WESTERN FRONT.

Taranaki Daily News, 20 July 1918, Page 5

WESTERN FRONT.

THE COUNTER-STROKE. Allies Attacking. On Wide Front. L Splendid Progress Made. ] j ] London, July 18. i A French attack on the Aisnc front 25 miles wide is making rapid progress. , General Foch's attack between Sois- 1 sons and Chateau Thierry is expected to save Paris and Rheims. ' General Foch's offensive is making splendid progress. Prisoners and guns | are coming in. 1 Later. ' The Trench - " have gained four miles, thousands of prisoners and many guns.— , Aus. N.Z. Cable Assoc. i iParis, JulyUS. j The French have recaptured Mont- '■ voisin, thus stemming the Crown Prince's , advance towards Epernay. The Aisno offensive has resulted in ' hundreds of prisoners and a gain of ; two miles. The French are still continuing their progress. Vancouver, July 18. The French and Americans have assumed the offensive between Fontenoy and Belleau.—Aus. N.Z. Cable Assoc. Paris, July 18. The French are within three miles of Soissons. London, July 18. The British have begun attacks at several points. The Americans captured 4000 prisoners. Vancouver, July 18. The United Press states that the Americans captured more than a dozen towns and villages between Soissons and Chateau Thierry.—Aus. N.Z. Cable Association. London, July 18. It is believed a general German retirement from the Marne is probable. French artillery has reached the German railway communication affecting the area west of Kheims. The offensive was a complete surprise to the enemy. The Allied guns dominate Soissons. Washington, July 18. General Pershing reports that the Germans facing the Americana have been completely driven back across the Marne. —Aus. K.Z. Cable Assoc. London, July 18. An American communique states: The i Americans in the Marne sector have entirely regained possession of the south bank of the river. The enemy north-west of Chateau Thierry re-attempted an attack near Vaux. The attack was completely \ broken by infantry and artillery fire.— ! Aus. N.Z. Cable Assoc. New York, July 18. The Americans passed beyond their objectives. Wall Street stocks bounded many points, and the City Hall bells tolled for the victory. LUDENDORFFS PLANS FAIL. Changed French Tactics. Knowledge of Enemy Plans. r [ London, July 18. ' Every hour news from the front emphasises tie utter failure of the GerJ mans to recover from the first checks east and west of Kheims. 5 Even the Cologne Gazette, in inspired J articles, admits that there was no success. It attributes the German failure 1 to the changed tactics of the French, 1 who delivered fierce counter-attacks with r the reserves, thus upsetting the plans of ' the High Command, who expected the same easy advance as at the Chemin des Dames. The Cologne Gazette says the German losses are within moderate limits, a significant admission, because it was always announced formerly that the ? losses were considerably fewer than , those of the enemy. Documents captured on German prisoners show that the main plan was to ' seize a line from the Mountain of Kheims to Montmirail (10 miles south of Chateau Thierry). Ludendorff realised that Kheims would be a formidable object to attack frontally, but he said that if the French line on either side was broken Kheims would fall of itself. The first lateral thrust was directed '■ on Chalons, thence to Revigny, the second upon Epernay, thence to Montmirail. 8 Ludendorff hoped to secure room for deployment of forces capable of attacking Paris. Already the Crown Prince has abandoned the attempt to drive forward the whole front and substituted local attacks. The result of the whole battle thus far shows that Ludendorff attempted a great deal more than his strength permitted. General Gouraud was aware of the actual date of the attack a fortnight beB fore it happened. On the night of the attack he withdrew all the troops from the front lines, and an hour before the German attack opened the French artillery opened a devastating fire upon the Germans assembled in the front line, while the German guns were playing upon 18 the empty French trencheß.—Aus. N.Z. * Cable Assoc, a

