ECONOMY OF FORCE.

Taranaki Daily News, 9 August 1918, Page 7

ECONOMY OF FORCE.

GENERAL POCK'S PPOBIdCY. (From the Times' Correspondent.) London, May 23. All experience in the lighting on the Western front goes to siiow that it is the first onrush which yields the greatest results. As the advance loses its impetus, it tends to- become exceedingly expensive. When von Hindenburg strikes again, ho hopes, no doubt, to repeat in some measure the sucees; attained in March, and he is spurred on to this by the knowledge that any further gain of ground now, either on the Somme front or in Flanders, must tend greatly to embarrass the Allies. That the 'Germans will be able to purchase a further advance if they are prepared to pay the price can hardly be doubted, hut the price exacted will be an exceedingly heavy one, for we »re no longer in a' position to yield ground readily. From the enemy's point of view one of the most important consequences of the earlier offensive on the Somme and in Flanders is that they have left the Allies extremely cramped for room. That i - what Sir Douglas Haig meant when he spoke of our lighting with our backs- to the wall. COMPENSATION \ . | The situation, however, has its compensations. The time the Germans have required to refit their divisions and to bring up. new men not only suggests that their losses in the earlier fighting were exceedingly heavy, but it has afforded General Foch the opportunity he needed to prepare our defence, to perfect our organisation and communications, and to make ready tov meet the blow when it falls. There should not be any reason to fear anything in the nature of a. surprise. All accounts tend j to confirm the- impression that we have keen able to establish a substantial air supremacy on the Western front, and that being so, our reconnoitring machine.' should have kept General Foch well informed of the enemy's dispositions. Time has aided us also in another and, very vital particular. The extent to which we have been able to replace the losses we sustained on the Somme can only be guessed at. But it is established that American reinforcements are now (lowing into France in a constant stream. It is the fashion in Germany to belittle the American effort. The enemy's Higher Command, however, is pro'balbly under no illusion as to the effect which these American reinforcements must ultimately have on the course of the campaign, their influence will not be felt immediately, but as the summer advances American divisidhs may be expected to take an increasingly important share in the fighting. The certainty of all this explains the policy General Foch lias hitherto pursued and will probably continue to pursue. His aim is to hold his line with a minimum of men and- to economise his reserves to the utmost possible extent. This doctrine of economising force was one which he always preached to his officers, and those who know him have no doubt that it is a doctrine which he will now seek to practice at Germany's expense. For von Hindenburg is hardly in a position to respond to like with like. He must go on pouring in men unless he is to make admission <Hiat he has been fought to a standstill. CUMULATIVE EFFECT. ' It is interesting to notice the manner in which the Germans have sought to produce a cumulative mora! effect on the Allies in all their preparations for the resumption of the offensive. There is a widely current report that the Sinn Fein arrest only just anticipated another rising in Ireland. If that is so, it. is'probable enough that Germany planned a rising so that it would coincide in point of time with the renewal of heavy fighting on the Western front Germany could hardly hope that any very considerable military impression would be produced, but such an incident would have been rather, disturbing to public feeling. There is reason to Relieve, moreover, that the renewal of the enemy's air raid 3 against London and Paris ia designed with the same purpose. The aerial supremacy we have established in France must be very disturbing to Ludendorff, thougli.it must be. known in Berlin by now that these raids occasion very little military damage, it is possibly heped that attacks ou London will induce «» to bring back aeroplanes from France. Such a"result might have followed 12 months ago, but, happily, the Air Service now shows itself capable of meeting. all the demands made upon it, whether offensive or defensive in character. By general agreement, the air defences of London have been very markedly improved. The barrage is better and more effective, and those who saw anything of the last raid know that our aeroplanes were more prominent than ever before in lighting thu enemy machines. THE WEATffiER ELEMENT. It has been rather hastily assumed'that the delay there, has been in the commencement of the" offensive will be all in favor of the Germans,' in that tho weather intends to improve as the year advances- This view, however, calta. for some qualification." IE the enemy's transport arrangements are to work smoothly, dry weather is essential. Thisis particularly the case on the Flanders front, where even a brief spell of wet reduces the ground to the condition of a quagmire. On the Somme front dry weather is less important to tire enemy's, plans, for the ground dries rapidly, and the movement of heavy guns is possible'' at almost any season of the year. What the Germans fear most in that : area-is not rain, but tho heat. The whole countryside is very ill-provided wfth waterways, and the problem of bringing "up'water to the troops in tho front line ia a very serious one. We learnt this, to tour-cost, when we were ourselves oc-cupying-very much the grcur.;) on whic'i jfche Germans -now stand. Only an old kwupaaguervknows the amount of water -soldiers require under active, canrpaigujl'rug conditions during a-spell of blazing teunslnne, The-difficulty in the-Somme Mixea is to .prevent the men'froircAhrow-'ing-theinselves down on the -ground and tapping up any may liave icollected in the shell-holes. The men ;knoW perfectly well, for'they are constantly warned oii-the subject, tlmt thin water rapdisease. But the'knowledge t&oessnot -present tliemtffrcanuslaMngfthxnr Ijfirst. Our own*anny "has suffered a^

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I —precisely, as it dhhin South. Africa.,! What the Germans need* therefore,,savaJ spell of weather -which is-both dry andtj cool. is hardly probable | that the offensive has been actuaDy-de; I layed from this cause. j

i It is far more probable that any delay ! there has been in the commencement of | the offensive is traceable to the activity of our airmen and to the air supremacy we have established. It docs not require any vivid imagination to conceive of the .embarrassment that must he caused to ail the enemy's arrangements when his ammunition dumps are blown up and his railways .are subject to daily bombing-by Allied aii-men operating miles behind his front. Some interference' of this character the Germans doubtlessly anticipated and took into account when they laid '.heir plans, but they certainly did not expect that it would be on such a scale as it has been.

There is much talk of a new enemy machine shortly making its appearnce on the battle front, and possibly the Germans hope to give a better account of themselves in the air in the near future than they have done during the last few weeks, but it will be very difficult to make up the leeway they have lost. Tt. is not s 0 much a question of machines as of men. All aeepunts agree that the Germans are now driven to the fatal expedient of putting half-trained pilots into the fight. The casualties of the German F!<■:»)£,' Service is suffering-from'this cause a;- > very heavy,, and fresh drafts have to ho called for from the training camps before such drafts, are fit to pit themselves against our own- better-train-ed and more experienced men. Experts express the opinion that it will be impossible for the Germans to put this right during the present summer. In that case the German gunners Will be partially blinded and the coming operations will be conducted under a serious handicap.