MILITARISM UNABASHED.

Taranaki Daily News, 4 January 1918, Page 7

MILITARISM UNABASHED.

GERMAN PLANS FOR THIS XKXT WAR. (By The Times' Correspondent formerly iu Berlin). On September 24 a short account, derived from a German review, was given in The Times of a small book called ''-Deductions from the World War," which had just been published by LieutciuintLiciioral Baron von .Freytag-Loriiiylioven, who was Quartermaster-General in the field when Jt'alkenhavn was Chief of the (lencrul Staff, end is now stationed in Berlin as Deputy-Chief of the General Staff. After delays, duo to the German censorship, Freytag's book lias now reach ed Jingland, and a remarkably interesting work it is. - As has already been observed, General von Freytag passes as a, "moderate" among the Prussian militarists. He is a master ot military history, a writer of »i - eat clearness, and lie is far from being a typical Pan-German, or even a Bernhardt He represents, indeed, the best nf Prussian .Militarism. Consequently tt'e have every reason to be grateful for his somewhat unexpected illumination, ui. this stage of the war, of German military opinion and militarist plans. - Much of the book is technical, and will be appreciated only by professional soldiers,. but the argument culminates in a chapter called ''.Still Ready for War," which shows how the most intelligent German soldiers utterly reject all idea of pacifism or internationalism, and look to the further expansion of German military strength. General von Freytag argues that Germany had not nearly adequate armaments before the war, and that, "in view of the central geographical position of the Fatherland, larger expenditure for the land army, in addition to the necessary expenditure for the Fleet, was unconditionally required." He assumes that in future, anil in spite of all difficulties, Germany will recognise that "facts are facts." H<vv : 8 the Army to he expanded? Obviously by following 'lie course which, as Freytag says, Germat y was pursuing immediately Wore the war—training a larger proportion of the men liable for military service. Freytag savs:

Wo shall have to continue to pursue this road in future, quite apart from the nm'isary increase of garrison artillery nml technical . troops. MorPovor, when the number of those who have fought in tin- sro.ii!. war has fallen away, we shall have to aim at. subjecting at least to a cursory training the men of military who *vf at first, rejected, 'but who in Hie course of the war have turned out to Up (it for service, so that when war breaks out t'fcv may form a generous source of reserves. Only so can we arrive at a real peoples' army, in which t-verv erne has gone through the school of the standing army.

PACIFISM AND THE GERMAN SWORD.

l'reytag says there can be no reduction of tiie two years'—for some arms three years'—service. He attaches value to the various schemes lor training boys and for turning sport to military account, but says that these things cannot provide any substitute for "real schooling in soldiering." He proceeds:—

It may be asked what is the use. of all this. Will not the genera! exhaustion of Europe after the world-conflagration of a certainty put the danger of a new war, to begin with, in the background, and does not this terrible murder of peoples point inevitably to the necessity of disarmament to pave the way to permanent peace? The reply to that is that nobody can undertake to guarantee a long period of peace, and that a lasting peace is guaranteed only by strong armaments. . . . Moreover, world power

Is inconceivable without striving for expression of power in the world, and consequently for sea-power. But that involves tiie constant existence of a, large number of points of friction. Hence arises the necessity for adequate armaments on land and on sea.

It will be observed that the DeputyChief of the German General Staff insists upon a continuing German thirst for sea power. In anotlitfr passage lie jays:—

Tiie world-war affords incontrovertible proof that Germany must for all time to come maintain her claim, to sea-power. We need not at present discuss by what means this aim is to be achieved.

