THE WAR OUTLOOK.

Taranaki Daily News, 23 January 1918, Page 7

THE WAR OUTLOOK.

■ ALLIED HELP FOlt iTAiA STRATEGICAL ADVANTAGES HELD IN WEST. (Wellington Times' Correspondent). London, Nov. 22. 'Sir William Robertson observed some time ago, in commenting on the general war outlook, tl&t the Allies had "made a bad istartf" It was a true saying, and some of the. consequences of that bad start we are watching even in the present stage of the. operations, when the war has been iij, (progress for more than three years. ,W-Wat Sir William Robertson had in mind when lie used these words .was that on nearly all the various fronts' the.* enemy ,\Vere able to penetrate, far beyond their own frontiers and establish themselves on strong defensive lines, relieving them of all immediate anxiety about the invasion of their own territories. In t'he result Germany hag been able to take risks, and to undertake offensives on which fihe miglit have hesitated to embark if the Western battle front, for instance, had run -along the Ike of'her ow:i frontier instead of running as it doe 3 deep into aoztie of the richest provinces of France. Other considerations apart, the successes Germariy won in the war through the utter unpreparedness of the Allies have giver, her resources in food and in the material for her munitions without wJiich she might have found it impossible to put up the long struggle she has actually sustained. Unfortunately, the- advantages she secured in Belgium and France*three years ago she is now in a fair way to securing also in another arena of the war. By t'he advance into the Venetian" plain Austria is relieved of the pressing anxiety she must We felt about. the safety of her own hearths and home?, ft is probably true enough that the great Victory Mackensen has obtained oyer our Italian Ally far exceeded the utmost expectations that were entertained in Berlin and in Vienna. The belief i« that the offensive, wlien it was planned, did not aim at anything more ambitious than the pushing back of General Cadorna over the Isonzo. But the Second Italian army crumbed and broke, and Mackensen was swift to turn the unexpected opportunity td account. THE CITY OF THE DOGES. German peace propaganda and intrigue have done for Italy what Austrian arms could never Itave accomplished, and instead of being content with recovering thu line of the Isonzo, Mackensen has snatched at the possibility of seizing t'he Venetian Plain and securing the capitulation of Venice itself. There is a di* position in some quarters to speak of Venice as though its fall would constitute for the Allies nothing more than a rather ugly moral blow. But far more than sentiment is bound up in the struggle that is being waged for the possession of the city. Venice is important to our Ally as a base of naval activity in the Adriatic, and it is the blindest folly to talk as though its- loss would carry wit'h a no material advantage to the enemy. ' * Even to-day, four weeks after the commencement of Mackensen s drive afDinst the Isonzo, it is difficult to say with certainty who was responsible for the disaster that has happened. Nor is recrimination about the past of very much use unless it enables us to avoid the repetition of such errors in the future General Oadorna seems to have sent forth no appeal for help until the defection of his Second Army opened hi? eyes to the perils with which he was faced. Presumably, therefore, he was wholly ignorant of the extent to whifth units of his army had been seduced froria their loyalty by the pernicious gospelof downing arms preached to them by enemy agents. Whether what has happened might have been avoided if the Allied direction of the war hud been controlled by a Central Council such as it ig now proposed to institute, it is idle now to consider. If the Allies had diverted some of their strength from France and Flanders to reinforce General Cadorna's blow against Larbaeh, the Germans would presumably have accommodated their strategy to the altered circumstances, and would have taken advantage of their interior-lines to strike a blow at-some other vulnerable point of the Allied front.

