The Daily News. SATURDAY, JUNE 15, 1918. THE GREATEST BATTLE OF THE WAR.

Taranaki Daily News, 15 June 1918, Page 4

The Daily News. SATURDAY, JUNE 15, 1918. THE GREATEST BATTLE OF THE WAR.

A recent cable described the latest German offensive on the Mont-didier-Noyon sector as the greatest battle of the war. Presumably it was the issue that was referredto and not the numbers engaged.. There are now three critical seetors in the direction of Paris —the Amiens sector, the MontdidierNoyon sector, and the AisneMarne sector. Prom Senlis, thirty miles north-west of Paris, to Bes-sons-sur-Matz, in the centre .of the Montdidier-Noyon sector, is twen-ty-five miles. From Senlis to Silly-la-Peterie, in the centre of the Aisne-Marne sector, is the same distance, so that Senlis forms a central point between the two sectors, and if the mass of Foch's reserves are grouped in the region between that town and Compiegne they could promptly reinforce either sector. They; would, however, be less well placed to reinforce the Amiens sector, the centre of which is about fifty miles from Senlis. It fortunately happens that the 'Amiens sector forms the point of junction between the/British and French,-and this greatly facilitates its reinforcement, as the two Allies can close in towards it from two directions. There are risks, of course, but, in war, risks must be taken,.

they are such as can be afforded. Ludendorff's plan is judged to be an attempt to crush, between converging armies the Allied forces between Montdidier and Chateau Thierry. Apparently Foch contemplates defeating tlie plan, and the determined nature of the French resistance, as well as of their counter-attacks, shows that they are quite alive to the momentous nature of the issue. Yon iTutier's army is endeavoring to force back the Allies from the Noyon-Montdidier front, while Yon Boehrn is exerting pressure between the Oise and the Marne. If these attacks should prove successful, the development of the German plans would be greatly facilitated, while if Ludendorff's move is now frustrated his prospect of victory will be more remote than formerly. The Germans have made an advance that is of but little stategical value, while the French have regained some of their lost territory. So far as the general plan of the enemy offensive is concerned, there is no new feature—the usual gas shelling, and waves on waves of infantry mown down in swathes. The element of surprise in evidence at the Bheims sector is entirely absent. It is evident the enemy knew that his task was one of great difficulty, so that he concentrated an exceptionally strong force wherewith to deliver the initial blow, having massed reserves in the rear. What progress he has made in the centre has entailed an enormous cost, not only from the devastating lire of the Allies' land forces, but from their aerial armies, which have been been taking a terrible toll, besides disorganising all traffic behind the battle-front. One of the main factors in the issue is the question of the extent of the enemy reserves. It is argued that if the German reserves had been as vast as was supposed they would have been utilised to the full in the Aisne struggle, and the Germans would not have waited until Foch brought up his reserves and restored the position, and the only way in which the Germans could prove the possession of these vast reserves would be to develop a first-class offensive between the Aisne and the Marne and follow it up vigorously and effectively. Such a course, however, would certainly convict them of having [ perpetrated a very great blunder, and lost such a splendid opportunity as it not likely to again present itself. Failing this, it may fairly be assumed that the reserves were limited, and that they have merely shifted their front of attack—not } for the first time by any means. So far, German strategy does not bear the impress of a master hand, it savoring more of the bull ring than military science—so much the better for the .Allies. At present the Germans seem obsessed with the Paris scheme. Meanwhile Paris is being very strongly protected by defences that, will withstand everything but longrange guns, but its real defence rests with the armies of the Allies. These armies are disputing with the utmost tenacity every inch of ground, and the indications of success are very favorable. In this offensive, violent as was the onslaught, there was no break through of the French front, and although the French have been compelled to give ground in the centre they have exacted a high price. Von Hutier may be expected to use his reserves to the full in the effort he is making, but when the time arrives showing that his reserves have been sufficiently depleted, we may look for the promised counter-stroke of General Foch. Meanwhile stubborn defence is the only course to be adopted. If Von Hutier fails to reach Compiegne in this offensive the whole movement will be a most costly failure. According to present appearances the violent struggle is likely to develop into the greatest battle of the war, but .the unwavering confidence of the Allies is certainly most reassuring to-the-timid, while inspiring to the rest' of humanity. The contest is still one in which Time plays the chief part,, and since the entrance of America into the war, time has ceased to be .a neutral and has become an enemy to the Central Powers. What' Germ any has been aiming at since March last has been the control of the Channel ports or the heart of France. The first attempt has failed, and the second offensive is not likely to fare better. The magnificent defensive stand that is being made by the Allies augurs well for the*, defeat of Teutonic aims.