THE PARIS SPEECH.

Taranaki Daily News, 29 January 1918, Page 7

THE PARIS SPEECH.

| PBIME MINISTER'S VINDICATION. J „ KITCHENERS PLAN. Loivlivi, Nov. 20. As a good many people anticipated, the "'political crisis" aria.iig out of Mr. Lloyd Urvrge's recent speech : : n Paris, has fizzled out, much to the relief of everybody except the few whose ineffaceable idea appears to be that the downfall of Lloyd George is necessary to the salvation of the Allies, and those men who always advocate changes of Government when the military situation is not to their liking. Mr. Lloyd George may not be "the only possible premier'' at this i juncture, as, some of his idolatrous partisans would have us believe, but most men not blinded Iry political or personal prejudice have come to the conclusion that the "visible supply" of alternatives is a negligible quantity. Most men found much in Mr. Lloyd George's Paris speech distasteful to them, for it did appear tkat he was making a serious attack on Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig, which presaged their removal from their respective posts. This view of the speech was strengthened by certain statements made by journals of tho most pronounced "pro-George" color. They hinted in various wordings that If he had cared to do so. the Prime Minister could have given the public indisputable proof of the fact that the responsible military heads of the British Ai;my (had done all sorts of things that ought not to have dono, and had undone most of the things they ought to have done—in fact, that in placing reliance upon Sir William and Sir Douglas we had leant upon props of straw who had let us and our Allies (town badly. Some of the "anti-George" journals, on the. other hand, saw in the speech the opening of a campaign against the gallant soldiers designed to make them the scapegoats for the blunders of the politicians: others inferred that the speech meant that in future the direction of military operations was going to be vested really in a small group of civilians who would impose their ideas of strategy on the heads of the Allies' armies.

The debute in Che Commons jesterday made it clear that both "pro" a.nd "anti-GSorgeites'' over-reached themselves. The Prime Minister defended his Paris speech with vigor. The pith of liis defence was that it -was made with a definite purpose, and had achieved that purpose. He might, he told the House of Commons, have made a speech of eulogy all round, Which "would not have had the slightest effect." He did make "a disagreeable speech, which forcet'J everybody to talk a'bout this scheme." H" took a certain risk in order to arouse public sentiment, and the Paris speech had done it That, of course, did not dispose of all the criticism brought asrainst that famous deliverance, but it disposed of a considerable portion of it. AST UNANSWERABLE CASE. As for the. more serious criticisms of the arguments and the language of the Paris speech, Mr. Lloyd George dealt with them fairly effectually. He pointed out that it was inconsistent to deny in one breath that mistakes had been made in the general strategy of the Allies through want of co-ordination, and to admit in the next that our general strategy wo.uld be improved by a greater degree of co-ordination. If all was well in the past why allow the need to change Either the disasters enumerated by Air. Lloyd George were the result of an inadequate concentration of strategy on the side of the Allies, or else nothing could possibly have been done, bv any application of their combined resources, to prevent the enemy's break through to the East, the re-establishment of Turkey, the occupation of the Roumanian corn areas and oilfields, the onslaught upon Italy, and other unpleasant happenings in the Near East. "NO ONE TO BLAME IN PARTICULAR." The second alternative will certainly not appeal to the intelligence of the average man; he simply cannot accept It. For the rest, as Mr. Lloyd. George said, but for tihe Italian disaster we might never have been brought to the .point of attempting to make that 'better application of our combined resources, for want of which we suffered those reverses, and prolongation of the war. Nothing of what Mr. Lloyd George said was directed %ainst any Staff or any Commander-in-Chief or of any of the Allied countries; he made that very clear, indeed, lie stated the point in Paris. "There was no one," he said, "in particular to blame. There was an inherent difficulty in getting so many independent nations, so many independ' ent organisations, to merge all their individual idiosyncrasies and act together as one." CIVILIAN INTERFERENCES. As for the accusation 'oE civilian interference with the Army, the Prime Minister said that it made him feel as if ho were "crossing the Channel on a destroyer in a choppy sea." Whereat the House laughed unrestrainedly. Mr. Lloyd George added that no generals in, British history have liad such freedom in their strategical dispositions as those who are responsible for our military operations in this war. Twice only in the course of the war had he acted against the advice of the soldiers: (1) In regard to the gun programme, when as Minister of Munitions he ordered a much larger number of guns than the soldiers asked for, and was called mad by one of his colleagues for so doing; (2) When, as Secretary for War, he, against the will of the soldiers appointed a civihar (Sir Erie Geddes) to reorganise the railways behind the line in France. On both these vital matters Mr. Lloyd George's "interference" has undoubterUy been completely vindicated by the march of events. He protested vigorously against mischivous efforts to divide soldiers and statesmen; what is wanted is the cordial co-operation of -both. "Those who foster dissension among them are traitors to their country." THE KAPALLO PLAIT. As for the "Rapallo plan" for the constitution of an Inter-Allied Council, Mr. Lloyd George was able to prove to the House that this project was first suggested by Lord Kitchener in January, 1915; that it was revived in July this year bv a military conference at which al] the Chiefs of Stall's were present, and which proposed "the realisation of unity of action on tile western front bv the help of a permanent inter-Allied military organisation, which will stiulv and' r»-e----pare the rapid movement of troops from one .theatre of war to another. 1 ' The Prime Minister proceeded to defend in detail the considered plan now adopted for putting into practise an ideal wMeb

