GERMANY AT HER MOSCOW

Taranaki Daily News, 11 December 1917, Page 2

GERMANY AT HER MOSCOW

WHY SHE NEEDS PEACE. THE ONE THING SHE WILL NOT BO LOYALLY JS TO ACCEPT THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF A LASTING PEACE—THE FREEDOM OF ALL PEOPLES TO GUIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY. HER WATERLOO AWAITS HER. London, Oct. 12. "The Central Powers stand urgently in need of peace," says the New Europe; "but. being in appearance the victors by reason of the vast territories they have overrun, they cannot bring themselves to offer the only terms which can give them the peace they need. "On New Year's Day, 1813, Napoleon stood where Germany stands to-day. His "Grande Armee" had 1 swept in triumph through Europe; the nations seemed to be at liis feet. But, as to-day, the conquered were unconquered, and 1 the tide of Napoleonic fortunes ibegan to ebb. "Germany is ab her Moscow. She needs peace. But unless ehe can strip herself and her policy of the arrogance J of conquest,, her Waterloo awaits her. The certainty of her defeat is far plainer! to-day than ever before, and the time required to bring it about is not -disproportionate if measured'by the magnitude of the cause which our victory will establish. "Yet it is curious to note that the doctrine that time is on the aide of the Allies does not Beem to find the same favor as it enjoyed not many months ago. Time is so certainly on our side, and Germany know® it so wfll, that she will raa!ke immense efforts to escape the dread effects of another winter at war. She will set peace machinery in motion everywhere in order to gain her ends; but the one thing she will not do is loyally to accept the first principle of a lasting peace, namely, the freedom of all peoples to guide their own'destiny. Times the guns and blockade of the Allies will- surely and ultimately Ibring her to that resolve if, meanwhile, we will but see to the utmost the immense advantages we possess," concludes New Europe. WHAT SHE COUNTS ON. Mr. Hilars Belloc points,out in Land and Water how the enemy counts upon the break lip of the political situation to achieve what he cannot do in other ways.

" (1) The teainy counts "upon the divergence of aims between the various Western Allies, and in this divergence of aims must be included the difference in national characters, tvaditions, and experience. " (2) He counts upon the lassitude, ignorance, and confusion of the civilian population as regards the war, apart from other domestic difficulties. '

" (3) He counts very much upon internal divisions, especially in highly industrialised countries and districts where the quarrel between the wage-earning workers and the owners was already acute before Prussia and her Allies challenged Europe to war. "These are the three main divisions of his political calculation—and it is a formidable one, full of menace to our future. "If we do not appreciate these three main engines which are calculated to counteract his desperate military situation, we shall not understand either why the enemy is still so confident or what good grounds <of confidence he has. We shall fail, therefore, to master his policy." TO WIN THE WAR. "This brief review of the political forces upon which the enemy depends for arriving at liis> object of a negotiated peace is no more than a summary of their names." adds Mr. Belloc. "It pretends to no analysis of their causes or their working; still less to any constructive Temedy for the evils they threaten. "One can only say in the presence of sutfh a peril that it is the duty of everyone who sees, what a negotiated peace would mean—and most educated men see it—to withstand by every means in their power the progress of lassitude and of disaffection, and to resolve by every means in their power the inevitable difference of temperament And tradition between the Allied- peoples. The discussion of those points which interested us in the days of peace is futile to-day. Equally futile is mutual recrimination between conflicting interests, however sharp their conflict. "The whole task and the only task is to win the war. And winning the war means the imposition by force of arms upon the German people and their Allies of the conditions imposed by European civilisation: not the persuasion of the German people to an acceptance of those conditions ; that would be worthless. N&r a. document merely registering those conditions that we know from repeated Prussian declarations and actions would be disregarded. The German never keeps his word. But Victory imposing these conditions, with the weight of guarantees held by the victors. Short of that, the war is lost, and we are lost," concludes Mr. Belloc.

, THE ENEMY'S DECREASING MEN: "We have about 950,000 German bayonets, but less than a million, upon the Western front, says Mr. Belloc. "The mere statement of that number in connection with a line over 500 miles long and with the opponents it has to meet is sufficient to explain wTiy the enemy now stands upon an increasingly anxious defensive. In material the handicap is still •heavier—and the difference is increasing. "Now to this main aspect of the situation we must add a second—the enemy's anxiety upon the question of man-power for the future is also increasing. He happens for the moment to be passing through a temporary crisis which we must not exaggerate.' 'The whole of the German class 1018 has passed through the fire this summer, while the corresponding Trench class has been in barracks the Whole time, and is still in barracks, and not to be put into tire AelcT until later. Germany will already have lost many boys out of class lOlft'through sickness,"death, wounds and capture this autumn and winter before the Freneli youths, a year their senior, come under lire at all. "In other words, the German Empire, which was. only nine months ago, a year behind the French in men, is now a year and a quarter behind them. This comparison with the French shows nothing hut the position against the most exhausted of the Western Allies. The iSposition of the English and Italian recruitment. is far more favorable. "Now, under these circumstances, the enemy has been compelled to a strictly •lefensive policy." ;