The Daily News. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1918. MILITARY UNITY OF THE ALLIES.

Taranaki Daily News, 23 February 1918, Page 4

The Daily News. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1918. MILITARY UNITY OF THE ALLIES.

Once more Mr. Lloyil George litis triumphed over the conservative traditions of t!ie Eritiali military service. In the face of a crisis such as the world has never experienced, the British Premier has dared to take the one and only courße to make victor}' possible, and the reasons set forth iu his forceful and logical speech in the House of Commons are unanswerable, challenging the House to repudiate or accept his policy of securing the military unity of the Allies, and the House wisely accepted 'his vindication of the Versailles changes. This vital question haß been regarded as the question of the day for some time past, but two stumbling blocks—party politics and party personalities—have prevented the carrying out of a measure that counts above all others at the present juncture. Now, Mr- Lloyd George lias fearlessly and determinedly overthrown the barriers, to that unity of action on which success depends. "If," 'ha said, "the Versailles policy was right, then personalities, however valuable, important or distinguished, should not stand in the way of its execution, and if it were wrong, no personalities and no Government ought to stand in the way of its being instantly defeated." There was the clear issue, but in the face of the acceptance of the policy by all the Allies, and particularly by America, it would 'have been sheer madness for the House of Commons to have repudiated the Premier's action. Given unity, and everything follows—strategical coordination, plans of campaign, orders of battle, concentration of reserves—direction above and obedience below. The time for political heroics (of which there lias been far too much in evidence) has gone, and the grim serious business of successfully facing the supreme end demands concentrated and united attention- Mr. Lloyd George lias indicated the nature of arrangements for constituting a central authority at Versailles to exercise, direction over war policy and having executive authority. The conduct of the war is to 'be practically removed from political control and even from control by the Chief-of-Staff in the various capitals, and it is only in the event of a difference of opinion as to plans on the part of the Com-mander-in-Chief, or the various representatives of the Council that the Government will be called upon to decide. The lack of concerted action in the past has robbed the Allies of t'he fruits of their initial successes, and the spasmodic offensives were never driven home. We have only to call to mind what happened last year. On April 9 the British captured Vimy Ridge. A week later General Nivelle stormed the Chemin des Dames, then came a lull till May 14, when, tired of waiting for the Russians, General Cadorna launched his offensive against the Carso. Three weeks later General Plumer stormed the Masaines Ridge and then came another lull. On July 1, Bnusiloff began to move, juut

when the Central P<r\ers were free to throw the whole of tlicir reserves again?t him. When the Russians Were beaten Roumaiwa stepped into the broach, hut too late Sia do any good. On July 31 Sir Douglas llnig launched his attack in Flanders, and three weeks afterwards General Cadorna made another attempt ,to reach Trieste, Thus were seven attacks made at seven different places, after interludes varying between onet

and four weeks. When it came to the point concerted action failed to materialise, thus playing into the hands of the enemy. The fault was not with the commanders, though they blamed each other, hut with the system. There was tactical success, but strategical failure. 'Had lirussiloir struck three months earlier than he did he would have made a better start, and kept it, while a decided victory would have taken the wings out of the Bolshevik sails, but the defeat played into the hands of the extremists preventing the setting up of a constitutional Government, and the Allies lost Russia's help in tho war. It was not until the Italian lines were pierced that the cause of the Allies' failure was laid bare. Had the Versailles Council been then in existence that disaster would not have happened, for intelligence must he pooled as well as troops. A single p\pert authority, collecting and collating information from one end of the front to the other, is obviously "better able to appreciate a general situation than three separate authorities working -n unoflicial detachment. Kven the Hermans recognise that collective direction of strategy is the only way by which success is possible, its moral influence lining as powerful as its material authority, for the consciousness of strength is the keynote of its power. Karly in the war the Central Powers' staff were pookd, each retaining its own sectional General Staff, but the supreme direction of operations comes from Kreuznach. The western front is indivisible from every point of view of strategy, tactics and intelligence, so that tho supremacy of the Versailles War Council is oi the very first importance, and through its decisions there will be obtained the unity that is of such vital import. It is unity that can alone save me situation, while multiplicity of action will imperil the issue. Unity of command, unity of direction, unity of thought, will and aim are tho attributes of victory. The Versailles scheme is no cut and dried collection of rules restricting the authority of the High Commands, for the authority of these will remain as heretofore. Its business is to secure and keep the unity of direction and movement that is the first postulate of victory. The Versailles Council is the outcome of the failure of ihf. policy u f independence and drift- Throughout the Empire as well as the Allied countries there should be a feeling of profound gratification that at last the conduct of the war has been entrusted to a council in which full confidence can 'je reposed in dealing with the greatest and most momentous crisiß of this terrible struggle.