GERMANY'S MAN-POWER.

Taranaki Daily News, 21 July 1917, Page 9

GERMANY'S MAN-POWER.

BEIXO GRADUALLY REDUCED ON WESTERN* FRONT. TIME APPROACHING WHEN THE LAST TEUTON STRATEGIC RESERVE WILL BE USED UP. (By Hilaire Belloc, the well-known British military critic.) The one great interest of the moment upon the western field of war is, unfortunately for the purposes of descriptios, the least picturesque point of all. It is not the question of advance, nor even of the hammering and consequent disintegration of the enemy's line —it is the degree in which the renewed Allied offensive, is dragging into the western whirlpool the last German strategic reserve.

We all know the situation. Austria was so hit by the surrenders in mass last .lime and July that she remained from that moment onward unable to do more than just hold her own. She was not able to do that thoroughly upon the east, nor upon the Italian front entirely. For upon the east she had to summon a great number of (ferman divisions and even to ask for the aid of two Turkish divisions as well. Both the Turkish and the German divisions have had to remain helping her. for Austria has not been able to find the resources for relieving them. At the same time, the Bulgarian Army is completely occupied by the intervention of Rumania and by the forces based upon Salonika. The Turkish resources have also proved unequal to the pressure that could be brought against them, and cannot lend another man from Asia to Europe. Therefore, in a degree not hitherto reached, the burden of the war upon the enemy's side falls upon the German Empire alone. The German Empin- represents in man power almost exactly half the great combination which has been formed as vassal to Prussia for the attack upon European civilisation. But the military work now being done by the German Empire in these latter stages of the Great War, which mark the failure of .Prussia,

is more like three-quarters of the whole, not exactly in man-power but in weight and effect. The chief mark of this last (German effort is the creation (by a deliberate policy of anticipation and risking the future) of a strategic reserve; and the value of this strategic reserve was its capacity of effecting a surprise . Tt could be thrown when it was needed (so the thesis ran) here or there at the will of the Herman command, that is. of TiUdendorff. In other words, the German Higher Command decided last December that the summer of 1017 was their last chance of getting a draw, and therefore borrowed future man-power to risk everything upon the present. They built up a large number of spare divisions and intended (while refusing action as long as possible, and consequently avoiding loss) to have those spare divisions in hand for on» last effort, launched at a time and place of their choosing. OHTF.F CONDITION' OF VICTORY. Now it is perhaps the most elementary point in all military history that the chief condition of victory is the freedom to decide the form of an action, and the chief condition of defeat the compulsion to accept the form imposed by your opponent. It would not be true to say that no great action in the past has failed to give success to the party which decided its form, but of the various conditions of victory this power of initiative is the chief.

The whole point, therefore, of an. ticipating income, as it were, and creating this strategic reserve in Germany, was the ability to use it not where the German Command should be compelled to use it by the Allies, but where they themselves chose to throw it, to the surprise and discomfiture of the Allies.

It was clear that if a very extensive and continued offensive could be opened early in the West, by the Allies, this German strategic reserve would at once be in part required to meet the strain. Jn other words, its value as a force to restore the initiative to Germany and to bo flung at will where and when Germany might choose, would be diminished nnd diminished in a degree proportionate to that in which the Allied offensive should smck it into the western whirlpool.

We know, for instance, what Germany had to do in the case of the Somme. She had to throw in, first and last, the equivalent of well over ion of her new reduced divisions, counting in infantry 9000 bayonets at full establishment. Anything upon that scale begun early in 1017 and continuously pressed would utterly prevent the German strategic reserve from be. in« used elsewhere at all. THE RETIREMENT PLAX. Hence arose the decision to retire upon a new line. When that, decision was taken we do not know. What we do now know by inference from all the surrounding circumstances is that 7.u----dendorff had planned a retirement before that part of the Allied front on which he conceived the chief preparations for a renewed offensive to lie. He further calculated that such a retirement would postpone the Allied power of developing a new offensive for about two months (.-neb was the intorvi' communicated to the German pnpers), and based this calculation partly upon ih:> kn'iwn or supposed rate of rconstr icG-n with the means available to lie Allies, and partly upon a novel act of war. This novel act war consisted in the complete destruction of the whole countryside over which the retreat was to take place. ll will be useful here to show what the view of the retirement was to Germany, and to give example of what the German Higher Command expected to be the result of the retreat on the St. Quentin line. It will bo remembered that the general statement sent round to neutral journalists and propagated by wireless toward the end of March, that the German retirement was a innster-stvoke. which had succeeded in destroying the Allien' plan for a spring offensive.

This statement could not have been niii.le at random. It may have had ;i political domestic object in the main •but even so it would not have been male if the Herman commander could have foreseen what was coming. In other words, lie has seriouslv suffered the effect of a surprise.

