JAPAN AND THE WAR.

Taranaki Daily News, 15 January 1918, Page 3

JAPAN AND THE WAR.

THE TRANSPORT DIFFICULTY.

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN. » A TRAXS-.SIBERJAX ARMY. The proposition put m the following article by Jacques d'Urville, in the l'all Mall" Gazette, suggests what might have been but for the defection of Russia. Whilst the Germans proclaim from the housetops the easy victory which the disorganisation of the Russian forces lias permitted them to gain at Rig*, from Areerica comes a retort which has already visibly disturbed them. The reception accorded to the Mission of Viscount Ishii, the stirring words pronounced at Washington's grave and in the House of Representatives, leaves no doubt as to the importance of the negotiations in progress in the American capital, and to be attached to the decisions which are being arrived at. The United States and Japan, to use the picturesque expression of Mr. Motono, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet at Tokio, are working ardently to inaugurate the "era of the Pacific." In order to face the German peril they are applying themselves fervently to the task, not only of reducing the demands of private interests—hitherto intensely at variance—but still more to find a practical means of uniting their resources with a view to helping the Powers, who for three yearshave been engaged in a merciless struggle, towards a speedy completion of their -work for the salvation of the world. Once more the policy of Wilholmstrasse, a monstrous combination of treachery and force, has ended in drawing together two rival nations, whose quarrels Germany had prided herselfMipon envenoming to a point beyond reconciliation. , THE YELLOW PERIL. It was, however, to be foreseen that the mere prospect of German hegemony over an enslaved or enfeebled Europe—a hegemony which might extend to the' Asiatic countries—must cause t.hp Governments of Tokio and Washington to i rise up in defence of a common interest, make their reconciliation an imperative political necessity. Japan, especially, by favoring the anarchy which reigns in all the centres of Muscovite activity, would only admit German influence nearer and nearer to the Far East; to avoid tliis, her course must be to substitute an allied Russia. Tl\e entry of America has considerably modified the conditions of the future. No secret consideration of personal safetyprevents the Government of the Mikado participating in the world war to-day. Even its political exigencies must be rei duced in so far as, apart from TsingTao, Japan possesses the Marshall Islands, the Mariannas, and -the Caroline Archipelago. Two million Japanese are also said to be massed on the Manchurian frontier, ready to unfurl the Standard of the Rising Sun. But, in the meantime, obstacles present themselves. Certain spirits oppose the creation of a' precedent by the intervention of Asiatics in European conflicts. With disconcerting logic they blindly accept Japanese naval co-opera"-tion in the Mediterranean 'vaters. but condemn the setting ont of the smallest battalion of "Japs" towards no matter which point on the immense front, where human lives are mown down hy thousands every day.

■Political preoccupations of the future must efface themselves before the trag'e realities of the moment. Certainly trie victory of the Allies is certain, and iiut for th c criminal follies of the Maximalists the intervention of America her(self need not have been necessary. But meanwhile the Russian giant staggers, blood-reddened with anarchy; the moral of the German nation benefits by easy [victories gained over an enemy who yields the ground; tile million men detained beyond the Atlnatic will not be ready for action till next spring; Rounmnia, despite her heroism, in agony awaits the arrival of sucoour; Servia, Belgium, and Northern France groan under the most odious yoke; dead, bereaved, and ruins accumulate while a sign would suffice to range on the battle front two million Japanese, armed and ready, to shorten all this human misery. What, do all considerations, all prejudices, and even a few political sacrifices matter compared with the result to be obtained! *

An objection that will be raised is that transport difficulties are the most serious obstacle to the use of Japanese contingents in the West. According to the possibilities of traffic on the TransSiberian in 1905, it would require, in fact, five months to bring a million men to the Russian front. In spite of the systematic, disorganisation pursued by a certain Russian Minister during the last three yeras, is it possible that these things have not been improved upon since then? If the prodigies accqmplfc',,. etl by the "Poilus" or the "Tommies'* who construct roads and railway in a ridiculously short time are tftkcii into account, what may one not expect "from ten million Chinese laborers, drawing their equipment from tbfe United States or from Japan, and putting forth their maxinrum effort, Imder the direction of Attftirean engineers? Is it quite certain, moreover, that there could not be a more easy cmplo.mient, nor one more immediately productive, and perhaps more rational, for the forces of our Japanese Ally, than to reserve them for the Russian front? One or two Japanese armies at desired points would soon give appreciable results. The essential thing is to hurrv.