PETROGRAD OR CALAIS.

Taranaki Daily News, 14 May 1917, Page 6

PETROGRAD OR CALAIS.

, THE GERMAN RETIREMENT./ AND ITS PROBLEMS. Everybody is asking why the Germans have furtively withdrawn from very strong positions in the region of the Ancre and the Sommc. The problem is being examined with profound interest and some perplexity (writes l.ovat leaser in the London Daily Mail). There is not sufficient recognition of the undoubted fact that under cover of mists and darkness the enemy have so far conducted their, retirement with success. We ought not to deceive ourselves in this matter. Though the British Army forced them to go, they have re. treated very skilfully. We are entering upon a very critical and obscure phase of the war. We should look at the new situation very frankly and without any bias. The journalistic experts have always told us that ground does not matter, and that our one object must be to "kill Germans." I have frequently ventured to doubt this view, and have urged that ground also matters enormously. But the experts cannot have it both ways. Though last week we got the ground, the Germans got away. Our natural jubilation must therefore not reach extravagant lengths.

Six different explanations of the causes of the German withdrawal have been published, though in a sense most of the six are variants of each other. We are told that the Germans evacuated formidable fortified positions:— (1) Because the constant pressure of the British armies had rendered their existing lines untenable. (2) Because when first their positions were badly battered they began to prepare now lines in the r'ear, and have simply chosen a favorable moment for •retirement.

(3) Because by falling back they impair the value of our new railways and other preparations. They compel us to "organise" our new ground, and therefore postpone our chane's of a successful spring offensive. (4) Because they do not mean to attack in the West this year and have begun to shorten their !in j instead. They mean to strike at Russia. The submarine campaign constitutes their offen. five in the West.

(5) Because they mean to attach us very soon, and may get us at a disadvantage on our new ground. ■ (6) Because they intend ".to force a war of movement in the West this year •and had first to extricate themselves from their fixed positions.

THEY HAD TO GO. To me the initial question does not seem to admit of argument. The Germans went not because they wanted to, but because they had to go. It is quhe inconceivable that they abandoned such tremendous strongholds as Gommecourt and Puisieux except und?r pressure. We have really been witnessing the belated close of the Battle of the Sonime. Tho events of last week are the true fruits of Sir Douglas Haig's victory. The enemy may be making tho best of a bad job, they may be evolving new schemes based upon their involuntary retirement, but there can be no doubt about the original meaning of their departure. They were pressed back. The first explanation quoted above, that the existing German lines had from various technical reason-, become untenable, is the true one. Bu: when we have said so much we are still only at the beginning of the problem. The real question is what will happen next. I do not in the least believe that the Germans drew back simply in order to force a war of movement in the West, which is perhaps the last thing they ■desire. Nor is it conceivable that they abandoned their powerful improvised fortresses merely to embarass our spring operations. Such may be the consequence of their withdrawal, but it cannot have been the reason that impelled them. All these "clever" theories do not impress me at all, for if it be helo that the retreat wan involuntary they are instantly vitiated. And no one can conceive Marshal von Hindenburg trying to bo "clever." His plans are always marked by a crude though massive simplicity. What, then, is the German purpose? •The enemy, let us remember, have certainly retired in tho Ancre and Sommc area under compulsion. They certainly hope to gain some sort of victory in the next six months, which is why they are comparatively indifferent about the United States. They certainly hope that their submarine campaign will bring about the downfall of Great Britain.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES 0? ACTION The Germans will probably adopt one of two main courses of action. The first is to stake everything on the attainment of early victory on land and sea in the West. If they aim at an early finish, to strike in the West appears the only course open to them. Hitherto I have always thought they would put their fortunes finally to the test in France and in the North Sea, because it seemed tho most, logical thing to do. There is much difference of opinion as to where they might strike. Some tiling they would aim at Ypres and Calais. Personally, I fancy they would fall upon some sector of the front held by the French. The second alternative is widely different. It presupposes that last week's withdrawal is only the beginning of a much bigger retirement which would shorten the German line by very many miles. If you draw a line from Areas to Soissons, but perhaps including Peronne, you -will get a rough idea of the kind of gradual retirement suggested. The second alternative implies that Hindei.burg argues thus: "We may trust the submarines to paralyse Great Britain by midsummer or a little later. I believe I can hold my own on the Western front, and do not mind yielding comparatively small areas here and there. Shortening my line will release a useful number of my divisions, without giving a corresponding advantage to the Allies. In six weeks' time I call begin a fresh offensive against Russia, where internal dissensions may turn to my advantage. To knock out Russia, while leaving our submarines to reduce the English to extremities, is now our best hope." This is a tentative discussion of alternative possibilities, and not a prophecy. I am not going to be rash enough to make any prediction at this time of day. It has to be observed that both alternates leave out of account the expected Allied offensive in the west. • Personally, I have only one conviction left about the future course of this war. I do not believe that Germany will throw up the sponge without endeavoring to seem to share this conviction, doubtless it will not disturb anybody. When I mention it, all the experts say is "Hush!" While we have every right .to'Jjjggjyni-

•couraged by the German retreat on the Somme, it would be tho maddest mistake to suppose that the Gernmns either know tlioy arc beaten or even think they are going to be beaten. They are still fighting to win and still believe tlioy have a chance of victory. They still dream of levying indemnities to pay the cost of the war. The ."till talk of retaining Belgium and the Baltic provinces of Russia, of making Antwerp a German port, of maintaining their grip on the French coal and iron fields. Merely to retort that I hoy are demented very foolish. Whit.' they hold such liugs areas of Allied territory they are at least not demented in their hopes. The next few months ar> going to transcend all tho previous stages of the war, and only by the most, gigantic and united efforts will the Allies be able to lay Germany in the dust.