CROWN PRINCE'S CHECK.

Taranaki Daily News, 13 September 1918, Page 6

CROWN PRINCE'S CHECK.

UTTER FAILURE OP iPLANS, THE GREAT MARNE DEFEAT. The utter failure of the Crown Prince's ambitious plans on the eve of General Foch'a great counter-stroke on July 18 is described by the special correspondent of the Morning Post. Writing after the first two days of the German offensive, he says:— The following points are notaflle:— First, the whole German plan of attack was shattered in the first 24 hours. Second, in all previous big enemy offensives this year several days have been necessary to stabilise the front except at Compiegne, where stabilisation was relatively rapid. Third, there has been on this occasion no disorganisation of the defence. Fourth, the Germans tried desperately to attain objectives whic'i) they had anticipated would be reached without effort. Fifth, the Germans were forced to extend along the line of the River Marne, but in that they were handicapped by the fact that the French held the heights which dominate the three passages up which they were trying to penetrate- Lastly, despite the large scale of which the preparations were made, the Germans had to attempt 4o restart the offensive all over again by the resumption of artillery fire. PREPARED FOR THE BATTLE. The French had known for at least two weeks that an enemy attack on the Champagne'front was imminent in force, and all measures had been taken to meet it. For a fortnight past reconnaissance parties 'brought in prisoners daily. On the evening of July 14 it was learnt that the attack was imminent. Immediate the plan determined was put into operation. AH the troops were withdrawn from the front line. A full hour 'before the German artillery fire commenced the French artillery opened fire on the troops concentrating behind the German lines, and this fire was maintained throughout the early phases of the battle.

The enemy artillery opened fire at midnight, and this was maintained for; four hours. At seventeen minutes past four the enemv advanced, to 'be met by a withering artillery fire. We know for certain that one enemy division lost 50 per cent of its effectives, and it stands to reason that when an attack of such density was stopped without ever attaining our line of resistance the enemv must have suffered very severely. As regards the early phase of the battle, and indeed throughout the whole development, the herpism of the men who remained behind in the advanced positions cannot t>e praised too highly Observers remained constantly in communication with the units To which they were attached, directing our artillery fire and themselves inflicting heavy punr inhment on the advancing enemy As late as five in the evening centres of resistance were still holding out. thmieh surrounded hv the enemv, while the survivors of a battalion that had been left behind on Mont Sans Norn cut their wrv through with the bavonet and returned to our lines, bringing? their prisoners with them. The only complaint received from the men who carried out the forlorn hope was that it rtoki, hearts to think that, surrounded as they were toy the enemy, thev would be comj pelted to give up the prisoners they had made. ENEMY EFFORT A COMPLETE FIASCO. The attack failed completely, the enemy all along despite their use of thanks, being checked and forced to fall back by our fire, and to abandon the ambitious projects they had formed. Orders taken on them prove that the Champagne offensive was no diversion, but a real attack on which high hopes had been based.

Thus according to the programme Chalons was to fall on the second day of the offensive, while another division was given the objective for the evening of the attack the River Marne between Aulnay and Clierville. The existence of these objectives, considered in conjunction with the actual nature of the attack, the large number of guns concentrated, and the vast quantity of ammunition damps, which must certainly have been formed with the object of providing supplies to follow up the advance make it certain that the attack in Champagne was an offensive from which results were expected comparable with those achieved in the offensive of \rareh 21, and its failures cannot Ibut prove a very great disappointment to the enemy. The attacking divisions covered a front 0/ 2500 yd« to 30o5yds. The first line was occupied by two regiments, with one in support* and one or two divisions behind it. On the night preceding the attack or on the night of the attack each division in the sector was, broadly speaking, replaced by two. The relieved division was then placed in the second line, while a division was brought up from the rear to the third line. From calculations on this basis it is possible to deduce that the number of German troops intended to be engaged was about double that identified in the first line positions. As to the German artillery preparation, all observers agree that, it was of extreme violence. At the moment when fire was opened large calibre shells were fired into Ohalons, nearly 20 miles behind the line, and such was the intensity of the artillery preparation that to people at Chalons itself the impression was almost given of being present at the battle. The streets were brilliantly lit up by the flashes from the guns, and the successive phases of tlbe artillery duel could be closely observed. GERMANS FIRE ON EMPTY TRENCHES. The fact that throughout the whole four hours of artillery preparation the enemy failed to discover that the French had partly evacuated the first line trendies proved valuable, not only in economising life but also by causing the enemy to concentrate his fire on unoccupied ground. The fire on the French artillery was very intense, but not for a moment did it succeed in blinding It. Despite the hail of projectiles the gunners carried out all their instructions to the letter. Meanwhile the men of the forlorn hope left in the advanced lines showed an intelligence only equalled by their gallantry. They not only inflicted losses on the enemy by their own fire, but they made effective use of all possible methods of signalling. There was thus not an instant's delay in learning that the enemy had left his trenches, and artillery and mchirie-guns, from the principal line of resistance and from behind it were able to deliver a paralysing barrage fire. This fire caused the enemy appalling losses, and completely broke up his at>t«#k. TJi# Ujbtnui of the French loves ■iittiiitiilaMi

is confirmed by two facts of special interest; first, that it has not been necessary to relieve any of the French divisions engaged in the fighting, and, secondly, by the statement of an officer made at five o'clock in the afternoon of tfhe first day's righting. He stated: "My first impression at present is that the troops under my command have as good moral as they had yesterday evening. We count on profiting by the superiority we have gained over the enemy still further to dominate him. My men all want to counter-attack." The same officer added, in praise of the artillery: "It is impossible to keep the artillery back when they know their comrades are in danger. All the time the various liaison services gave them excellent objectives, and they kept firing without stopping." The qneray troops included the flower of the German army They comprised the fifth, Second and Third Guards, the 195 th, 197* and 200 th Jager Regiments, the Ist, 2nd and sth Bavarians, several Wurtemburg Divisions, including the Twenty-sixth, the Tenth Division, trie Tenth Reserves Division, the Seventh Magdehourg, and the Twenty-third Saxon. According to statements of prisoners, the offensive was undertaken to force the Allies to make immediate peace, and tlie name of "Friedensturm" had been given to the battle.