Freytag goes on to declare emphatically that the reason why Germany enjoyed peace for so long before Uu present war was not the strength oE the movements for 'fraternisation of the peoples" and the many "fine speeches," but solely "the power of the Cierman sword, which could not display its true btrength until the war broke out." Freytag expects that agreements intended to banish war will be concluded between States, but he observes that all such agreements ore "after all only treaties"

-lie might have written "only scraps of paper." He cannot believe in "a realisation of true pacifist ideas"; lie hopes that the world-war will have rid the Hermans once for all of ''confused cosmopolitan aentimentalism"; and be coi.t hides:—

In the future, as in the past, the German people will have to seek firm cohesion in its glorious Army and in its beiaurelled young Fleet. There is a little special aluse for the States:

The fact that precisely tlie President of tlie United States of North Amend lias advocated the brotherhood of the peoples Burely ought to frighten us. America's 'behaviour in the war has shown that pacifism, as represented in 'America, is only business pacifism, and so at bottom nothing else than class materialism. This truth is not altered by the (act that it is wrapped in a hazy garment of idealism and so seeks to hide its real mean.up; from tlie innocent. Nor is the truth altered by the appeal to democratic tendencies, for precisely this war is showing that thosa-who at present hold power in the grea»jlemoeracies have risked in irresponsible%ashion the future of the peoples entrusted to their leadership. THE BLOCKADE: BRITISH DELAYS. ■ Interesting are Kreytag's observations on the peculiarly economic character of the_\var. He lays stress upon the fact that the Germans were so absorbed in their own wars of 1804, 1881), and 1870 thai they never learnt what, there was to learn from the American War of i Secession. Hence their disappointments I about the blockade when their original plan to crush Franco had failed Frey.tag says:—

The consequences of the blockade to ; wliich the Central Powers were subjected showed themselves at once, Although vve succeeded in developing our war economics by our own strength, yet the unfavorable state of the world-economic situation has throughout the whole war jieen felt hy us. That, alone explains why our enemies found ever fresh possibilities "f "aist&Dct'. Tv *•*

stood open to t.hnii). and why victories which would once have been absolutely decisive, mid the conquest of whole kingdoms, did not 'briii;! us nearer to peace. But. in a passage which i. worth a good many other payes of the hooi: put together. Freytag observes that HermanyY; enemies failed 1 > take full advantage <>! the possibilities of the blockade. He :-avs:—-

Out' enemies only gradually perceived the true situation. The operations which they had begun extracted only little by little the full advantage of the world-economic situation, which was favorable to .them and unfavorable to us: thev did so only when tlicy met with unexpected powers of resistance m the Central Powers. SPIRIT OP TI-IE ARMIES. There are some interesting references to the spirit of the various armies. The Austrians are only mentioned once or twice in the book, and then with a patronage verging on contempt. Freytag once says outright that ''the Germans Were on several occasions threatened with the prospect of the Austro-llungar-iau Army being defeated utterly by the far superior Russians."

As regards the Germans, Freytag says that "the want of ollicers made itself felt in an extraordinary way after the original heavy losses in the.autumn of 1!J14, and otherwise brave men occasionally failed when their leaders were taken away by enemy bullets.' He declares that the German Army has a traditional contempt of danger such as belongs to no other ' people's army," but in this, as in all other matters, he insists upon the inestimable value of discipline and training, such as can bo obtained only : under :i system of avowed and determined militarism. [Freytag throughout ta]l;s proudly of ''the spirit of German •militarism," and there is in his book none of the usual German hypocrisy on the subject.} In an interesting passage he says: All of us, leaders as well as men, have human weaknesses, and assuredly not ,J1 German soldiers are heroes 'by nature. But it is precisely in this—in the fact Unit the weak are carried along with the fetrong—that the educative force of this fight for the existence of Germany displays itself. The. weak could not do otherwise than strive io be heroes. Reverses, such as were occasionally inevitable in this long and tremendous war, have doubtless had a temporarily depressing effect upon the troops, and, after efforts and a consumption of nerve power s«ch as previous wars did not know, there has sometimes been a yearning for rest. But even in the third year of war the war-Hire did not merely smoulder, but. always burst out afresh in flame. In Transylvania and Tioumania and in East Oalicia in 1917 the troops showed a vigor which was not finer in the first days of the war. The charm of victory enabled them to defy all the difficulties of ground and all the evils of the weather. They would, indeed, have been no people's army, linked to the home country by a thousand threads, if the desire had not existed for the conclusion of the long war which demanded ever fresh sacrifices, and if a calmer feeling had not taken the place of the enthusiasm of the first months. But it was just nuch a, feeling that was necessary for the accomplishment of such gigantic achievements in the West and in the East. What was wanted was not enthusiasm, bill the, living heroic iense of duty in the German soldier. The chapter on "The Technical Development of the War" contains little thai is new, but there are interesting passages on aircraft and air raids. After remarking that aeroplanes have acquired a superiority over airships in laud warfare. Freytag says:— The Zeppelins are extraordinarily sensitive. They have to keep at considerable heights, because they provide very large targets. This reduces the accuracy with which they can aim 'bombs. They also need a large expenditure of labor and materials, and they have to be housed in sheds. The brilliant invention of Count Zeppelin provided a weapon which, especially at the beginning of the ivar, was of great moral importance, and was also of indisputable value, because with the Zeppelin we got over to England; but in this sphere also the large fighting aeroplane has taken its place. . . . Aviation obviously lias a great future. Its possibilities of development are numerous.

