WHERE WILL GERMANY STRIKE?

Taranaki Daily News, 13 March 1918, Page 6

WHERE WILL GERMANY STRIKE?

■i , NOT ON THE WESTERN FRONT. SAYS FRANK 11. SIMONDS. / The campaign of 1918 opens with certain very clearly marked problems in all minds. By reason of the Russian cotlapse and the Italian disaster/ the Hermans have regained the offensive, the ititiative. Theirs is now the opportunity and the power to strike. For their enemies the riddle is now: Where will the next German blow fall? In the west, in Salonika, in Asia? In addition, there is the problem of the Italian campaign, which is still proceeding. Will the Germans and their Austrian allies, who are doing most of the work, be able to press their advantage to the extent oj compelling the Italians, now supported by the French and the British, to fall back to the line of the Adige. surrendering Venice, Vicenza, and Padau? It is perhaps worth while at the outset to examine for a moment the conditions out of which the present German advantage has grown. At the outset of the last campaign, that of 1917, the German situation was, on the surface, almost desperate. Russia, France, Briton and Italy, with their minor Allies, possessed a combined force vastly in pxcess of the troops of Germany and Austria. The Central 'Powers were outnumbered on every front, and, by contrast with their condition in the previous year, they no longer possessed a strategic reserve like that used against Verdun. GERMANY HARD PRESSED. Beginning in June, July, and August, I me, when French and British troops at the Somir.e, Italian troops along the Isoii. zo, and Russian troops in Galicia had developed a concentric, and, in a measure a so-ofdinated. o(Tensive, the Germans had ben compelled to accept the defensive, and on all fronts they had lost ground, prisoners and advantages which were not to be concealed or counter-balanced bv the successful offensive made against Rouiriania just as the campaign closed, an offensive which was actually successful, because Roumania was sold out by the Russian ruling faction betraved and thus abandoned to destruction. Germany had found herself hard pressed all through the latter half of 1910, and her enemie* micht rcasonablv have expected at- this time last year that with the renewal of a concentric'attack in 1917 Germany would be forced to shorten her lines east and west, or court the disaster which came to Lee when he endeavored to hold a front too extended for his numbers fn the last days of the Confederacy. THE CONCENTRIC ATTACK was resumed, hut after a preliminary round of allied successes—French and British on the west front, Italian*on the Isonzo, and Russian in Galicia—Russia suddenly collapsed, and from that moment- onward rapidly disappeared as a factor in the situation. With the disappearance of Russia the Allies lost their advantage in numbers. Conceivably they were still more numerous, but they had no longer n. decisive advantage. Moreover. since the western front has only a limited extent. Germany at once acquired a reserve to be used on this line when there was need, although she did not make and has not as yet made any large droit upon it. ALLIED FAILURE IN 1917. The failure of the Allied offensive in 19l7'"was assured the moment Russia dropped out, and Germany was henceforth in o position to level a new blow. She had the numbers on the line and behind it to make the security of the western front absolute, despite minor fluctuations. What should she do with her new reserves acquired through Russian defection' She elected to use a portion of them—a small fraction, certainly less than 100 000-hii an offensive against Italy, whose Isonzo attack was becoming dangerous to Austrian safety. The result was the Italian disaster and the loss by Italy of 250,000 prisoners, half of all her artillery, and more than half of all her military accumulation in stores and munitions. The Italian disaster completed the ruin of allied prospects which the Russian collapse had begun. Italy now became a liability, and it was necessary to send men and guns at once to save her. At the moment when the Germans were beginning to transfer their troops from the eastern to the western front the Allies were obliged to detach two armies from the western front to serve in Italy; and with this action they lost all advantage with "numbers on the west. The recent British attack at Cambrai. which might have resulted in one of the decisive battles of the war had Haig been able to support Byng \yith the corps sent under Plumer to I tat}', ended in a bitter disappointment and a dashing of all British hopes. As the New Year opens the Germans are able to put on the western front substantially as many troops as the British and the French. I do not think that even Austrian aid will