AUSTRO-GERMANY.

Taranaki Daily News, 17 July 1918, Page 5

AUSTRO-GERMANY.

post, that of First tJuarlermaster-Gtti eral, or Sub-Chief of Staff. How far von Hindenburg was responsible for the German strategy during 1917 and 1918 even the German critics cannot say. No one heard of von Ludendorff in the days when bis patron's name was sounding through Germany, but by a curious trick of fate it was Ludendorff and not Hindenburg who acquired fame ■when Hindenburg became Chief of the General Staff. Possibly, too, it was no trick of fate, but simply the verdict of the facts. Von Hindenburg was an old man. It was not until 1903, when he was 54 years of age, that he obtained command of an army corps. He retired in 1911. Wben he was recalled in 1914, therefore, he had been three years out of harness, and his field command certainly did not bring him practice in the solution of the peculiar problems that confront the Chief of Staff. His experience of General Staff work had ceased when he was a major, and it \va9 an i-n----tirely new field that lie entered iu the summer of 1916. That was where von Ludendorff was invaluable, and the critics may not have been so far wrcng when they said that von Hindenburg supplied the name and von Luder.doril the brains of the combination. One of the critics a few weeks ago observed that when von Hindenburg ordered the German retreat on the Somme early in 1917 he had in view precisely the attack which has been delivered thi-s year. But that is scarcely a correct statement. When von Hindenburg ordered the retreat early last year he did not know that he would be freed from anxiety in regard to Russia. He was intent on shortening his western front and on getting rid of dangerous irregularities. It is perfectly true that he lowed it to be believed that he was planning a counter-stroke, and in shortening his front he was securing the full advantage of the interior lines on which he was operating. But the immediate purpose of that retreat was to forestall the Franco-British offensive which be believed to be in preparation on the Somme, in continuation of the offensive of the previous year. And he could lfot even then have been sure of his position, because the possibility of powerful French and British attacks on the flanks of his retreat was obvious. In 1917 he had no great counter-stroke in contemplation because he lacked the superiority in men and guns, without which victory could not be hoped for. Whether he actually planned the campaign of 1918 is not known. He is credited with having proposed the offensive that brought the Italians to grief last year, but then the credit for that plan is also given to i General von Mackensen, who was reI ported to have paid a visit of inspection to the Italian front. The great service that von Hindenburg rendered his country, beyond doubt, was the stimulation of its mobilisation, for he insisted on the supreme importance of man-power, at a time when the armies of Germany were palpably declining.—Lyttelton Times. ,

WHAT GERMANY REQUIRES. .WHAT SHE LIKES OF AFRICA. Received July 16, 7.40 p.m. London, July 13. Hie Kreuz Zeitung, discussing Germany's war aims, 6ays that only weaklings can believe in the possibility of an understanding with England. Germany will hare no paper arrangements. She will simply require of England, France, Belgium, and Portugal the cession, as an Indemnity, of such portions of their po?teMiong as she may need for the establishment of her Central African Empire, which she intends to develop into a great military power by training colored Miliary troops.—Press Assoc. SERIOUS RIOTING. Received July 16, 7.40 pjn. Amsterdam, July 15. Vienna reports serious rioting st Jarol>lf. —Pre»« Assoc. B2NDEKBURG. Humors of the death of Hindenburg .fere current on the Western front three or four months ago, and it was definitely ■tated early in thie German offensive that the generalissimo of the German armies in (he field was extremely ill. The present announcement of his death is presumably authoritative. Hindenburg waa not nominally the generalissimo, because that distinction belongs to the Kaiserj but since the days of the great Moltke it has been the tradition that the Kaiser should accept the decisions of the General Staff without demur, and if that tradition has been observed in this wtr Hindenburg was the actual Com-mander-in-Chief. He became Chief of Stalt of the Field Annies at the end of Augnit, 1916, when von Falkenhayn was in disrepute because of the Verdun failure. Von Hindenburg Was at that time the idol of Germany, for all the enemy victories in the east were attributed to liU gcnitu—though von Falkenhayn had planned the greatest of those victories, von Mackensen had been responsible for the tactics—and his appointment was apparently nothing more than a concession to popular clamour. Shrewd critics, indeed, have always declared that von Hindenburg's own successes were due in the main to his able Chief of Staff, von Ludendorff, and, Of course, when von Hindenburg obtained the highest post he insisted that a position should be created for his trusty lieutenant. Naturally the changes in the German command are judged on partial information, because the inner history of Germany is not revealed. On the surface it appeared that von Falkenhayn had been superseded because he had failed at Verdun, and that von Hindenburg had been chosen to succeed him because the Easterner ww the popular hero. But this is not by any means the whole story. From von FaQcenhayn's point of view Verdun was not wholly a failure. He unsaid to have opposed the enterprise, and totally to have entered upon it only with the object of forestalling an Allied offensive in 1816, and not with any expectation of a break-through. He was ■nperyded, not because of incompetence, bat partly because he did not stand well vith those around the Kaiser, and partly because the rulers of Germany wero at the time revolving large schemes in th.nr mifwi, and needed'the prestige of a g'oat fi««M to commend those schemes to the country. They were able subsequently to say that the comprehensive mobilisation of the population enforced by the patriotic service law was demanded by V«t Hindenburg, and all the subsequent measures of the same kind were presentad lor the loyal endorsement of the people "because von Hindenburg required' it." At that time, too, tie Pan-German* vera already looking east, and they yfgpttA th£ uncompromising Easterner at the head of affairs. There was a oiagsel between von Hindenburg and von fcifanlajm, according to current report*, beeanse tod Hindenburg bebeved that qaifuj ought to be content to fight a V»i*ng battle in the west, and to throw bar —in weight against Russia. Von Falkenlatyn, on the other hand, refused to radnee the armies on the Western front to a minimum, and von Ludendorff, it ia recalled, went so far as to resign the divisions demanded for "the eaat wen not forthcoming. The dispute mm to a head early 1916. Von Hindeatarg'B argument v- -hat in 1915 and MB the task of Germany had beeo in the east, and yet the demands of the rnttrrn wim""** were refused by the Of—l Staff, and he was able to soy iw A* Central Powers had been robbed pf complete victory over Russia solely fceenn the diviaioiis required had not been pheed at Ida ditpanl. The difficulty was solved in a curious manner •esraiy notieed even in Germany. Von Hindenburg became not Chief of the General Staff, butof the General Staff pt the Field Army, leaving the General (Staff in Berlin stul nominally in control «f operations in all theatres, and also of BdMhstten of men aft home. Von