GERMANS UNABLE TO

DEBOUCH. ENEMY PINCERS SLIP. FRENCH ARTILLERY DOMINATES MARNE VALLEY. London, July 18. The enemy renewed his attacks westward and eastward of the Kheims salient, capturing the western portion of La Bourdomierie village and the heights, which the French re-took on Tuesday. The French are again counter-attacking. The Germans remained unable to de- : boucli from Prunay. The advance has lost its breakneck speed. A favorable sign is that the villages are changing hands repeatedly. ' The enemy during the third day sue- : ceeded in advancing his line towards important positions, *hich he may subsequently capture, providing he possesses the requisite forces. On the other hand, the enemy has failed to gain the strategic advantages -which are the necessary preliminary to a vast converging westward movement, which was the High Command's plan. The German pincers have slipped in Champagne, between Prunay and Massiges, where a rupture would have enabled the enemy to cross the . Roman road and reach Suippes, and thence Chalons. Here our line holds. The German attacks misfired at only one point. They succeeded in advancing to-day, after two unsuccessful attempts. , Tli" Kermans, at 11 in the morning, atta •;• on a six-mile front, penetrated to ;i ucpth of one and a half miles at ' : the deepest point. The Montagne de Kheims advance was made at enormous cost. i During the night the French repulsed two violent attacks on Vrigny and Beau-mont-sur-Vesle. The French re-entered two villages which had been strenuously disputed, including Montvoisin. The French artillery dominates the Marne valley, which is being heavily shelled. The French hold the whole high ground overlooking the valley, with the exception of one point. The offensive, which the enemy hoped to develop into a drive, is now regarded as a failure, and has become a series of local disjointed actions, therefore it can truly be described as a German defeat, but probably the battle will continue for some time with fluctuating results. The Germans still possess a large number of available reserves, hut it is believed likely that owing to this failure the High Command may determine to reorganise and use the reserves for an assault on another part of the line. The increased German artillery fire on the British front is regarded as eignificant in this connection. The enemy at no point had advanced one-third of the programme distance, and he has suffered colossal casualties. The French are full of hope that the enemy will not succeed in taking Rheims, though they anticipate the utmost efforts to capture the city by ramming tactics. In the event of the Germans gaining possession of the Montagne de Rheims the tenure of the city will become precarious. It is evident that Ludendorff planned to rupture the Champagne front, isolate the French armies, and exploit the success by local battles. Further stern fighting is inevitable, because the enemy is compelled to continue his attacks in order to save his face.—Aus. N.Z. Cable Assoc. FRENCH HEROIC RESISTANCE. FURIOUS COMBATS. London, July 18. A French communique says: The battle continued with unbroken determination on the whole front west of Rheims, but, notwithstandingf his efforts the enemy did not succeed in increasing bis advance Our troops' heroic resistance and incessant counter-attacks stopped the enemy's thrust after all the fluctuations of the advances and the retirements of the day. Actions are progressing south of the Marne, on the wooded slopes northward of Stagnan and Monthodon Chapelle. Very sharp fighting north of Damblizy and Festigny resulted in holding the enemy to the southern outskirts of Banquiny and Chataignil woods. The enemy succeeded, east of Oevilly, in regaining a footing in Montvoisin, between the Marne and Rheims. The battle continues north of Reuil in the King's Wood, which the Germans penetrated. We are defending it foot by foot. The Forest of Courton is the theatre of furious combats. The enemy continues to be held westward of Anteuil. The Germans did not succeed in reaching iPourcy Ditch, which has been the objective of several renewed powerful attacks. A brilliant Italian counter-attack westward of Anteuil drove the enemy back. Enemy corpses are lying in front of the lines in the valley of Arbre des Ombreaux, and testify to heavy enemy losses. The situation is unchanged in the Vrigny sector and south-west of Rheims. East of Rheims we broke an attack between Beaumont-sur-Vesle and Sillery. Our positions are intact along the whole Champagne front.—Aus. N.Z. Cable Association and Router. SIR D. HAIG'S REPORT. ' ANOTHER AUSTRALIAN SUCCESS. London, July 18. [ Sir Douglas Haig reports: The Australians carried out a successful local , enterprise on the 17th in the neighbor- ] hood of Villers Bretonneux, advancing , their lines on upwards of a mile front. , They captured two field guns. , We slightly improved our . positions '. eastward of Hebuterne, successfully raid- , ed southwards of Hebuterne, and repulsed raiders southwards of Bucquoy. [ There is considerable hostile artillery fire northward of Bailleul— Aus. N.Z. Cable Assoc, and Reuter.

IN CASE OF FAILURE.

