THE DEATH STRUGGLE.

Taranaki Daily News, 30 May 1918, Page 6

THE DEATH STRUGGLE.

CONFLICT IN THE WEST. CONSIDERATION OF GERMANY'S STRATEGICAL PLAN. (Wellington Times' Correspondent). London, March 28. Whatever motive may have prompted t her to stake everything on one throw, there can be no doubt that the (Jesperate struggle we are now watching on Western front represents an effort on Germany's part to drivo a wedge in between the French and British armies, to roll them up singly afterwards, and so obtaiiv a military decision in the war and a victorious German peace- There have been signs that this policy, involving as it does very considerable risks to the enemy, has been the subject of some friction between von Hindenburg and Ludendforff. Von Hindenburg does not appear to have been so enthusiastic for the scheme as hia shadow counsellor. The grounds on which he based his objections were probably military in character, but their precise nature has not been allowed to transpire. We have no means of ascertaining, therefore, whether the strategy that is being pursued is dictated by inflated confidence bred of .Germany's successes in the East, or whether it ia dictated by the desperation of the internal situation in Germany itself. _ Opinion in London inclines to the latter view, and we get a certain confirmation of this impression from the enemy's ,ovn official communiques. It will have (been noticed that on the opening day of the great battle, very little information was volunteered to the German people. It waß only on the second day, when the British line begaji to bend back, that the world was told that the Emperor William himself was in command, and the German newspapers began to speak of the struggle as the Kaiser's battle. The flamboyant character of these German official pommuniques strongly suggests also that the enemy finds it necessary to cheer up his people by every possible means. If things are not in a very bad way in .Germany, why is it thought necessary, in the middle of the greatest battle the world has ever watched, to chronicle the fact that the booty captured includes great quantities of clothing?

THE GERMAN STRATEGICAL PLAN. Though we do not know the considerations which have weighed with the enemy, and can only conclude from what has actually happened that the bull is charging with its head down, we need no guidance either from von Hindenburg ot Ludendorff to form an accurate appreciation of the enemy's strategical plan. He sought, in the first instance, to drive a wedge between the French and British armies, or between the forces operating to the north of the Somme and the forces operating to the south. Had ho succeeded in this he wojild doubtlessly have endeavored to press on along the valley of the Somme with the intention of catching the British Army under two fires and forcing it to fight with its back to the sea, with no possibility of co-operating with General Foch's strategical reserve in the south. Simultaneously Paris itself would have been threatened along the valley of the Oise and along the line of the Marne. To some extent this plan may have 'been encouraged by the theory of defence that has been adopted by the Military Committee as Versailles. This theory is to hold your defensive positions more or less lightly, depending on your army of strategical reserve either to arrest the enemy's advance if it penetrates too far, or to fall upon the enemy's flank and deliver a vigorous counter-offensive if the penetration does not beooino dangerous, but merely results in entangling the enemy's forces in a narrow and somewhat risky salient. The wisdbm of this policy remains to be justified by events. Op to the present it has to be frankly admitted that it has proved somewhat costly to the Allies, though the offensive is always more expensive in human life than the defensive, and wo have unquestionably inflicted great and, indeed, serious casualties on the Germans.

ENEMY EXAGGERATIONS. The extent of our own losses can only be guessed at. We are certainly not justified in accepting the enemy's own figures. It would profoalbly be safe to deduct one-third at least from the German computation of the number of guns that have fallen into their hands. Happily, many of theso were dsetroyed foefore they were abandoned, and the tale of prisoners is enormously swollen, of course, by the wounded who had to be left on the battlefield in our retirement. It may be accepted that we lost heavily in tanks, for these were largely used in the novel task of assisting the infantry in counter-attacks.. On the other hand, our flying men seem to have had things very much their own way. Our low-flying planes bomlbed the enemy's reserves with great vigor, and with practically no interference except from the ground. Twentytwo and a-.half tons of bombs were dropped on Peronne and Bapaume while the Germans were massing there to continue the attack, and all accounts agree that the flying service was of enormous assistance in retarding the enemy's preparations for advancing over the devastated battlefield. With every mile that the Germans advanced their transport difficulties incruised. The men travelled light in order that swiftness might he imparted to the blow, They carried nothing buit thesr iron rations, and as these suffice only for two, or at most, three days, the problem of bringing up supplies was soon added to the problem of bringing up reinforcements. This latter problem | was facilitated to some extent by the eclvelon formation adopted, divisions I moving up to the attack in turn and taking tho place of those shattered by our artillery fire or worn out by exhaustion. THE STRATEGICAL RESERVES. What next and next? As these lines are being written there is welcome indication that the German advance is being arrested, though the battle is not over yet, and we may have further moments of crisis like those which occurred when tho Germans crossed the' Tortille stream and when they pressed forward as Martinpuich and Ooureellctte—dangerous phases when nothing but the intrepid bravery of our troops prevented the Germans from separautJ nij? the armies operating north of ' lie Somme from the oomibiaed

French and British armies south of the river. But in attempting to peer into the future it has to be remembered that the Germans have the mutative, and our plans must necessarily conform in some degree to the policy von Hindenburg may pursue. If he is arrested on very much the same line where the opposing armies now stand, will he go on throwing fresh divisions into the fight and piling up his casualties, or will he confess that his victory has only resulted in the creation of yet another stalemate? In seeking' to answer this question we come up once more against the problem of the motives which prompted the enemy's offensive. If Germany was driven to it by desperation, and feels that she must have peace at once before American reinforcements I begin to exercise a real influence on the course of events, then Hindenburg may go on. All considerations of caution suggest that we must wait until we identify a sufficient number of German divisions before we can come to any conclusion as to whether it is still in the power of von Hindenburg to strike a fresh blow at some other point. All we know for certain is that every German division has been recalled from Italy, and that even the French front has been skimmed to provide additional driving force to the blow on the Cambrai front. Whether von Hindenburg has also impinged to any extent on his strategical reserve is a point on which official information, at least, is not yet available. NEARLY EQUAL. In the anxious moments which may still lie in front of us it is valuable to remember that the opposing forces in the West are as nearly equal in number as they can be. For this satisfactory aspect of the situation our unstinted thanks are due to Sir Douglas Haig and Sir William Robertson. Look at them from any point of view that you may, everyone must admit that the events of the last few days are a striking vindication of the attitude that has always been adopted by what is known as the Western school of strategists. If some of the politicians had been allowed to control events it is quite conceivable that by this time our resources in the West might have been frittered away on ambitious schemes in secondary theatres of the war. Sir Douglas Haig and Sir William Robertson always resolutely set their faces against any such dissipation of our strength. With clear insight they saw j that in the end the war must be decided on these Western battlefields. The Ger-1 mans also saw it, though they took advantage of their interior lines, and the unpreparedness of the Allies, to devote themselves in the first instance to the business of knocking Russia out of the fight, in order that their hands might be free to deal with the much more serious menace in the West. And if the German advance can be arrested, the battle we are now watching may prove in very fact decisive of the whole war. If the German blow fails in its objective the casualties the enemy has sustained must greatly weaken any resistance he can put up when the Allies are able, with American reinforcements to take the initiative once more.