It i> clear from the pronouncements commuilceted to the Herman Press and put forward in various forms in its organs that the retirement upon the St. Quentin line was expected thoroughly

by the ■German commanders to postpone the Allied offensive for many weeks and to restore to themselves a full initiative of attacking where and when they choose.

The retreat ontild not, in the concoptinn of tlie German Higher Command, bo followed with sufficient rapidity to restore the power of offensive action to the French and British, and it was to be used .for tho purpose of recovering initiative for the enemy and tho tion of a war of movement in which the form of battle should be decided bv themse'.ves. OFFICIALLY EXPRRSSKi/. But these phrases written by men, "ho had not openly acknowledged authority, might always foe disavowed .by the enemy's command, and it might be argued by those who do not know how the German 'Press is worked in such matters, that the error was no more than the error of journalists unacquainted with military problems. Unfortunately for this view, sometiling or other made the flhanfcelloi' himself insist upon the pronouncement as official, and give it to the world within ten days of Vimy. In was actually as late as March ->8 that BethmannHollweg told tho world that: "On the j western front the operation of retirement continues according to plan and is giving a liberty of action which increases with every day that ■passes." A list of this sort is exceedingly important, and it might be indefinitely extended, I believe, 'by a further search through the German Press of that time. Tt enables us to judge the extent and nature of ifche superiority which tho French and "British. High Command have established; (for the great test of superiority is the power to impose will. With so much quoted from the German Press by way of digression to illustrate my point, I will return to the main argument. We have seen what the plan of the

German retirement was. That plan went wrong in several important particulars.

In the first place, the retirement had to begin earlier than was intended, and not quite in the form that was intended. There is the' clearest possible evidence to show that it was intended to pivot upon the Bapaume Ridge. The Biipaume Ridge was lost simply because the enemy was shot off it. Such wholly now works as were constructed for its defence and abandoned would never have been constructed upon any other theory. Further, the enemy had no time to destroy the most important of all the areas subjected to his original plan—the area of and around Noyon. It was the most important because it whs the threshold of the French pursuit from achieving the rapidity it did. MISCALCULATED PURSUIT. The next point in which the plan went wrong was miscalculation, closely connected with this interference with the enemy's time-table, of the rapidity with which the pursuit would be taken up, an error which was also supported by a miscalculation of the rate at which reconstruction of roads and bridges would be possible. Lastly, the plan was marred by an error as to the rate at which, and perhaps as to the exact places in which, the new concentration of men and material would be made for the renewed attack. Tnstaed of a respite of two months there was no real respite at all, but continuous fairly hard fighting and only an interval of three weeks between the main retirement and the first great bombardment of the renewed offensive. To what this last error was due it is difficult to guess. One can hardly believe that the enemy was ignorant of suck great concentrations as were necessary to the task undertaken, but perhaps one may suggest an undervaluation of the Allies' enormous and increasing resources in munitionment. You can find out from the air that a concentration is taking place. You cannot find out within any degree of accuracy its magnitude. At any rate, the great offensive began after a fashion that clearly showed the German forces to be taken at a disadvantage by it. The counter-con-centration to meet it did not develop upon the north until it was too late, and, as we knew, the strongest and pivot question of the northern end of the new line was lost by the Germans to the British in the course of Easter week.

Against the second blow, which was to come on the other limb of the great salient along the front of the Aisnc and in Champagne, the enemy had prepared a very considerable concentration, and was aible to put up a (proportionately strong resistance. Nevertheless, he lost entirely one of his key positions, and partially lost the second, suffered less in guns by far than he had suffered in the north, but more in prisoners, and altogether by the time the second blow was completed he had lost in valid prisoners alone, infantry to the equivalent of nearly four divisions, and guns numbering perhaps an eighth of his total original equipment upon these sectors. Before the third week of April was over the enemy had already clearly begun to draw on his strategic reserve, and that we havecompelledhimsotodo at such a date is the capital point of all. We have learned, therefore, merely by tabulating what have been mentioned in dispatches (certainly less than the total), tho appearance already of twenty odd divisions against the western offensive of 1017 over and above those first deiputed to meet the shook, and those twenty odd divisions can be but a portion of the total moved up under necessity into an action the form of which is decided by the Allied Command and not by the German.

