EVERYTHING IN.

Taranaki Daily News, 8 June 1918, Page 7

EVERYTHING IN.

GRIM STRUGGLE IN WEST. CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM MARCH OFFENSIVE. (From Wellington Times' Correspondent.) London, April 11. The new German oli'ensivc which has been launched in the northern sectors of the British front conveys a lesson which the nation's leadeis have happily taken at once to heart. There can hardly be any doubt now as to the object the Germans are pursuing. They are out to destroy the British Army. Recognising that with the arrival of American reinforcements their military position must grow weaker rather than stronger, the Kaiser's War Lords have decided to throw ■everything in now in the hope of bringing the war to an early and victorious conclusion. I'rom their point of view 1! is a sound policy if they hope to win the \Var. If thoy fail, they lose. There can be 110 maimer of doubt as to that. The offensive ;s always more costly than the defensive, especially fflien it is conducted, as the Germans conduct it, with great masses of men thrown forward in ciose formation. To that extent if the Allies can hold the German assault between now and midsummer, von Hindenburg will be in a much weaker position at the fall of the year to resist the counter-strokes of the Allies when General Foch feels himself in a position to take the initiative. Mr Bonar Law estimates that the climax of the German ell'ori will come at the end of May and in ■Tune, Thereafter the tide should begin .r.tu turn.- ■

People are asking how it is possible, at the rate at which the Germans are using up their reserves, for von Hin(ieuburg to continue his offensive for months on end. He cannot. He is piling' up liis casualties at too fast a rate far that. But Mr Bonar Law never suggested that the additional men asked for under the Man-Power Bill are to be enrolled under any such expectation as this. But if the Germnhs exhaust themselves by June, then will come the great opportunity of the Allies to launch their counterstroke before the enemy is able to reorganise his shattered divisions. And just as Germany is throwing in every thing now, so shall we need then to put every available man into the fight. THE NORTHERN THRUST. That the Germans are putting forth their supreme effort cannot be doubted. When von Hindenburg flung practically one hundred divisions into the first stage of the ,Somme battle military men who had the best information available about the reserves the Germans had at tlieir disposal believed it was impossible -for the German Higher Command to attempt anything more than a local diversion at other points of the far-flung battle line. But the fighting south of Ypres is on a front that" would have been considered of great width prior to the Somme battle.

The first- blow was launched, aa on the Somme front, at the junction of two Allied armies. For it was the Portuguese in the centre who gave way in the first instance and prepared the> way for the Germr.n penetration to Givenchv and the line of the Ly» and afterwards into the ruined village of Messines itself. Whether this great blow was intended as a diversion to prevent the Allied concentration of troops at Amiens, or whether the Germans hoped that in order to save Amiens we might have weakened our line in the north to a perilous extent, we do not yet know. If the enemy acted on the latter supposition, the result must hnve come as !i disappointment. For there is ground for stating that Sir Douglas Haig always foresaw the possibility that the battle 011 the Somme would be followed almost instantly by a second shattering blow in the region of Ypres and on the roads covering Calais and the Channel ports. The break up of the weather must have sadly disturbed the German! plans in this area. They are fighting in the swamps, and the ground they have won round about Leventie is an expanse of muddy flats of no great importance. THE SOMME REVERSE. The political crisis that has been produced at Home by the proposal to apply conscription to Ireland has to some extent obscured the military aspects of the debates which have taken place 'in Parliament. The proceedings, have, however, thrown some light 011 the circumstances of our reverse on the Somme front. F.veryone was asking how it came about that though the opposing forces in the West were very nearly equal and inclined, if anything, to a slight preponderance on the part of the Allies, the enemy's blow when it fell found us outnumbered to the extent of four, five and even ten to one.

This would have been easy to understand if we had been taken by surprise as the Germans themselves were taken by surprise in the autumn of 1017 b,v the attack of the tanks on the Cajnbrai front. But there lias never been any suggestion that we were taken unawares. On the contrary, Mr Lloyd George told the House of Commons that the military committee at Versailles was extraordinarily accurate in the forecast it gave of the enemy's [.lans. Two or three months before the event Ministers were warned that the Germans would attack exactly where they did, that the offensive would be launched on a front wider than had ever been known before in the fighting on the Western front, and that von Hintlenburg would be prepared to throw 03 divisions into the battle. In point of fact .the divisions actually employed numbered 97, and in this small matter of detail only was the weight of the German assault under-estimated. We seem to have had very accurate information also of the date on which ttin attack would take place. How qame it, therefore, that we allowed ourselves to be outnumbered and that the Germans were able to penetrate so perilously near to the outskirts of Amiens and to threaten the great- lateral railway between Paris and the northern ports on which the Allied communications depend ? AN EXCESS OF CAUTION. The answer given to this question by various Government speakers lias not been so clear or definite as might, have been wished. We know that General Gouch's arn> v »« M «"i« »»il that that

| distinguished Geneva! himself ias been | re-called pending the result of the milij tary inquiry which has keen ordered, i In the meantime Ministers may have been reluctant to tell all they know until the inquiry is completed, though in the meantime .Mr Bonar Law has courageously taken the ultimate responsibility for anything Unit occurred 011 to the shoulders of the Government. Mr Bonar Law's suggestion that democratic institutions anil democratic Parliaments are not the best instruments with which to conduct a great . war will not perhaps bear very close examination. Certainly the British House of Commons cannot be accused of hampering in any way the Government's conduct of (he war, nor can it be accused of whining or whimpering over the heavy casualties sustained. Heading between the lines of the different speeches delivered, indeed, the impartial critic is led to the conclusion that there was a dispersal of our reserves because the Allied leaders hesitated to accept the forecast of the Military Committee at Versailles. If any error at all was committed, it was an error on the side of excessive caution. Our aerial reconnaissances showed that there was a great concentration of troops pointing to an attack south of Arras. But there was nothing to show that this concentration might not be designed against the French rather than the British front. In fact, Lord Curzon expressly stated in the House of Lords that up to the very end General Petain continued to expect the attack on the Champaign front which was held 'by his own gallant force. Mr Bonar Law also pointed out that though German divisions were being piled up against us south of Arras, "nobody could say with certainty where the attack was coming." The reserves might have been concentrated before (•Mr lines "even if it was intended to use (hem against French troops in some other parts of the line.'' The decision iiiicl (o be taken, therefore, of risking everything 011 the assumption that the forecast of the Military Committee at Versailles was correct, or of malcing dispositions calculated to meet the danger wherever it came.

CONSEQUENCES OK THE RKVEESR. In the light of what afterwards happened those responsible for the final decision no doubt wish now that they , had acted oil the information obtained by the Military Committee at Versailles and communicated to the British Government by General Sir Henry Wilson. But it is easy to be wise after the event, and our concern now is with the consequences of the reverse rather than with its causes. Happily the position is not irredeemable. We are in a position to replace our losses, both in .nen and guns, and General Foch continues confident of his ability to ensure the safety of Amiens. The Germans obtained a great success though at the expense of very heavy casualties. But if they can be held in the positions they now hold, they will have failed in their main object, which was to separate the French and British Armies and roll up the latter with its back to a eoast deficient in ports adequate for the purposes of supplying the needs of an army numbered m millions. And if the Germans fail in this ultimate object the consequences for them must, as Mr Bonar Law said, be very serious. They are staking everything on one great effort, and if that effort fails we may expect to see a marked change in the terms on which Germany will seek to secure peace before things still worse befall her.