the Germans to once more attempt a great offensive against France, where the Verdun operation was begun as early as 20th February. Verdun was a German defeat ranking morally with the Marnc, for it proved that the long-suffering and "Boloised" French could not be terrorised out of the war.

But the new British army's offensives in this year were disappointing in result, and the submarine sinkings began to give the war at sea an unfavorable turn for sea-carriage and for British insular power, In May of 1916 Germany was emboldened to bid for sea-supreui-acy; the result was the indecisive Battle of Jutland, 31st May> which did not alter the pre-existing naval situation. By April Russia had captured Erzeroum and Trebizond, and had occupied most of Turkish Armenia; but this achievement was offset by Tdwnshcnd's surrender. Egypt's defence began to be offensive in May, 1916, giving the "Westerners" new ground for criticism of "side-shows" and diversions. Salonika was stagnant, the occupation being at that time presented in a political rather than a military light. It played no active part in the tragedy of Rumania, who was probably betrayed by the Sturmcr Government of t...-.*„ The showiness of the Rumanian victory enabled the German sword to pick up much of the prestige it had dropped earlier in the year at Verdun. But the great event of 1916 was political: President Wilson was re-elected, and ruthless submarining (initiated Ist' February) began to draw the United States into tihe wal.

1917—EXIT RUSSIA, ENTER

AMERICA. In 1917 submarine sinkings reached their monthly summit in April, but Germany paid for them an altogether disproportionate price, since the United States declared war on 6th April, 1917. The other great event was the Russian revolution, at first Liberal, then LiberalSocialist, then Bolshevik, and leading rapidly to Russia's military collapse. Tilie replacement of the Slav by the American, the Tsar by the President, revolutionise 1 , the whole political and military meaning of the war, which became more than ever a fight between Western sea-power and Continental land-power. On the Allies' side democratic ideals finally replaced secret treaties and political bargains. Sir Douglas Haig's numerical advantage in the West produced no big military results —despite costly offensives—and seems to have been cancelled or reduced as the Russian collapse released German troops. It was now evident tihat the Allies could not be sure of a military decision without the aid of great American armies. While Haig gained little or nothing except attvitive effect on the best personnel of the German army, Italy suffered a colossal defeat. Thus the enemy closed 1917 with a brilliant victory over the Italians in somewhat the same way as foe saved his prestige in 1910 at the expense of the Rumanians.

Russia and Rumania and Serbia (except the remnant of Serbia's army) having practically dropped out, no Allied offensive in the Balkans was reasonably possible without Greek sympathy and aid. Venizelos had been busily paving the way for a Greeco-Entente co-bpefa-tion, and a step forward was taken by means of Constantine's abdication in June. The Entente armies in MacedoniaAlbania bided their time.

Palestine and Mesopotamia became, once again, theatres of British offensive operations, carried on despite the failing grip of Russia in Armenia and Persia. The fall of Bagdad (10th March) and Jerusalem (dOth December) was of great importance religiously, politically, and militarily. Thus the advocates of warfare in subordinate theatres had at last sonic ammunitiqn with -which to return the fire of tho "Westerners." But tho point of view of the "Westerners" was quite understandable, considering the temporary unreadiness of America to fill the gap.left by Russia, and to pour troops as well as munitions into f-he West. ■»•;..■ 1918—GERMAN EFFORT TO FORlki' STALL THE AMERICANS. , The race with the Americans'for Paris; was thu keynote of German •. policy- sißf 1918. Gervnany abstained ftonuvgiving any substantial aid to the: hard J pj'a?<aß.4 Turk or to Bulgaria; she didaiot ivy tft. push the Salonika force into the sea*; she did not realise all the. military ajo vantages she might ha»K jrealised, j4ffi Russia and Finland. Instoad»«oi dog\g these things, she aimed to destroy the Allies' Western armies before-; America's arrival. Hence Germar.y.V. offensive (in five phases) iv. France and. AustriaEiingary's one-phase offensive in Italy. Ausfcria-Hungaa-y's defeat, and, the Allies' successful reaction in the fifth phase of -fie German operations in France (a reaction admittedly due to the acceleration of American; ;ieinforcejmentß)\ once more swung the odds Against the CMdJsal Eowais. Indeed, Xiermnnyfe second misfoutune on the■Slarao -wus .probal% the «cf fflie» war. H was scries jof-defeats inflicted in FacKs best style. iHavmg regained the initiative, the Genlerafeaimo.made a maEteriy use thereof. k&adWse won tusfWestern victories wiih-|ion±-<niW)iiig WJevJßastern- armies. In fact,, (dtttiag M 8 the .&&» detached tsoops >to«elp>3'apan't»aidt4J)c Caecho-Slowaks SasatesV 3ote&ewfcGeraffin forces beSlSai the- Pteifio Coasifc and lake gsiifcall> opened Bp.-.nesir'tponts' to «rfh. Bnsaja aad <xt ■**te*toj*' AtfMe*%]Bl*tffe» vw»,«»Mof; -aes wet *>^^J^'* im^!^!^^^%-

three Tmlash armies, and conquered Synr The erowning point of Eastern "politico mihtaiy sujcess came, m Ucto--sx?r Tslien d ESperey's AIIh d arm, based «u Salonika, broke the Rulgauan forces, whose right wing was placed at the mercy of the Serbw and French. Before this sudden and astonishing victory: was driven home in a military rway, Bulgaria surrendered to the Allies, "<thi» breaking the enemy "corridor," tm•covering Turkey and Austria-Hungary, iand setting those States an example which they were not very slow to follow. By that remarkable development the Salonika strategy was at last vindicated, tad the German Westerners -felt into their own trap. " Ttoe failure of their policy of Western cpneemitratkm was threefold: (1) they fatted *to preserve their Western fEoafc; (2) failed to crush fiodk before tie American arrival; arid (3) even failed to 3*old tiie Western position -which sky, lad inherited from 19K,. After losing fro Foch thousands of grins, hundreds of tibjongaiids of prisoners, did millions of casnalfies, Germany was unofficially ireBotted to have signed a eusread*r *r»S»+*