THE ITALIAN DISASTER.

Taranaki Daily News, 4 January 1918, Page 3

THE ITALIAN DISASTER.

TREASONABLE BEHAVIOUR OF TROOPS. An authoritative statement concerning the causes of the disaster 011 1 lie Italian front, apparently circulated by the I'ivss Bureau, appeared in the London newspapers early in November. A short paragraph from i:< was telegraphed to New Zealand, but, the most important point was omitted. "Owing to the wild reports which have been circulated there is complete misunderstanding as to the causes of {lie Italian disaster and the lessons to be drawn from it." it runs. 'lt is not true that the enemy has withdrawn largo forces from the eastern theatre and concentrated them against Italy, nor is it true that the Germans are commanded by the redoubtable "Macken sen, nor have the Italians been overwhelmed by superior numbers. Only three G?rnt:in divisions, forming part of an Austro-German army under Otto von Billow, took part in the attack 011 October 24, with three others in close reserve, and the strength of the Italians was greater than that, of the enemy. The disaster wn\s due to a portion, happily, it is believed, only a 9iuall portion, of the Italian troops having become infected bv treasonable intrigue and refusing to fight. This made a gap in the line, through which the enemy broke, and although other troops, and especially the Third Army on the right flank, tgught most gallantly, the whole Italian defence was compromised. On the portion oi the line where the enemy made his main attack literally no resistance was made, and the enemy's troops marched' practically without firing a shot a distance of about twelve miles on the first day. "This disaster could not have been avoided, as some have suggested, by the Allies undertaking an offensive in order to capture Trieste some months ago. The inferiority of the Allied communications, as compared with those of the onenty; the fact that, the latter are acting on interior lines; the difficulty of the terrain; and, above all, the fact that the Germans could at any time, by concentrating in the Trcntiro' within twenty miles of the main Allied line of communieaions, endanger their line of retreat, all render such an enterprise radically unsound. The Italians had no anxiety whatever regarding their ability to hold their positions" but even if Allied assistance had been forthcoming, it is unlikely that any reinforcement could have saved the Italian army under such circumstances. The enemy's break through was accomplished with such suddenness that these reinforcements would only have been involved in the disaster. There has been no failure 011 the part of the Italian High Command or of Entente strategy; commanders are powerles- H. put a stop to treasonable intrigue :■ troops unless statesmen put a »t«i : " in tlie country. The real lesno>- " ' gained from this event is the r.eces- ■/ for the statesmen of all the l.in.i, . countries to infuse into their !'• i"'-' that spirit of determination wl.'i ■ '• alone carry them through such s •< gle as this. If this lesson is Iw. > 1 Italian disaster w»>.; it atHMHjjt a guise.''