THE RUSSIAN TRAGEDY.

Taranaki Daily News, 10 December 1917, Page 3

THE RUSSIAN TRAGEDY.

A J!U?SIA\ MINISTER OF WAR IN THE DOCK. ' now nr: is jo o sj-x visits he <u-. I'ICE TO BETRAY Ills COLNTUS' AND FILL ATS" OWN POCKETS WITH- BRIBES. 'London, ijc'pt. 28. The trial of GencraJ Sukhomlinoff, who for six years (V90I) to 1913) was Russian Minister of War, is unveiling the tragedy of Russia's military defeat and showing that it was largely due to his personal dishonesty. It is an appalling story. His dishonesty was nothing compared with the terrible results to which it led. He is guilty of high treason against the people of Russia. HTGH TREASON. "After the terrible calamities in the summer of 1913, when the Russians were deprived of all their conquests in Galicia, and were driven out of Poland with the loss of nearly a million prisoners, General Sukhomlinoff was dismissed, and an inquiry was instituted into his administration. It remained for revolutionary Russia to push on with his trial. The charge against him is one of -high treason. "The indictment against liim," says the Manchester Guardian, "is that he omitted to increase the output of the Russian munition works and so helped the enemy; that he failed to supply the army and fortresses with guns and shells, and prevented the artillery department from supplying them; that'in reports to the Tsar, for his own private reasons, he concealed important facts; that he communicated secret information to German agents knowing them to bo spies, and that ho enabled Myasoyedoff, the chief of these, who had been dismissed from the army years before as a suspected person, to re-enter the army during the war. '.•'This Myasoyedoff was subsequently executed for espionage. It is further charged against General Sukhomlinoff and his wife that they took bribes both to favor contractors and to betray their country. General Sukhomlinoff deposited in his bank while Minister 702,000 roubles, although bis salary was only 40,000 roubles. UNPREPARED FOR WAR. "We would direct attention to the evidence of the complete lack of military preparation with which Russia entered upon the war," saya the Manchester Guardian. "As early as August, 1914, the shortage of shells and cartridges was marked. By September General Zabelin was telegraphing to Sukhomlinoff that 'the situation 19 desperate.' The Russian guns were allowed only one shell each a day, while the German guns were pouring out hundreds. So unable were the Russian guns to offer resistance owing to lack of shells that the Germans pushed their batteries tip to within 20,000 yards of the Russian lines and mownd the Russians down. The Russian generals begged Sukhomlinoff to send them even blank: cartridges, ahythjpg that would even make a noise, so as to keep the moral of tho soldiers up. "The supply of rifles was even more tragically inadequate. As early as August 23, 1914, it was decided to send troops to the front with only one rifle for every two men. Two months later it was one rifle for every five or ten men. and then later battalions were sent without arms at all. General Yanushkevich told the Court that 'hundreds of thousands of soldiers were in consequence obliged to go into the trenches, or even into battle, unarmed.' Reliefs could not be trained because they had to wait for the rifles of the dead. The Russian losses were immense. ■ SECRET OF DISASTER.

J ''That is the secret of Russia's military | disasters. The Russians evacuated Lemberg because they had no shells or rifles, and BrusilofT himself said they lost Przemysl for lack of cartridges. General Sukhomlinoff's defence is that it was impossible for a country so lacking in industrial machinery to equip a modern army. That is a strange da fence for a man who, a few'monjhs before the war, announced in the Press Russia's perfect •readiness for war, and who Spared no effort to force a general mobilisation. "The evidence given is, however, still more, sinister. It was proved that in all those years nothing whatsoever was done to correct the evils revealed by the Japanese War; that General Sukhomlinoff ili'd not even spend on the army the money voted for the army; that he gave borrupt preferences to bad guns and- bad contractors. ALL READY! "Still worse, when war come and revealed Russia's desperate straits, Sukhomlinoff's invariable answer to every request for munitions was to say, 'All necessary measures have teen taTcen,' | and to do nothing. "On iSeptember 26, 1914, the French Ambassador, at the request of General Joffre, asked if the supply of shells was adequate. Sukhomlinoff gave a reastsuring answer, and deliberately omitted to ask for foreign help. .Parallel with all this went Sukhomlinoff's intimate association with Gefrnany's spies, his accumulation of money, and his wife's exj travagances. "Such, then, is the inside of Russia's They were prepared in advance and carefully aultivated during the war by the Government of the «ld order, that Government which, in spite of its incapacity, its corruption, and the calamities it has heaped upon Russia and Russia's allies, is still not without its friends in the Press of this country. . "That corruption ran through the Russian administration from the top to the bottom was a commonplace, and that nothing had been done in effect to reform and reorganise the Russian army after the Japanese War was evident to many students of Russian affairs, and coirld be gathered from the Russian press and the proceedings of the Duma. The plain fact was that the Russian Government of the Tsar; the Government of the old regime, was utterly incapable of honest and efficient work of any magnitude. The rottenness of the army was part of its own rottenness. DID WE KNOW "Was his known to and understood _bv the British Government, and in particular the Foreign Office and the War Office? If it was, the British policy seems to have taken no account of such knowledge, and it is certain that those military writers in this country who seek and receive official inspiration thought no praise too high for Sukhomlinofi and his 'new model' army. Here is matter upon which the British people may well ask for enlightenment from tneir rulers." FROM THE EVIDENCE. Here are some terrible extracts from the evidence sriven at the trial:—*

"As early as, August, 1914, telegrams showered upon the staff of th'e Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and thence upon the Minister of War, from commanders of various army units painting the-sit-uation in sombre colors and demanding shells, etc. Por instance, on September 10. 1914, General Zabclin sent several telegrams,to General YanushCevich, Ch}ef of the General Staff, the last of which said:— j "An intense battle is going on along the entire front. The expenditure of cartridges .is extraordinary, and their reservts are being completely exhausted. A fresh supply is urgently needed, and must not ho delayed. The situation is critical. , Pleaso help. The situation is desperate. Help. Send by express trains to Brest and Zdolbunoff.'' No improvement in the supply of munitions took place. On April 3, 1915, Yanushkevich reported to Sukhrtmlinoff:— "The thing has happened. We have evacuated PrzemVsl. Krusiloff explains it by lack of cartridges, your and my bete noire. . ... There is a cry from all the arihies: 'Give us cartridges.' Six days later a new report: 'The position is not improving. The cause is the same. Yesterday the Germans fired three thousand heavy shells against the sector of our first regiment. They have swept clear everything. Wc could only flro 100 shells." ' On .Tune 'l2, Yanuslilcevieli again reported:— "Wo have no rifles and 150,000 men r.tand without arms."