GERMANS HAVE ALERNATIVE PLAN. FRENCH BOMBARDING. MARNE BRIDGES. Received July 19, 12.45 a.m. London, July 18. The French are still bombarding the Marne bridges. The enemy undoubtedly has an alternative plan in case of failure- It now remains to be seen what it is. He probably means to combine the present offensive with something else. Epernay is now in no danger. It is unlikely to be taken. The enemy i 3 still half a mile from Pourey. There was heavy rain yesterday— Press Assoc. FRENCH OFFICIAL REPORT. Received July 19, 7.50 p.m. London, July 18. A French communique states: We attacked this morning from the region of Fontenoy and Ogaisne as far as the region of Belleau. We advanced at certain points from two to three kilometres. We have taken prisoners in the Champagne. South-west of Manteuillo fosse we stopped a violent enemy attack. North of iProsnes an attack by enemy guard troops failed completely.—Aus. N.Z. Cable Assoc, and Reuter. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS. THE IMPORTANCE OF LORRAINE. Writes "Criticus" in the Dunedin Star: The first aim of a counter-stroke should be to get at the enemy's vitals as promptly as possible. In this matter we are rather handicapped, for while the Germans are only a little more than 40 miles from Paris, the Allies are many hundreds of miles from Berlin. We must look for a sensitive spot somewhat nearer, and the nearest point of really vital importance to the enemy is the province of Lorraine. The neck of land between Verdun and Liege, which carries the enemy's communications with Belgium and Northern France, is only 100 miles wide, and an advance into Lorraine will constrict it. No very great measure of constriction would be required to Tender the enemy's position in those regions too dangerous to hold, and by compelling them to fall back we should strike the Germans a deadly blow. Lorraine is even more important from the fact that it is the chief source of Germany's iron supplies—the very basis of her war industries—as well as producing large supplies of coal. It's capture would be a disastrous blow to Germany's munitions production and a tremendous relief to that of France. Germany is a country very poor in iron supplies, and during 1913 out of 28,600,000 tons of iron ore produced 21,135,000 tons were obtained from Lorraine. The French journal 'L'lllustration' states that in May, 1915, the representatives of the great industrial and agricultural associations of the Rhine provinces informed the Chancellor that 80 per cent, of the iron ore used in Germany during the war came from Lorraine. They added: "If the production of iron ore in Lorraine is seriously interfered with the war will be half lost." Thus we see the vital importance of Lorraine to the enemy, and it has the advantage from our point of being a vital point quite close to our lines. The Valley of Briey, the chief source of iron ore, extends from near Metz to Longwy. An advance of 30 miles in a north-eas-terly direction from Verdun would put us in possession of it, and the, same movement would constrict the enemy's communications with Belgium and Northern France. Moreover, to the northeast of Nancy, extending for a distance of about 40 miles from Falkenberg to St. Wendel, is a great coal region. An advance of 00 miles from the sector covering Nancy would just put us in possession of this area, and we should also take in our stride a considerable saltproducing region extending from Chateau Salines to near Saarburg. These two moves would break the back of Germany's war industries, and so constrict the enemy's communications with Belgium and Northern France as to compel them very soon to evacuate those regions. These considerations snould be remembered by those people who have made up their minds that the Allies cannot win a decisive victroy. We can win or lose, according to the amount of intelligence we put into the work. USING THE INNER LINE. Having clearly grasped these facts, the policy of our leaders next year should be directed towards taking advantage of them. In order to do this they must concentrate all their resources, and make use of the inner line. In previous offensives the Anglo-French have deliberately chosen the outer line. The British have struck on the western arm of the big salient and the French on the southern arm. On the Somme they struck together at the same spot; but they took the outer line, apparently for no other reason than that the Somme was the point of junction between the two armies. This policy of choosing the outer line seems to have been due to the same kind of egotism as that which so long successfully obstructed the appointment of an allied generalissimo. Working together as one army, it will be necessary for the British, French, and American leaders to sink their own individuality and be content with a smaller measure of limelight. If they are unwilling to do this next summer they will prolong the war indefinitely, at a cost of millions of lives and thousands of millions of money. This is too high a price to pay for individual egotism, and the allied Governments should come down with sledgehammer force upon that sort of thing. We must take a leaf out of the enemy's book. As they made use of the inner Hne to aim at the vitals of the AHes, so should we use the inner imo to aim at the vitals of Germany. Our inner line i* provided by the region behind Nancy, wfcere we shall be close to the vital urovJnee of Lorraine. From this poiiH \( 'e stall have the option of striking )7i \ hreinßrectrons—northward, noTth-eaati,4 -d, • »r eastward. In any of these direct■( »«j t& flhall face a nice, (lat sector auitp'i n fear purpose, ami ;,.ibstantial J." # tirr way will 1 ■? prions for R"TBn this anpb. i>n, the BritiaJi- fc«~and French niriking forces «i« «tfi »7i ipscd as one :irmy, organisedgj d Wv <t>"-->l. nml Ii swiftlv follow tit, o"* * w " il ' om *'''■'' I! " 3 ' e £c shall A? ((We «.'»ej£e the initiative,

and anticipate the enemy cm any one of j three main fronts. THE POLICY OF BULGES. The_ net result of the enemy's offensive activities during the past summer has been the driving in of a series of bulges into the Allied lines, none of which is decisive. If the enemy had shown the ability to drive in their bulges in such a way as to give them ao organic strategical connection, the result might have been different; but this they have failed to do. The bulge towards Calais, the bulge towards Amiens, and the bulge towards the Marne have no connection each with the other. Now it is probable that Allied thrusts against the enemy will be held up in much the same way after covering a certain distance; therefore, we should endeavor to drive, home our bulges in such a way that they co-operate in securing our strategical aims of seizing the Lorraine iron and coal fields and forcing the enemy out of Belgium and France. Taking up our posWon behind Nancy, wo might bluff heavily about a thrust into Alsace or in the Champagne, and then drive a big bulge straight across the Lorraine border north-eastward from Nancy. This move might capture a large part of the big coal afea around Saarbrucken. When the enemy's reserves had been drawn to that point to check our advance, we might swiftly change front and stride for the valley of Briey from the Champagne, from Verdun, and from the "northern area of the newly-created salient. These two moves, well executed, should eithei put ug in possession of the gTeater part of the iron and coal, or bring us so close as to enable lis to deny their use to the enemy by means of our heavy artillery and bombing planes. When the enemy's reserves were massed to check the new advance, another change of front might cany us to the Rhine through Alsace, and we should then threaten the whole of the enemy's position on the west bank of the Rhine. Thus, the policy of bulge-driving, skilfully carried out, might break the back of the enemy's resistance next summer.