ALLIED HELP To what extent the reinforcements now being vus'hed to Italy's assistance will aave the worst aspects of the position that has been created the future alone can determine. • But the time that has been taken iii bringing these reinforcements into action aii'ords sharp reminder of the advantages the Germans possess in their interior lines, lb is an advantage which no amount of co-ordination on the part of the Allies can take from them, and the geographical difficulties which stand in the way must not be forgotten. Nevertheless, it is as true today as at any time during the war that you can sometimes iendef the best assistance to an Ally at one end of the line by striking with all your force at the other extremity of that line. Thanks to the., chaotic condition in Russia, Germany is probably stronger on tho Western front to-day than she has been at any previous period ot the war But three years of strenuous campaigning must have imposed a heavy strain on her man-power, and great as the Italian losses ift men. and guns have been, the Allies 3till have a substantial preponderating advantage over the enemy botn in men, in artillery, -niti m munitions And that advantage tends to increase with every transport that America sends across tin Atlantic. (mfortunately the 'blow lias fallen on Italy at a moment when winter conditions render offensive operations on ar. ambitious scale exceedingly difficult on the Western front- So far as trie fighting in Flanders is concerned, there arc indications it is slowly, hut surely, dyin« down under the influence of the sodden ground: We shall not rest satisfied until we have won the remaining spurs of the Passehendnele Ridge, but beyond that-it is not reasonable to expect our men to go at this lata season of the year If any diversion is to he expected on the British tront we must l»o'< for it on harder and firmer ground than is afforded amidst the msrshes which separate the Paswshenuaelc P.idge from Ronlers and beyond sir Douglas IJaig. in his dispatches, sppaks o? a series of enw operations on a wide front between fit. Quentin and the Rirer Scarpe. Whether these will develop eventually into a serious menace to the tlindenburg line is a question to which no-answer is at, present possible But the area indicated embraces, of course, the vitally important nodal point of Camhrai. with all its network of roads and railway.* that feeds the German front all Uut way from Arras to the Champagne. It is im>vrtns>t > V> remember t^nt gftgn&lfM » tb) W«tea front tl-1-

summer, though they may have resulted as yet in nothing more important that those one kilometre advances to which Mr. Lloyd George made allusion in his ■ Paris speech, diave given us possession of positions of supreme strategical importance all the way from in | the North to the Chemin de s Dames, in [the south. Whenever the weather conditions permit, the time is ripe for turnin® these strategical advantages to good ac° count. Froiicn experts have been of opinion for some time past that it another big retirement is lo be forced on the Germans in th* G West it is more likely to come in the south than in Uie north. Any advance in,the direction of Cambrai would further emphasise the pronounced character of the great salient that ba s been produced in the German line round and about La on. The salient in the nojith is equally marked, hut the belief is that; the Germans will endeavor ro nold on in-Flanders through t»e winter on account of the important part 'which the Belgian coast plays in their vaunted submarine campaign.

THE POLITICAL CRISIS. Amidst all the anxieties and pre-occu-pations occasioned toy the Italian disaster, it is satisfactory at least, to be able to record that the political crisis at Westminster, which dovetailed so embarrassingly into the military situation, has blown'over without producing t'he further convulsion which was at one time feared. The military resignations that were predicted in some quarters have not takxjn place, aild, if Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig are satisfied wit* the guarantees they have received that a new Allied Council is not going to impinge seriously on their authority, we may look forward to the future with confidence and even with hopefulness. In some circles there is still a little suspicion about file designs of the Eastern stfhool of strategists. But all the indications are that the Western theatre of the war will continue., in the future, as in the past, to call for and to receive our main attention. Strategists of the Eastern school are not afflicted with hydrophobia and if they can see their way tc extend tho sphere of military activities into other arenas without in any sense weakening our grip in the West it will be so much to the good. The problem is one more of transport than of men, for the huge army we continue to maintain at Home was the subject of surprised comment in the report recently uublisncd r;' the powerful committee which has hoeii inquiring into the flnan side ot the war situation. liven if the politicians who are to sit on the.Supreme Wai Council should find themselves lr. disagreement at any time with t'lifc vie"'.) of the soldiers jvho are really responsible for operations, their decisions will lie subject to the veto of then* respective Governments before excutive effect can lie given to them. Tho objection that any attempt to upset the recommendations of the Supreme Council Would involve the breaking-up of the Alliance and a German peace represents a rather exaggerated estimate of tho results likely to follow frouv the setting up of dual authorities.