all saric men have insisted on as being necessary to our success in this war, and the whole of his closely reasoned justification of the Rapallo .scheme deserves study. It leaves little unanswered of the practical professional criticism advanced by unprejudiced military men.

Much of the serious criticism which lms been levelled agaiijst the Prime Minister is due to misunderstanding of how the Supreme Council will work, and to the fear that in some way it may and will lessen the authority of the British Imperial General Stall' and our High Command. Apparently these fears are groundless.

The Council takes the place of the former intermittent conference. The Supreme War Council is an attempt to coordinate the whole Allied effort and to concentrate the brains of the best strategists in the common cause. Therefore it must have a permanent staff to study the various plans and suggestions submitted by the General Staffs of the Allied armies. TfiTa Supreme War Council will, on the information before them, aided by their personal knowledge, work out plans and submit them to the Council. The Supreme Council Staff are really not supreme except in name. They are an advisory body to the Council, just as the Council are advisory to their Governments. ALLIED WAR COUNCIL. . The -Staff at present consists of General Focli, late Chief of the French General Staff, Generad Cadorna, formerly tile Commander of the Italian Armies, and Sir Henry Wilson, who is generally reckoned to be one of t'he 'brainiest men in the British Army, and who hag spent most of his time since the war a3 the chief Liason Officer between the British and the French. To this trinity will be added an American officer, probably General Bliss, Chief of Staff of the American Army. There will also be an Allied Naval Staff, sitting at Versailles, atyl cooperating with the Military Staff. The Supreme War Council will meet frequently to f.tudy the schemes prepared in the meantime by the expert staff, and on occasions when naval, munitions, shipping questions'or foreign affairs are to be considered the Ministers concerned will attend. Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, will invariably accompany the Prime Minister so that the plans can be discussed and decided' upon with the assistance of the Government's chief military adviser as well as of the Versailles expert Staff. It is, of course, vital'y important that plans should 'be considered well ahead, and that no time should be lost. The \Var 'Cabinet are fully in agreement with the Prime Minister and General Smuts, who, wit.li General Robertson, was with Mr. Lloyd George in Italy, approved thoroughly of the scheme, and assisted materially in bringing it into existence. It has now been made clear both by tlio Prime Minister and from other evidence that the present measures do not represent "the excited plunge of adventure" but a fully considered attempt at sane reorganisation. They are endorsed up to the hilt bv France, by Italy, and by America, and indeed there is" evidence that there would be strong support among tlhe Allies for much bolder advances in the direction of unity. In some quarters in France there has been indeed persistent advocacy for, the appointment of a generalissimo in supreme command of all the Allied armies. Mr. Lloyd George was emphatic in his opposition to that idea. "I am," he said, "utterly opposed to that suggestion; it would not work." The proof of every pudding is in the eating and the digestion, and only the course of the war can decide whether the "Rapallo plan" furnishes the ultimate solution to the problem the Allies have to tacke—whether single-minded-neas, common inspiration, and mutual goodwill make the system now adopted yield a genuine and sufficient co-ordina-tion of strategy to produce the results desired. Meanwhile Mr. Lloyd George certainly, seems to have scored a most decisive victory over Ms enemies. Whether he has achieved the supreme object of giving the various armies of the Entente one soul and one purpose remains to be seen. Under the present plan the several Governments are, it seoms, to rttain their full authority over their own national resources, and the great question is whether moral pressure will be sufficient to bring their efforts into 'harmony with the comprehensive aim and methods laid down 'by the Inter-Allied Council.