The Daily News. FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1917. A WAR CLIMAX FACTOR.

Taranaki Daily News, 28 December 1917, Page 4

The Daily News. FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1917. A WAR CLIMAX FACTOR.

To refer to the climax' of the war at> the present junctnre may seem premature, or possibly Tash, but to devote consideration to the factor that may bring about the climax is quite another matter. That faetor is the air service, the development of which is now the most serious concern of Britain ' and' | -America. It is <pot» question of having air superiority so much as having an: ■overwhelming superiority that will enable the Allies to secure decided advantages in their naval and military operations, and will also enable extensive raids to be made on Germany with the object of destroying enemy sources of supplies and producing a moral effect on •the German people that will lead to an unheaval which will, of itself, materially assist in bringing the war to a close. This is no mere idle, speculative theory; it is part of a plan that is in course of elaborat'on, and its possibilities are illimitaLie. Hitherto Britain has relied j on her two great services, the Navy and Army, but this war has evolved a third service of even greater utility than those named, because it can operate at all seasons, over land of every sort and; over the sea. The air service is whnt industrialists describe as "continuous running," for the wet and wintry wither which holds up armies has no retarding influence on aircraft, and the heat which paralyses war operations in certain parts of the globe has no effect on aviation. The advance of aviation since the war commenced has been a miracle of human progress, science and inventive skill, and before the end ot the conflict, air power and the wider economic veto still reserved behind blockade and embargo, will play a part equal to that of armies and fleets ;in sl.'ortei:ing the war and reducing the enemy i.o submission, besides binding bim over to keep -the peace. That is why there must be special organisation of the air service, not as a subsidiary element, but with a status equalling that of the Army and Navy, emancipated from conventional naval and military control, yet co-operating with both in the general object of winning the war. We have to bear in mind that the real crux of tliia war of nations is the total man power plus economic resources. The latter are not generally considered, but it lsj obvious that they are equally, if not more so, as important as the man power, and that is why air power ii-iist be super-added to naval and mi'.ltary power, the three acting as one, linked together in a single purpose and adding thereby to the strength of the whole. It has to be remembered that Germany is also putting forth her utmost energy in aviation development, so it become? all the more imperative to prevent any relaxation of pressure on her man powiw, for the greater thiß pressure is exercised the less power will Germany be üble to put into the output of aeroplanes and submarines. If the year 1918 is to see the termination of the conflict thou must be the maximum development on the part of the Allies, and especially of America, for it is to the United States that we look to accelerate and clinch ths final victory of the armies. We have to face a mighty concentration of enemy forces in the coming year consequent on the defection of Russia and the release of enemy forces and aeroplanes. We owe it to our armies to fender th.> utmost possible help, and the air service "Mitt be the chief means at assiiWuce.

There are two ways in which Hint service can accomplish this object, provided it is given an independence, a range, a potency which would make it comparable in effect with the Navy and Army. It can co-operate wil.li the other two services and especially with the army, in offensive operations, and by destroying and harassing the enemy reserves, besides helping in many other •ways. There is yet another and ft vastly more effective means whereby aircraft can shorten the war, an-l that is to raid Germany's munition centres and the vital lines of communication linking up on both sides of the.jßhine bridges, for there are in the whoie war theatre no areas more vulnerable than the Rhenish and Westphalian, thus striking at the fount of German war industries. The destruction of the Rhine ralVay | bridge near Duisburg, leading directly from Krupps to the front j of the great bridge between Cologne and Deutz and of the famous bridge between Mainz and Kastel, would mean an immense dislocation for Germany, nine tenths ot whose military supplies for her weßtern armies must pass these denies of trans- | port. It would be striking at Germany's 'Hie line, and the effect would be considerable. To accomplish this is only a question of air power and air supremacy, and the ability to shatter these works would also include the ability to destroy the whole network of enemy communications, thus breaking down the German military machine and facilitating the final victory. There should ba j.o difficulty in estimating the moral effect of such raids on Germany, where (he people have been taught that war can be waged with impunity and with vvery form of frightfulness. ' The treatment would be drastic, but the time has arrived when it is necessary to demonstrate to the German people that they are not exempt from punishment, and it is probably the only way in which they can be weaned from all war and from the Hohenzollem system. It may, therefore, be claimed that the climax of the war in this third element of air sarvice is inevitable. The challenge has been forced on the Allies, and they are facing it in earnest. It is not by hundreds of aircraft that the end will be achieved, but by tens of thousands, for there must be a crushing supremacy, and to grasp and wield that supremacy is the task that is now being undertaken. When it is accomplished it should shake the infatuated belief of the German people in their relative impunity, and bring ,them nearer to the point when they will feel this war unbearable and begin to reckon with their rulers.