As regards air raids Freytag is free from any considerable measure of hypocrisy. He says:

'Unfortified places of no military iir portance have had to suffer. The bom bardment of these places is in itself objectionable, but the limits of what is per missjble are in this matter in many ways elastic. A new weapon opens up its own paths, as is shown, for example, by the submarine war. In any case, in this struggle of the peoples with its economic background, the war is turned more and more against the enemy countries, and the principle hitherto accepted that, war is made only against the . armed power of the enemy is in ithis as in other spheres relegated to the background. STRATEGY PRESENT AND FUTURE. Freytag's chapter on "Leadership" is in many respects interesting. Having ndmitted the failure at the Marne, lie discusses various aspects of the trench warfare, and he examines the German substitution of "breaks through" for the clasical Herman strategy of outflanking. He argues that the Germans could never outflank the Russians, because of the enormous area of the country and of the length of front, which was so great, that even a smashing blow at one wing did not affect other sectors. As to "breaks through," Freytag makes remarks which are interesting in view of the present campaign in Italy. He says:— The preliminary condition of success was always the moral and tactical superiority on the side of the attacker, and ii corresponding violence, of mass ell'ect. The fact [Freytag makes only one casual reference to Verdun in the. whole course of his book] that we did not possess this moral and tactical superiority in sufficient measure in the West has al- ! ways relegated to the background the idea of breaking through the enemy Iront. What has to lie done is not only on a comparatively limited front to break it upon the enemy with concentrated masses—these masses will immcdratelv "re exposed to outflanking on both sides—but to force in a more ov less considerable part of the enemy front, and then to develop strategically, the hreak-through which has suoeeedod tactically. The extent of the success will in every case depend upon the local conditions and the strategic situation.

I hronglioiit. the les-on' which Freytag is moat; concerned to teach is that the new experience doe? not displace, hat must be grafted on to, oil knowledge. He rcpeatedlv declares that the importance of outflanking strategy lias not been alTected by the lessons of the war; what Germany most try to do is to obtain by "policy" a better startingpoint for her future wars. The following passage may lie taken as Freytag's real ""deduction from the world war' 1 : If, as we hope, policy sneered* • future in prevent in" the recur*', "t----such a menacing siV'.sU,l£i>.

rate in producing the effect that we shall have greater freedom for violent and decisive blows in one direction, then the war will take a different shape and will be more like former wars. Our business, therefore, is to maintain the fundamental ideas of war as they lived in the Herman Army up to the year i 0 to soak them in the experiences of the prc-.cn!. war. and lo make the fullest technical use of these experiences- -hut to do all this without giving an entirely new direction to our thinking on strategy and tactics.