ITALY.

Taranaki Daily News, 7 February 1918, Page 5

ITALY.

ITALIAN SITUATION, CAUSES OF DISASTER. v LED TO RUIN BY BLIND ' CONFIDENCE. y ; An article entitled: "Cause tad El fects of Italian Disasters," appeared ii \L Clemcnceau's Parisian papel "I.Tlomme Knchaiue," on November 23j It was signed "XXX." The wrt«< said; "Without touching the question '«( reason—always an easy, but oftej short-sighted, explanation" of disaster-! let ns consider the military aspect d the Italian situation. To begin with the principal error of the Italian, (higl command alone sufficient to brin/, about the catastrophe—was the fault] disposition of its armies. The S«cori« Army, after crossing the Isonzo, wai drawn up facing northward on thmJiigi mountains of Mzli, Monte Nero, fflj ■ Vrich, without having reached*the crests) which were still in possession of tint enemy. The Third Army, on the otta] hand, had conquered the crests and Cucco, Monto Santo, and Vodice. II faced eastward, and had advanced accost the Bainsizza Plateau toward Laibacbj 13ut between these two armies the An*< trians held a whole sector wlricli formed! from Tolmino to Santa I/ucia a 'ldndVof outpost separating the Italian forces "Military critics had already drawtf attention to the danger of th'is situ*.-' tion, and pointed out thr.t the strategic arrangements of > both Italian ftca>:es| might be thrown into coiiu'sioa: 'l»y tfcd enemy if the latter, holding tlie inietf* mediate liigh ground, should derf&o toj attack on iboth sides with cufffcietV forces. That is precisely what* hapjjescif when the Germans were able- to part of their troops from Russia Italian Alps. ERRORS DUE TO BLIN© OP'm.TTßffi," "The second error: Behind thcsa-crnM ins, drawn np in so perilous r! posStiiJaJ there were at least reserves TtaCtgi ix ease of a surprise. In May, lON, in}i"£hqf course of the Austrian offensive ia tJH 'J'rcntino, Generol Cadorna had profited! by a moment *o\ respite to constitute, the Fifth Army a reserve. If wao tho' intervention of this force at the' crijacaP moment that forced the enemy to tH treat. For reasons that we are unaHfii to understand, this Fifth Army xfib dig solved one fine day. Not that msj>pora er was wanting; it was and still is | tifnl in Italy. The reserves oi jnaßj power v/ero numeroui;, enough to fundaa other ainiies as well. But tl>3 Reneialiasimo has always seemed- v&%-' willing to keep them near the frorjfe So, when need came, they couSI COM intervene, and thus the r&ufc' ttT. "U«SJ Second Army, followed 'by fB» ttrttfiVfll' up and precipitato Tctreat 'of <fo3J»W!J carried everything away. -I "This error is connected with cea«£Bl othera, all of which are to bejcrplaiSneaV by Wind confidence in tlio solidrhr of fHB| conquests made. Otherwise, -moA < ense is thejs for the mistake >"of massing all the main supply depots at / 6£Hsl»tfa<ff distance from the front, IretJEcen IsaajH and the Tagliamento? To take tlftr ease of wheat alone: More than -SODjPOtf tons thus fell into the hands of ff&> famished enemy. , , £ "How, too, are we to- excuse therWfi?* nlete lack of intrenehments, possible retreat, and tho fact" that noti a single" road of retreat was a single bridge—'beyond five old •6nfflS s *j thrown across the Tagliamenio? ThSjj congestion produced almost from thffl outset by the enormous mass of meBJ and material on the river hanks, ing to cross at the same moment;. <cpßtij the Italian Army almost as the sudden loss of its supply samtesf which had to be left to the enemy. | "Those who have visited the Isidraay front must 'Tiave been surprised ttiac#,l despite all errors, positions aa strong - ** l ! those of tho Second 'Army hofore .'HeBBM and Tolmino gave way so easily. The'! fact is that even the best fortified posi*j tions are worth just what the men hohra ing them are worth, and" the value is in exacT proportioni.io that'ipjafi! their leaders. * S -;!

GENERALS RETIRED WHOLESALER "Now, the state of mind of the-iltal*, '. ians leaders was obvious to 'all who'} . penetrated into their inner circles Of* kill the armies in the war the Italians, alone could boast tliat they had ti< ways kept the same commander aincw the beginning of the struggle. But tWar, appearance of pennaiienco at tho jtop,l ; i vanished as soon as one. came to' -thai , ranks of his subordinates. As -far aAf, they were concerned, incoherenec^ehangß, 1 ' , ami uncertainty were Hie in\ ariablo'Tulo for each coimnanih-T of a unit. In Italyr retired generals lyero to be counted hy the hundred. Down there they called them silurat" (the torpedoed ones)' top indicate tho suddenness with which they ustd to lie smitten. Too often the rca- * son for tlieir disgrace, did not seem extremely serious, but the phraseology of tlieir dismissal was aluajn as cuttingns a knife-blade: '\ r ou will immcdia-tely hand over the command to tSo-and-So, your successor'; and the succc&sor'iwaa already on the spot to take it.

"This method may be excellent if it is not overdone and is applied wisely. TLat was not always the. case, for a>»,regrettable kind of oligarchy had gradually Ki-uwn ii]> urouud the General-; issiiuo. Kirst-class leaders were ofteaj its victims. 1£ would ibe diilicult'to-fiiiij?! in 'ltaly, outside, this narrow Cortes,s! any one who would criticise ii«uer»3s,4 tike illaKiii, (jiiorrini, Luerari, and Mem--*' l Lrctti—and hnw many TilicisV —a!i jnerci-i les»ly 'torpedoed,' but st'H popular M tlm army, i>ncra! O.pelic, who was ;, the l.rst to cuter 'iorizia, !ia\ his ceiii-i inand taken away a fu-w. JlisSsf •icfo-y. and was rcuaced t:> a inercdivi" I '': sion eoinniaiider and ;,ent kick t,o Ilia;,; rear as n Hilwdiiiaic to a colleague who!' had onlil tiiea been subordinate to llini.-

"Capello name hack into favor last ' f .summer and led his troops, to victory on the Itain-i/./a. I'latcnii. Hut his successuyain proved lata!, Hardly had he given oich-rs In liis a run. (lie Second, to-con-solidate the positions won. .when he was once more thrust trside in company,. ..' willi other-.. His successor, Gimeral. M..i.tiiMi-i. had bandy lake,, over the. command lor a few dnvs when the' German altaek liroke upon' him. Others, a* 1 bra ,-e'«iid capable as lie, have realised' in I liis war Ihe irijli ef Napoleon's sayinir: 'Von can':, wit : ,i you haven't} got >oiir men in hand.' Iku, there bad jiot jbeen time to make this conrnol between 't'i " "< the xVeond .'"a,v aud their i"".i. 10-wl. •!•-■. r-ml so. under Iho terrible :-hock .of Oi-tober -JWvU, that Secoritt . \'% '»Ynny broke." * '