We can put; not accurately, but in round numbers, what this strategic reserve is, or rather, what it was at the beginning of the year (ibetween which date and the "Britiaji offensive or the nth, the Hermans suffered no very heavy losses). In round numbers the Herman Empire had in sight up to the end of this summer, over and above the formations existing last December, a million men. Again, in round numbers, about half that figure represented men available as soon as they could be trained; tlm other half human material that would dribble in from hospitals, from hitherto exempted men, etc, MUMHKR 01' UESKUVKS USKD. We may, therefore, take it that the strategic 'reserve, inclusive, of drafts ready in the depots to 4111 the gaps caused in it through action, is equivalent to well over UIXtjOOO men. If we suppose the men actually incorporated to be about half trie materia! available, and the rest to be lying behind lilling gaps, we may suggest something over twenty—at the most, ■say, twenty-five—of the new small German divisional formations to have, been held in hand by the enemy before the great offensive began. It may be an. exaggeration to suggest that as many

as ton nave already town sucked Into tin- western buttle. I repeat, it is only a Misnrestion or guess; but 1 think it probable that when we know tue tacts

it will be found a tolerably accurate guess. At any rate, the future will decide for us, because wo shall see by the masses of troops the German Empire may use elsewhere whether or not the Allied offensive has seriously depleted this strategic reserve.

As this article was completed the first news came in of a renewed blow—the third—delivered, or rather begun, by the British on a chosen sector of 16,000 yards before Arras and along the critical Scajpc line. It is clear that the enemy has 'been compelled to bring up a great mass of reserve force and herein again will lie the true interests of the actions that will be in progress when these lines are before the. reader. Xot the advance of so many yards in such and such points nor (of itself) the tale of prisoners, but the extent to which we have compelled the enemy to throw in and lose his reserve. NOT "BREAKING THROUGH" Catch words are horrible things and have become more horrible since they became the necessity of bad journalism and worse politics." (But if ever there was an occasion .when it was legitimate to use them for this purpose of rubbing in an important public lesson, it is in connection with this German talk of "■breaking through." If everyone watching this gigantic battle of the West would ibear in mind the phrase "not /breaking through, but breaking up," and never lose grip ot it, the whole of public opinion would l>e informed. It would cease to con■idw mere advance over ground, it would cease to exaggerate special tactical points; it would (put in its right p*aportions and character the enormous new task, and let us hope conclusive task, which our ancient civilisation opened with the guns of Sir Douglas Haig on Easter Sunday.

To get 'back to first principles: The object of an army in the field is to ,put out of action the army opposed to it. An army is put out of action by the loss of its fighting power in such a degree (compared with the corresponding loss of its opponent) that it can no longer maintain the struggle as one organisation against another.

This loss of fighting power is effected in one of two ways: Numerical loss, and loss of organisation. Sometimes one factor predominates, sometimes the other. Both are present in any defeat. At Se- ■ dan, for instance, ajid at the capitulation of Mete the loss was almost entirely numerical; the only two existing regular armies of the French 'were cut off from supply, compelled to surrender, and all their men and all their guns ceased in a military sense to exist. At Waterloo the loss was mainly loss of organisation, that is, the mere'number of killed and wounded would not have decided the matter. (What decided it was the breaking up of the army from Sn organisation to a mass of dust by the blows inflicted upon it. In a war of positions, each party facing the other on a line which cannot be turned, and each in sufficient numbers to hold such a line, two main , types of decision are possible: The first type is the breaking of the line over a sufficiently wide gate to allow the victorious side a passage right through. The second process consists of disintegrating the line by pressure over a very great part' of its length exercised by superior against inferior power until the line gives way in one or several places. Detailed local victories immediately follow. The whole defeated force, rapidly gets inferior in numbers and organisation and, though still capable of falling back, is less and less able to stand the blows delivered.

The .French, therefore, had for their object to make the German line suffer as much as (possible, and this was done by pushing at specially selected points forward after hammering the trench system to bits with the superiority of gun power, and between these selected points causing pockets or small local salients to (bulge out from which the enemy either failed to retire—and therefore suffered a heavy loss in prisoners and guns—or retired with very great loss through not leaving prisoners behind. Further it was their business to get hold of the observation points which had been of audi value to the enemy In establishing his immensely strong positions; and to seize the highest ground, his counter-attacks up hill.

ADVANCE INSIGNIFICANT. The mere advance on the map is insignificant in both senses of that word, but it includes everywhere upon the left and the right, where the two efforts were made, the tremendous system of field fortifications iwhich the Germans had elaborated in more than two and ahalf years of work, and it has seized heights which were the object of the effort. What is the effect of this? Tn the first place, the hammering of the advance has accounted for many thousands of prisoners and scores of guns. .But even more important than the losses in prisoners was the necessity of counterattacking on a large scale to which the enemy was condemned. The value of strong works is that they economise men. When you lose your main system and are thrown back cm shallow, hastily prepared trenches behind, you must, if you are to hold at all, bring up many more men and suffer much higher losses ; you have, to counter-attack heavily (at a corresponding expense) while consolidating your new line.