give the Germans any decisive advantage in the matter of numbers. They are able to, concentrate in the west most c.f the guns hitherto used against the Russians, all those captured from the Italians, and it is not impossible that some of the Russian artillery will presently find its way t(f ,the German lines in the west. In this sitnation any allied offensive on a large scale becomes, it not impossible, altogether* unlikely. To attack now would mean far the Allies huge losses, with relatively' small possibility of a supremo success." ft would risk exhaustion without commensurate promise of victory. On the other'Jiand, to wait, to accept the defensive, is tf? enable the United States to bring up its forces, of which no large portion can be effective in 1918, but perhaps a million wilfjbe ready to take part in the campaign of J919. Ilcnce the Allies, since the submarine warfare does not threaten them with famine or defeat in the next 16 months, are bound to accept the defensive and let Germany risk exhaustion by the attack. WHERE WILL SHE STRIKE? Now, as lite situation stands to-day, Germany has the men and the material for an attack. But she cannot wait. No great new ally is getting ready behind her guns, as we are preparing behind the French and British armies. Her prospects next year will certainly be, worse than they are now. But far and away beyond the military are the economic questions. Every month the war continues the world is becoming insensibly but unmistakably, organised industrially, economical!v, and financially against the Germans. The hostility to Germany is spreading, and the task of regaining the old markets and establishing the old commercial relations is becoming more diffieult. Thus, if Germany has the op. portunitv to strike, rt» hj»« also the

necessity of taking prompt efforts to close the war, which is no longer merely a problem of military factors., But where will she strike? This is the question which is filling the Press of the world to-day. Will she strike in Asia Minor to regain Bagdad and Jerusalem, restore her dream of p. Berlin-Byzantium-Bagdad Railway, regain her old sallyport against British Hgypt and the Suez Canal which a Turkish Palestine supplied? Will she attack the heterogeneous force now defending Salonika and offering the sole European obstacle to the completion of Mittel Europa, walling off this vast Teutonic creation from the Aegean and from the natural outlet of the Central Empire at the south?

WESTERN OFFENSIVE. UNLIKELY, Or will the Germans make one more colossal effort in the west? They faileu at the Marne, they failed at the Yser and about Ypres, they failed at Verdun; and it flinty three attempts they had all the advantages that numbers, preparation, munitions could, give them. Can they hope to succeed now? l's it. worth the sacrifice, recognising that if they try and fail they will come to the end of the year facing victorious foes who are assured of a great strategic reserve in the following campaign, when the United States is at last ready? Tlij/ Germans have announced their forthcoming attack is to be made in the west. They have heralded it with brass bands and a blare of trumpets; but their attack upon Verdun, upon Russia in April, 1915, upon Italy a few weeks ago, all these were surprises so far as German publicity was concerned. Tf Germany contemplated an attack in the west would she talk about it, giving her foes due warning, the chance to make the last preparation, and search their own fronts yet onec more for some 'weak point? It seems to me —and this is the conclusion I find in most of the European journals—that a German offensive in the west is unlikely. It is by no means inconceivable; it may come—it will come if the Germans are actually in possession of information, naturally lacking in our own case, which would lead tliem to believe that either the British or the French armies are breaking down in mor- , ale, as were the Italians before the recent disaster; but, accepting the possibility. it remains plain that the great weight of chance is against such a ven- , lure. A western offensive <•::n come, it seems to mo, only if the German situation—l mean economic not military—is so desperate that the Germans feel that they must risk everything on one more. hid for a quick decision. In that case they will attack in the west, becausft nowhere else can a decision be had. A complete victory in Italy, even a victory which brought Italy to make a separate peace, would be not decisive so far as Britain. France, and the Uniteti States are concerned. Much less would a complete success at Salonika or about Bagdad win' the war, or even compel pea"e on terms which would leave Germany any substantial profit for her great sacrifice'; in men and treasure. Victory