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Taranaki Daily News, 9 May 1917, Page 4

GERMANY'S BLUNDERS. It was the fashion among the Allies towards midsummer 1918 to blame von Falkenhayn for seriotis blunders. But the blame really attached .to Germany's pre-war preparations, and to the whole theory of war which the patient industry of her General Staff had elaborated fo* so many years. They nad placed thejr money on a horse of surprising pace but of indifferent staying power over a long course. It is a little diffcult to see what other road von Falkenhayn could have taken. He had to speed up the conflict and attack somewhere. To hya the

dfentre of gravity lay in the West, and it is not easy to say that he was wrong. It' he could put Franco out of action, it would be impossible for Britain alone . to conduct the war on that front, and the Alliance must: crumble. Von Hindcnburg, it was understood, while agreeing on the necessity of an offensive somewhere, preferred the Kastern theatre. He would have had Germany remain strictly on the defensive in the West, while he endeavored to obtain a teal decision against Hußsia. It may fairly be said that both schemes were impossible, and it is idle to determine degrees of impossibility. An assault on Russia in the spring and summer of 1916 would undoubtedly have failed, as the march through Poland had failed the year before, Since von Palkenhayn's plan miscarried, the exponent of the untried plan increased his reputation, but there is no reason to believe that one was wiser than the other. The time had gone by for a decisive German offensive, and her tactical misconceptions were exacting their penalty. A new rtfi'enslvc indeed she must undertake, but its chance of forcing a decision had gone. The specki blunder of Germany at this stage, accord< mg to Buchan, did not lio onjy with the General Stall', but with the whole German authorities, civil, naval, and millU'ry, and with the German people. Since Vhe was clearly on the defence, it would have been well to take the measures proper to a defensive campaign. She was holding far-flung lines with too few men and the path of wisdom was obviously to shorten them. There ia some evidence that after the failure at Verdun the wiser brains in her Gtneral Staff favored this view. Bat in the then state of German opinion it was impracticable. When the people had been buoyed with hope of a triumphant peace and a vast increase at, territory, when the fanatics of Pan-Germanism were publishing details of how they intended to use the conquered areas, when the Imperial Chancellor was. lyrically apostrophising the map, a shortening of the lines in East and West would havfe tumbled dow;i the whole edifice of German confidence., ,She could not do it; her political commitments were too deep; her earlier vainglory sat like an Old Man of the Sea on her shoulders. Yet beyond doubt it was her best chance. Had she, bsfdre the Allied offensive began, drawn in her front to the Vistula and the .We.use, she would have had an immensely strong line, and adequate numbers wherewith to hold it would have offered the Allies the prospect of an interminable war, under conditions which they had fondly hoped they had made impossible Her one chance was to weaken ihe Alliance internally, to weary this or that Power, to lengthen out the contest to a'poiit where the cost in money and lives would induce a general nervelessness and satiety. Moreover, by shortening lwr lines her food problem would have become far less urgent, and the deadliness of th? blockade would have been lessened. But she let the moment for tiie heroic course slip by, and when the first guns opened in the combined Allied advan-e that course had become fir ever impossible.