The Daily News. MONDAY, MAY 27, 1918. IS COMPLETE VICTORY POSSIBLE.

Taranaki Daily News, 27 May 1918, Page 4

The Daily News. MONDAY, MAY 27, 1918. IS COMPLETE VICTORY POSSIBLE.

A short time ago General Smuts made the somewhat startling statement that he did not believe an out and out victory was possible for any group of nations. He is, of course, entitled to his opinion on the subject, but whether it was wise to proclaim his views is quite another matter. Had he asserted a belief that Victory was improbable it would have left a loophole of escape, but in war "possibilities" are almost illimitable, provided the necessary power is utilised to the right extent and in the right manner. In discussing this question, a writer in the Dunedin Star, whose contributions on war topics are always worthy of close attention, emphasises the fact that strategy is as potent today as ever it was, eo that there need be no hesitation in pronouncing an Allied victory possible, but, he adds, whether it will be realised will depend entirely upon the amount of energy and intelligence which the allied leaders put into the work. The reasons he adduces are so cogent that they are worthy of reproduction. He says:—

la war it is always the unexpected that happens, and lightening changes repeatedly occur which transform the whole situation and bring victory to those who had been in imminent danger of defeat. Only last year the enemy were in danger of being crushed by combined attack on east and west, but the untimely collapse of Russia saved them, To-morrow a revolution in Austria might give a similar lift to the Allies, Another possibility is that the enemy may exhaust their reserves so badly during the present summer in head-long offensives as not to be able to stand up to the vast American armies now in process of formation. Not only are they committed, to the present offensive, but they are likely to be goaded to desperate efforts for a decision by the critical problem of food supplies It is admitted that they have been almost completely disappointed in their hopes of Uuye food supplies from Ukiaiuia, and

I in their efforts lo obtain corn and meat | tlioy are rapidly brewing trouble for I themselves in Russia. The meat raII ion in Germany lias been reduced from 225 grammes to 150 grammes for each person weekly, and in Saxony the wheat ration has been reduced from 250 grammes lo 150 grammes per day. That means a reduction of the meat ration by nearly one-third and of the Saxon wheat ration by more than one-third. If the rations were at starvation point before, what must they be now ? If the food question leads to desperate but unsuccessful efforts for a decision throughout the summer, the German reserves are likely to be largely reduced when the time comes to face the new American armies Ex-President Taft has just declared that America will have 3,200,000 men under arms by the end of this year, and 5,400,000 by the end of 191!) As America's fighting resources are developing at a rapidly accelerating ratio, there is nothing improbable in these figures, and whether she can put a striking force of 3,000,000 men into France during 1910, backed up by limitless reserves at home, depends mainly upon transport. The shipping output is now going up hand over hand, while losses are steadily decreasing. With the continued increase of the number of anti-submarine craft available and the perfection of convoy methods, losses may ultimately become negligible, and adequate transport become available for all purposes. There need be no limit then to the size of the armies America sends to France short of the number required to win, and if anyone imagines that the American people will hesitate j to go to the last man and the last dollar, I now that they are committed, they show little knowledge of human nature. There are other prospects. The strategy of the Allies contemplated turning the enemy's flank and joining hands with I Russia through the Balkans. That strategy was thwarted when on the eve of success by the failure of Russia. But it was Russia's defection, not the allied strategy, which was to blame. If the war has now to be "won in the west," that is a misfortune, and the one thing which throws doubt upon the possibility of final success. It will mean hammering away at a terrible cost at all but impregnable lines which cannot be turned, just as we have been doing for the past two years and as we have seen the Germans doing recently We have just had admirable illustrations of the difficulty and cost of these batteringram tactics, and though we may win i that way if we are prepared to pay the price, it will be much better if we can obtain room to manoeuvre by turning the enemy's flank in the cast. Ther& is still hope of that, for though our advance m Palestine has been temporarily suspended by the necessity of withdrawing troops to France, the Government of India have decided to raise an additional 500.000 men, and this should provide us with the means of resuming our; operations against the Turks. We must fight the Turks somewhere. The notion that we can ignore them or take them out and lose them is pure illusion. as their reported advance into Persia shows. We have large armies of Indian, Egyptian, and other native troops, which we can employ in the eastern theatres much more conveniently than in Europe. If this war is fought to a victorious conclusion it is likely to be a very long one, two years being the minimum time in which we can hops to secure a decision by military means. We may yet crush Turkey first, and be able to carry aid through the Balkans and the Blaolc Sea to those elements of resistance in Russia which German aggression is developing, and turn the enemy's flank. So no one is justified in declaring that an out-and-out victory ig impossible, though if we throw away our opportunities and persist in trying to make phrasemongering take the place of clear thinking decisive victory will be very improbable.

The situation is admirably put, though the prospect of another two years war is disconcerting. All the same the Allies are pledged to fight to a finish, no matter how long the struggle may last, but it seems extremely improbable that the Central Powers can hold out for even twelve months longer, still we have to recognise that the end in view cannot ibe attained without the hardest work and the hardest fighting. The nearer the Allies get to the realisation of their purpose, the more they will be upheld in their hope of a lasting peace that will set the seal of freedom on all the nations.