I in the war, if it is to come on the field of battle must come somewhere between the North Sea and Switzerland, and if Germany fee's that she must risk all on one more bid for a decision under conditions far less advantageous than on the other occasions she will attack ih the west, and we shall see the greatest conflict of the war unfold within the next two or three months. MINOR GOAL PROBABLE. On the other hand, if Germany hopes simply to lact the war out, if she hopes to win it as Frederick the Great won his most terrible struggle, by wearing out his foes, as Louis XIV. saved his territory in the War of the Spanish Succes. sion, she is mdst likely to seek to break the nerve of. her opponents by aiming at victories in indecisive fields, which, despite the fact that thev arc minor, will impress the world, and because of local circumstances can be won with a minimum of cost to herself. Such ail operation was the attack upon Roumania a year ago. The recent Italian affair is an equally good illustration of this strategy. Tf Germany desires to take Salonika, T think the majority of allied militar? critics are of the opinion that she could do it at n price., She has the inferior lines of communication. An attack! upon Salonika would put the allied transport system to a. very great strain; it would compel a further shift of French and British troops tQ the Near East, certain to be opposed bitterly in both nations, and it would thus weaken the western front, which remains the decisive front. The Germans could also rely upon* Bulgarian troops for the main effort. For Bulgaria Salonika is the prize that has been sought ever since Bulgaria began to have great aspirations. A MACEDONIAN VICTORY. Germany would supply the gun 3, the generalship, a. few chosen troops, perils no more than those Billow is leading in Northern Italy. Certain Austrian units might be added, now that Austria has been saved from immediate anxieties. Such an attack would be directed against a very strange allied army made up oi Italians, Serbs, Greeks, Russians, British, French, and contingents drawn from British and French colonies. These forces hold a wide front with comparatively few good lines of communication behind them, and the people of the districts they occupy are in part hostile, as is a considerable element in all of Greece. Now, conceive what would be the effect of a sudden and successful push early in the spring which carried the Germans close to Salonika, if it did not immediately win the town. At the outset of a new campaign the Allies would suffer a moral defeat. They would have promptly to decide whether to send troops from the West to the Near East at a moment when the German blow in the west would still seem to be hanging over their heads. For, whatever happens, the Germans are going to have the men and the guns to attack in the west if they choose, without regard to any Macedonian effort. In fact, if the Allies should decide to send men and guns from the west to Salonika, in addition to the armies which will have to be maintained in Northern Italy, the Germans might decide, rightly of wrongly, that the situation in the West, thus "modified, warranted the launching of a real offensive which should aim at a decision. WHAT ABOUT SALONIKA? In a word, a German offensive against Salonika which would have a real chance of success would at the opening of (lis fighting'seasoif of IMS,'upset all the Allied plans and precipitate a real crisis, the crisis incident to making the decision whether to continue to spend men and guns and transport, the most precious element of all, upon a Macedonian sideshow'. If the decision was against such dissipation Greece might fall and the German domination of the Balkans would be complete, the Kaiser would re-estab-lish his brother-in-law and confront the world with the accomplished fact. Now, ,is to Asia. Just as the attack upon Salonika would, in the main, be made by Bulgar troops, an offensive against Bagdad and Jerusalem would be chieflv the

work of Turkish troops, German led, reinforced by a few German divisions, and juunitioned and gunned by the Germans. It would cost the Germans little in life and a failure would have no disastrous effects at home. And the same is equally true of the Salonika enterprise; if it succeeded, the British would have to face the problem of making new sacrifices in the West r.nd withdrawing new divisions, or of accepting the loss of Mesopotamia and giving all their attention to the defence of Egypt. Egypt and India wotild, in a sonse, be imperilled, and both have a value in the British mind wholly unappreciated by any other nations save the German. VENICE LIKELY TO FALL,, The last thing in the world I am trying to do is to ..prophesy that the Germans will make their