INVADING GERMANY.

Taranaki Daily News, 28 September 1918, Page 6

INVADING GERMANY.

i TIffiOUGH ALSACE. ; ('"'Critieus" iu Dunediu Star.)' There are several powerful arguments in favor of a thrust eastwards and north-eastwards from the Lorraine front. Any blow delivered by the Allies this autumn may be looked upon as an attempt to gain a substantially improved strategical position in readiness for next year's offensive rather thaji as an attempt to crush Germany out of hand. Now, although the flatness of the Lorraine front favors the preparation and launching of an allied offensive behind it, yet this same flatness also favors the enemy to a not inconsiderable extent. It means that the point of the right angle formed by the western front from Rheims to the Swiss border is cut off. This greatly shortens the distance from [the Champaigne and other fronts west [of Verdun to the Alsace front. If the Allies could thrust out their front across the Lorraine border, drive a big salient into the German line, and put a point on the southern right angle, they would largely increase the amount of time required by the Germans to reinforce their i front in Alsace. Moreover, Mete is a great railway centre. Railways radiate from it in all directions like the spokes of a wheel. We are only 13 miles from the city; and if it were captured a heavy blow would be struck at the communications of the enemy between their northern and southern fronts. Reinforcements for Alsace would have to travel by a much more .roundabout route. But against this is to be set the fact that this would attract powerful bodies of troops to the defence of the Lorraine j front, and thus lead to the taking up by the enemy of that central position at the apex of the right angle, which would enable them to rapidly reinforce either the Champaigne or the Alsace sectors, while at the same time guarding Lorraine most effectually—that sector which is undoubtedly the most vital to them. Tie thrust against the St. Miliiel salient they will probably regard as merely a local venture, and so may not fundamentally alter their dispositions to meet it. ONE SUPREME ARGUMENT.

There is one argument of supreme importance in favor of the next allied thrust being delivered through Alsace. Ever since the early days of the war the Germans have threatened to devastate Belgium and the occupied French, territories if compelled to evacuate them. We know from experience that they are quite capable of doing this. During their retreat last year they deliberately converted the country behind them into a desert as far as possible. They cut down all the fruit trees, and destroyed farms, villages, and towns. If they have been less thorough in their destructiveness this rear it is merely because they have been compelled to retreat hurriedly, and have not had the opportunity to do their worst. Yet they havo done a vast amount of deliberate damage even as it is. It will be idle to appeal to any considerations of humanity or of sanity if they are compelled to fall back further. They will urge "military necessity" as a justification, and under cover. of this excuse will glut their vindictiveness and baffled fury to the utmost. Moreover, there is' the obvious consideration that if the Allies advance fighting across Northern France and Belgium all the country over which they advance will be badly damaged by the barrages, quite apart from the wanton damage that the enemy may do.

Marshal Foch and the Allies will naturally wish to spare French and Belgian territory as much as possible, and if any territory must be damaged by fighting it is desirable that the damaged territory should be German. The way to save Northern France and Belgium from devastation is obviously to compel the enemy to fall back out of it by threatening to cut them off by our advance elsewhere, thus reducing the lighting and shelling in the disputed areas to a minimum; while, at the same time, seizing sucn a position aa will enable the Allies to prohibit the Germans from devastating the country as they fall back under pain of drastic and deadly retaliation. Marshal Foch, therefore, with au eye to safeguarding French and Belgian territory, will naturally look out for a line oi advance which will put him in a position to devastate German territory In retaliation if necessary. This is the only effectual safeguard. We have seen enough of German methods to realise that there is no hope of persuading the j enemy to spare the occupied territory by argument. 'But a bully usually has a [profound tenderness i'or his own skin, and once we can seize a position which will enable us to retaliate effectually, actual reprisals will be unnecessary. The threat will suffice to bring the Germans to reason. It is not many months since London and other English towns were being subjected to wanton and systematic bombings. To-day we have a special aerial force for the purpose of attacking German towns, and the result is that raids upon London are now scarcely even 'heard of. The Germans are too busy defending themselves, and they are careful not to be unduly provocative in aerial raids. THE ONLY WAY. The case for an allied thrust in Alsace from the point of view of pure strategy has already been presented, and a very little reflection will show that the strategical arguments are powerfully reinforced by the political arguments for saving Northern France and Belgium from devastation. On the Lorraine "border we are quite close to what is technically German territory, while in Alsace the Allies are actually well across the German border; but both Alsace and Lorraine are looked upon by the French as French territory temporarily alienated, which will be restored to France after the war. For that reason they will not wish to retaliate upon the towns and villages of those two provinces, and a threat to do so would not move the Germans. The Allies on the Lorraine front are from 30 to 40 miles from Germany proper; whereas in Alsace they are only 15 miles away. In Alsace, moreover, a thrust would stand a tnncli better chance of reaching the enemy at home from the fact that German reinforcements would take much longer to reach that front in strength. The Alsace line, in fact, is the only way by which we can be confident of getting to close quarters with Germany in one swift surprise rush, and once we are able to command wide areas of German territory with our guns, Northern France and Belgium will be aafe from devastation. Tt will only be necessary to warn the enemy that town for town and village for village will be destroyed in Germany for every French or Belgian village destroyed, and the 'Germaas will at once become sweet Seasonable.