CRUSHING REVERSE.

Taranaki Daily News, 21 May 1917, Page 6

CRUSHING REVERSE.

HOW BAGDAD FELL. SIK STANLEY MAUDE'S BRILLTANT OPERATIONS. Writing on the fall of Bagdad, the military correspondent of the Westminster Gazette gave an illuminating description of the strategy employed by the British General. He* said:— The Turkish defeat at Bagdad was even more decisive and severe than that sustained at Kut. Its magnitude is hardly yet appreciated. The first point that stands out is the skill of the generalship. At Kut General Maude prevailed by a \vell-eoneeived and ably executed stratagem. He feinted against the enemy defences at Sanna-i-yat while he delivered nis main attack against, the defences south of th? Tigris. At Bagdad he feinted against the defences on the right hank of this houth-west of the city, and at the critical moment for the enemy uncovered his real and main attack along the Diala, and prevailed. Leading the enemy to suppose that lie meant to repeat his tactics at Kut he reversed the ruse. It was ably done. Since the only road bi-tween Kut and Bagdad runs along the north bank of the Tigris, viic British .•.•rmy had followed that road. Electing ti make a stand on the Piala, the Turki knew that we must, either deliver a frontal attack, or, to initiate a turning movement, bridge the main river. Either event, they most probably thought, would give them time, precious as enabling the Sixth Army in part to recover itself, and back up the reinforcements ?ent to arrest the pursuit. THE ENGINEERS' WONDERFUL FEAT.

But General Maude sprang a surprise. Our attack on (lie Diala defences opened on March 8, and during that day it was confined to that line! During that day, however, the Tigris was oridgcd, that is to say, the movement forward of the mass* of bridging material must have kept pace with the movement of the army, rapid as that had been. This was a wonder'.il 'eat on die part of the engin. ers, only eclipsed by their completion of a half-mile long bridge in a few hours. Not taking chances, the Turks had posted a strong force on the right bank of the Tigris, to the south-west ef tJe city, and the defensive position, so'lth Df the swamp known as Lake Akarku, ivas well chosen. On March 9 our attack there also began. It was energetically pressed and with «,uc«ss, though meanwhile, on tVe Diala we had apparently made no progi'p^. On the night of March 9 British tn'.ps succeeded in crossing the Dia'a, and in establishing a bridgehead on the Bagdad side. But on March 10 the attack o:i the opposite bank of the Tigris to the toutli-west of Bagdad was pressed 0.-en more energetically than on the prcc dThis for the enemy was tlr: critical moment. We may reasonably suppose he was led to think that the south-western attack was the real thing. It was just then that the attack along the Diala was launched and the passage firced. Warned by their experience at Kut, the Turks decamped, and in n hurry. The loss of most of their artillery is ruinous. THE DIRECT CONSEQUENCE. The political eonsequ-'iices of the capture of Bagdad need not be emphasised, but the military consequences of this crushing reverse will be yet creatcr. H is a blow at the heart of Turkisn power. Nor is the victory to be attributed to the deficiencies of the Turks as fighting men. The Turks are first-class fighting men, but the troops who overcame them are better. Among those troops our Indian divisions merit publie recognition. Some day perhaps we shall realise that our Indian Army is unsurpassed by any body of soldiers in'the world. Now that the British have advanced as far as the valley of the Diala they are nearer to Khanikin than the Turks, who are in retreat at Kermanshah. There are developments yet to come,