great effort for 1918 in Macedonia or in Asia, or in both regions. What lam trying to point out is that the weight of evidence points in this direction. I expect to see the Aus-tro-German offensive in Northern Italy reach the Adige either before winter shuts down or in the spring. The Central Powers have advanced in the moun. tains now to the point where they possess most, of the necessary ground, and the Italian position seems to be untenable. The Italians will naturally hold it asjo'ng as possible, to gain time to prepare the line of the Adige, but the line of the I'iave, in the judgment of military men. is no longer permanently tenable, in the face of recent Austro-German gains on the Asiago <Plateau. This means that Venice will fall. It means that a now strain may bo ,put upon Allied resources in men if Italy calls for further reinforcements. Add to this a successful offensive in the spring against Salonika. and what will the result be? Will the Allies then send still more troops from the West to save the Balkans? Tf they do, so much the better opening for a German offensive in the West, so much greater the strain upon Allied transport and by so much more the domestic problems of fond tml power in the Allied countries are complicated. Exactly the same circumstances are in the picture if the Salonika blow is preceded )>y a winter campaign against Bagdad. ALLIES MUST WAIT. Tf the Germans can wait six months, if their economic, political, and industrial condition enables the high command to pursue a strat"<rv purely concerns! with military considerations, then it seems to me they are bound to make their first campaigns in Macedonia and in Asia, with an intensification of pressure upon Italy, if thev do not push her behind the Adi"o before the spring campaign onens. Thereafter, if the Allies should yield to the obvious temptation and French and British troops nrc. sent to Italy and to Salonika if British troops nrc withdrawn from Flanders for Egypt 'nd Palestine, then the Germans can bunch their great Western offensive. Meantime they can threaten this great Mow. using it: as a political rather than a military weapon, holding it over the heads of their Western foes and thus possibly contributing to the discussion of peace. Tf the Allies hold fast to th n west, and take their losses in the east. Germany, having launched ne western offensive, can still seek a neacQ by negotiation with the coming of the winter, using the successes she may have attained, perhaps-at Salonika, perhaps at Bagdad, probably in 1 Northern Its Iv. a-* arguments to prove that 3he is invincible. And in all this time the Allies will hardly be in a position to make a reallv greet offensive in the west, because the United States will not yet be able to supply the troops necessary to ensure a decisive advantage in numbers. If this Gorman pence bid fails, then the advantage will pass fob nil the period of the war to the enemies of Germany, because our reserves of men are well-nigh unlimited, and by the spring of 1919, thanks to n, million American troops. Germany will he outmanned on the western front, and we and our allies will be in a. position to launch mid maintain an offensive which will bring Germany to terms. DOMESTIC POLITICS ANOTHER , MATTER. The campaign of 101S, a.s I see it,promises, then, to be one in which the Germans will have the offensive, and thus the opporlunity to strike where they choose. T believe they will strike, not in the west, and immediately, hut that, while continuing their pressure wpon Italy, they will open their operations with an offensive against the British in Mesopotamia, and possibjv in Palestine, using Turkish troops,* and when ■spring comes direct another attack, this time upon Salonika, employing mainlv Bulgarian troops. As the Austrians will supply most of the man-power for the Italian campaign, this will leave the Ger. mans with practically all their man-pow-er in hand for us on the western front, if they chose; but I do not believe they will use it there unless the economic and industrial situation within Germany is such that they cannot endure another ten months of war, or the -Allies make such a general dissipation of their*forees, thus weakening their western front, that the Germans see a chance for a decision in the west. If they do, they will take it. In all this discussion I have left out any examination of the domestic political conditions of Britain. France and Ttaly. If the people of any one of these nations become war weary, the Germans will profit. Oil the other hand, a collapse of the German or Austrian publics would be similarly advantageous to the Allies. But these are not, immediately, military considerations, and it is with the military considerations that I have endeavored (to deal.