NEARING THE END.

Taranaki Daily News, 31 December 1917, Page 2

NEARING THE END.

19171 CAMPAIGN, AUIES ESTABLISH MILITARY) ABCEMDAMOY. {From Wellington. Times' London Correspondent), London, Oct. 18. The-message of thanks which the War Cabinet has communicated to Sir Douglas Haig and his men suggests that in the opinion Of the authorities the campaign of 1917 is now nearing its end. In the first battle of Ypres : th e fighting continued right up to November 11. But the weather this autumn has been much leas favorable than in 1914 for the continuance of active operations. It maybe that even yet Sir Douglas Haig mar be able to complete the conquest of the* Paaschendaele Ridge before a final halt •has to be called. Nevertheless, it is re-j cognised everywhere! that the en di is, nearly in sight. It cannot be said that we have achieved all or nearly all we hoped to aceom> plish this year. But no Iblame for th»» can attrcb to British arms. For many weeks past they have been sustaining the main burden of the fight, and how well they have sustained that 'burden has been indicated by the enemy's inability to launch any effective offensives in other theatres of the war. But for the collapse of Russia, we might at this moment be recording a Very different story. The success of the Britirh offensive on the Flanders front, and the fact that Germany was constrained to draw off reinforcements from every other arena of the struggle in order to prevent us from effecting a clean break through, conveys a very hopeful moral. For, if the plans of the Allies nad not gone awry through Russian failure, it is more than probable that an actual military decision would have been secured this summer. If things had gone as they were planned to go, we should have seen that simultaneous offensive which would have robbed Germany of the advantages sho derives from fighting on interior lines. [DISAPPOINTED HOPES. Consider for a' moment what wouM have happened if, when the Allies in the West passed tactically to the offensive early in the summer, a great Russian loffenslivo IhSadl synchronised with the French, British, and Italian attacks. On the Western front we have seen the Germans driven back on the Aisne, on the Somme, at Arrae and to the east of Ypres, whilst on the Italian front the Austro-Germana were so hard pressed by General Cadorna that nothing but their entire release from all anxiety in the East enabled them to avoid an overwhelming military disaster which would have placed Trieste at the mercy of our Italian Allies. Let no one imagine that the Central Empires had reserves available to meet a Russian offensive if a Russian offensive had been forthcoming. All the evidence points the other way. The loss of the Vimy Ridge and of the heights to the east of Ypres would not have been permitted by von Hindenburg if he could possibly have prevented it. Every available man and every available gun was thrown in to arrest the British advance. The Germans did not put up a stronger defence because a stronger defence was not available. If, instead of a stronger defence, there had been a weaker defence, the indications are that, in spite of the weather, we should have broken through, and that the Germans would at this moment have engaged in evacuating the whole of Western Belgium.

The Russian debacle robbed the Allies of just that additional pound of weight (which was required to turn the scale definitely in our favor. As it was, the Germans were able to preserve, if not an equilibrium, at least the semblance of such, and the winter win give them a breathing space in which to determine whether they shall endeavor to repeat in Belgium the "voluntary retirement" they successfully accomplished on the Somme early this year, or whether they shall hold out and fight out the war to a decision next spring on very much the same ground on, which the ODDOaing armies now stand.

'VALUABLE TIME LOST/ Many people are asking how it came about that Sir Douglas Haig deferred until so late in the year the offensive On the Flanders front. The answer is unquestionably that the Allies, even up to the eleventh hour, hardly appreciated the completeness of the Russian collapse. It does not matter whether the politicians or the soldiers were to (blame for this miscalculation. But it is known that when the British struck at Arras tlrey struck in co-operation with the French on the Aisne and with the Italians in the Trentino. Furthermore,' the Russians were expected to advance into Galicia, and though there was much disorganisation in the interior of Russia, the •Russian armies themselves were better equipped for attack and 'better provided with; munitions than at any earlier period of the war. But the Russian offensive did not come off at the time that was arranged, and when it did come off it collapsed ignominiously through the disaffection of the troops. • Russia had unquestionably a great opportunity, for even at that stage of the campaign -the enemy's lines in the East bad been dangerously weakened in order to buttress up the Hue in the West. But the opportunity was missed, and the French on the Aisne and in the Champagne, and General Cadorna on the Italian front, found forces opposed to them greater than they had reason to anticipate. For reasons which M. Painleve has already explained in the French Chamber, the French offensive in the south didi not exactly coincide with the British offensive on the Arras front. The blow which resulted in the capture of Vhny Ridge was struck on April- 9; French co-operation, largely through the ■break-up of the leather on the Aisne front, was not •the month. ■ CHANGEDfsERITJSHriPLANg. These more or less abortive operationswere fortunately not fatal to the alternative British plan to which Sir Douglas Haig afterwards turned Ms attention, .but they delayed it. The French, havingdecided, wisely in the circumstances, to. waab for American reinforcements next spring before attempting a final decision wi the war, (Sir Douglas Haig left General Borne and General Ryng to watch the Artois front and moved up his main ' iarmies to the north of the Ly». But all <thiß took time, and-the great offensive on ■ the islanders front cculdf not be-started ontil July 31 This left littfe anose> ihan-iwo. monthsi tn wJfieh to drive bacfc the Germans overt (the Easschendaele-ißidgß and out of Bou-Ibhj—opera-iaoas the accoatpHßhmant off jKhiijh was essential if the enemy was to

There was, aa we all know, a long delay from the middle of August until well into September—a delay the causes of which will doubtlessly be revealed in the fullness of time when. Sir tDouglas dispatches on this year's operations come to be published. But though all our objectives have not been achieved we have established a military ascendancy over the enemy, the effects of which must be far-reaching. Furthermore, we have established the fact that the German line in the West is not invincible, and have secured positions which will afford us the most excellent jumping-off places for the resumption of the campaign in the spring of 1918. Last, but not least, the moral of the German armies has becn\eriously affected by the shattering blow they have sustained. We have evidenco of this in the debates in the Reichstag when German Ministers were constrained publicly to defend the "propaganda work.' 1 which has been set going amongst the men in the trenches. You do not need "propaganda work" if troops are satisfied with their lot, or with troops who feel conscious that they are niarch-j ing to victory.